



THE FATHER OF JIHAD

'Abd Alla'h 'Azza'm's Jihad Ideas and
Implications to National Security

Muhammad Haniff Hassan

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'Abd Allāh 'Azzām's Jihad Ideas and
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May the Force be with us, *Amin*.

Muhammad Haniff Hassan
Singapore, 2014

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Preface

This study revolves around the jihad ideas of `Abd Allāh `Azzām — an iconic figure in jihadist circles. To date there has been no single work in English dedicated to the study of his jihad ideas — a fact underscoring this study as an original academic contribution.

This study has several objectives. The first is to render an in-depth description of his ideas by way of a review of his writing, hitherto little referenced in the literature. The second objective is to identify how these ideas have inspired so many to participate in militant jihad in the Soviet–Afghan war, and indeed elsewhere. The third objective of this study is to highlight the internal contradictions and inconsistencies in `Azzām's ideas, and to juxtapose these ideas with contemporary jihadism. The fourth objective is to identify specific aspects of `Azzām's ideas in order to extract key lessons for counter-ideology work within the framework of counter-terrorism.

The primary approach of this study is that of a qualitative literature review of `Azzām's books, articles and transcripts of sermons and speeches. In analysing the text, the study applies Snow *et al.*'s framing method, used in the study of social movements as the key analytical tool.

Upon reviewing all of `Azzām's literature and other relevant published materials, the study concludes and makes three key arguments/observations on `Azzām's jihad ideas. The first is `Azzām's success in mobilising Muslims for jihad in Afghanistan was not due to his jihad ideas alone, although they mattered to him and were important tools for mobilisation. The study identifies two other

non-ideational structural factors that were critical in effecting his mobilisation. Secondly, some aspects of `Azzām's jihad ideas have serious implications on national security. Thirdly, some of `Azzām's jihad ideas diverge from dominant ideas held by current jihadist groups like Al-Qaeda and these could potentially be used to counter contemporary jihad ideas and practices of jihadists.

The study then addresses the above observations and all other issues arising from it with the objective of providing insights to delegitimise current jihadist ideology, thereby providing a means towards the mitigation of its threat to national and global security.

Transliteration Table

Arabic	Romanisation		Arabic	Romanisation
ا	‘		ط	ṭ
ب	b		ظ	ẓ
ت	t		ع	‘
ث	th		غ	gh
ج	j		ف	f
ح	ḥ		ق	q
خ	kh		ك	k
د	d		ل	l
ذ	dh		م	m
ر	r		ن	n
ز	z		و	w
س	s		ه	h
ش	sh		ء	a
ص	ṣ		ي	y
ض	ḍ			

Vowels		Long Vowels		Diphthongs	
اَ	a	اَ	ā	اَو	aw
اِ	i	اِ	ā	اِ	ay
اُ	u	اِ	ī		
		اُ	ū		

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Chapter 1

Jihad Ideas of `Abd Allāh `Azzām: Making the Case for a Case Study

1.1 Introduction

This is a study of the jihad ideas of `Abd Allāh `Azzām. Born in Palestine in 1941 and having migrated to Jordan when his hometown was occupied by Israel during the 1967 Six-Day war, he was an influential and iconic figure in jihadist circles due to his role as the key mobiliser of foreign volunteers and fighters when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. He was assassinated in a bombing on November 24, 1989.

Despite his revered status and important contribution to militant jihad, there has not been much study done on him and no single work in English has hitherto been dedicated to studying his jihad ideas.¹

The emergence of jihadist terrorism as one of the major contemporary global security threats makes this study not only of academic value, but also of strategic and operational importance to the current offensive on terrorism. This study endeavours to provide a greater understanding of the threat of jihadism and the methods for its mitigation.

¹There is a PhD dissertation in Hebrew about `Abd Allāh `Azzām. The dissertation was submitted by Asaf Maliach and endorsed by Bar-Ilan University in Israel in May 2006. The dissertation's title in English is *`Abd Allāh `Azzām and the Ideological Origins of Usāmah ibn Lādin's Worldwide Islamic Terrorism*. The dissertation was then largely used as basis for a book published in Hebrew in 2009. See Maliach and Shai (2009).

The study sets to achieve the following objectives:

- To provide an in-depth description of `Azzām's jihad ideas through a review of his ideological materials.
- To identify aspects of `Azzām's jihad ideas that has inspired many Muslims to participate in jihad in Afghanistan and perhaps elsewhere.
- To identify internal contradictions and inconsistencies in `Azzām's jihad ideas and also those that conflict with contemporary jihadism, thereby gaining insights into the security ramifications of his jihad ideas.
- To identify aspects of `Azzām's jihad ideas and practices which could be used to counter contemporary jihadism.

The primary approach of this study is that of a qualitative literature review of `Abd Allāh `Azzām's books, articles and transcripts of sermons and speeches. In analysing the text, the study applies Snow *et al.*'s framing method, used in the study of social movements as the key analytical tool.

Upon reviewing all of `Azzām's literature and other relevant published materials, the study concludes and makes three key arguments/observations on `Azzām's jihad ideas. The first is `Azzām's success in mobilising Muslims for jihad in Afghanistan was not due to his jihad ideas alone, although they mattered to him and were important tools of mobilisation. The study identifies two other non-ideational structural factors that were critical in effecting his mobilisation. These factors are: (1) precipitant events that provided justification for collective action frames and context for mobilisation, and (2) powerful allies that provided direct assistance for mobilisation or facilitated indirectly.

Secondly, there are two specific aspects of `Azzām's jihad ideas which have serious implications on national security: (1) the duty to reclaim all past Muslim territories that are currently part of, or occupied by, non-Muslim states, and (2) the duty to wage *jihād al-ṭalb* (offensive jihad) against non-Muslim territories until they are either part of *Dār Al-Islām* or submit to the rule of *Dār Al-Islām*.

The study explicates in detail how these two ideas could pose threats to state security.

Thirdly, some of `Azzām's jihad ideas diverge from dominant ideas held by current jihadist groups like Al-Qaeda. The study identifies these as rather "positive" implications of `Azzām's jihad ideas and practices because they could potentially be used to counter contemporary jihad ideas and practices of jihadists. Aspects of `Azzām's jihad ideas and practices identified under this category are his opposition to the acts of rebellion against Muslim rulers and prohibition of indiscriminate attacks, effecting attacks against the enemies outside conflict zones or in non-belligerent countries, and the use of terror tactics.

Based on the above findings, the study offers some recommendations that would contribute to the on-going counter-ideology work against jihadist groups.

Although the study of `Azzām's jihad ideas is significant to the understanding of contemporary jihadism, it must be highlighted at the onset that `Azzām is just one of many other ideologues that have contributed to the shaping of contemporary jihadism. Thus, more studies like this should be undertaken on other ideologues to uncover more insights in aid of the ongoing counter-ideology work against extremism and terrorism.

This chapter will introduce the foundation of this study. It seeks to answer the question, "Why study `Abd Allāh `Azzām's jihad ideas?" and demonstrate in detail the academic and practical value of this study. It will, (1) establish `Azzām as a prominent figure worthy of academic research and how his jihad ideas and practices are relevant to the current challenges of terrorism; (2) highlight the contribution that this study can make towards the body of knowledge in this field; (3) identify the research framework used in this study to achieve the above set objectives; and (4) illustrate how the study will be conducted.

This chapter is divided into three sections: (1) background; (2) justification for studying `Azzām; and (3) research plan.

The first section delineates the global security concern following the September 11, 2011 incident, prominently marking jihadism as

the source of threat. Countering jihadism has thus become a significant endeavour.

The second section proceeds with more background to the study. It is divided into two parts. The first highlights the important role played by the Soviet–Afghan war as the context that facilitated the emergence of `Azzām as a prominent jihad ideologue. The second part accords an account of `Azzām's life, and his role during the Soviet–Afghan war.

The third section illustrates how the study will be done. It defines the aim and objective of the study, its academic contribution, methodology it uses, its unit of analysis, research questions, assumptions and structures. Likewise, the chapter elucidates and vindicates the use of Snow *et al.*'s framing model as an analytical tool in deconstructing `Azzām's jihad ideas.

1.2 Background to the Study

1.2.1 *The threat of jihadist terrorism*

The most profound impact of the September 11 incident has been in the field of terrorism. Before this incident, terrorism was a local security concern, limited only to specific countries. However, September 11 elevated terrorism into a global security problem.

This change was due to the transnational character of the perpetrators and the extreme measures they were willing to take in waging wars against their enemies. These enemies are the United States, a large number of European countries and leaders of most Muslim countries who they perceive are collaborating with or supporting a modern “crusade” against Muslims. Countries such as Russia, India, the Philippines, China and Thailand are also seen as being guilty of committing atrocities against their Muslim citizens.

September 11 directly and indirectly led to the proliferation of terrorism in many parts of the world when it exposed the vulnerabilities of the “enemy” and the impact that terrorism could have on a target

country. Some examples are the Moscow theatre attack and Beslan hostage crisis.²

Widespread anger against the US-led military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq in response to September 11 led some Muslims to embrace the cause propagated by the perpetrators of September 11, resulting in the attacks in Madrid, London, Istanbul, Bali, Jakarta, Casablanca, Amman and Riyadh, to name a few. Some attempts such as the Singapore Jemaah Islamiyah plot,³ Richard Reid the “shoe bomber”⁴ and the José Padilla’s bomb making plan⁵ were successfully thwarted by the respective governments.

Conversely, September 11 led other terrorist groups to review their terror practices. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) for example has since discontinued the use of armed struggle.⁶ Indeed, with the initiatives taken against terrorism all over the world, some terrorist groups have been forced to cease operations so as to avoid being targeted and to ensure the survival of their respective causes.

Thus, the threat of terrorism today comes largely from a single source — jihadist groups.⁷ “Jihadist” refers to a person who subscribes to jihadism — an ideology that is committed to the establishment of an all-encompassing Islamic state so as to implement Islam as a way of life for all (Muslims and non-Muslims) through the violent dissolution of the existing international system.⁸

There are many jihadist groups that are operating in many parts of the world. Some are local in their characteristics and political objectives, while others are transnational. Al-Qaeda (also

²Chechen warlord claims theatre attack (2002); Dougherty (2004).

³Ministry of Home Affairs (2003). *The White Paper: The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism*. Singapore.

⁴Who is Richard Reid? (2001).

⁵Ripley (2002).

⁶Epstein (2005).

⁷*A Century Foundation Task Force Report* (2004), p. 1.

⁸Habeck (2004), p. 4; Kepel (2005), p. 15; Roshandel and Chadha (2006), p. 10; Phares (2005), p. 59.

known in Arabic as *Qā`idah Al-Jihād* or *Al-Qā`idah*) is regarded, at the time of writing, as the number one enemy at the international level for its transnational character and its “success,” especially after September 11.⁹

Jihadists consider it obligatory to establish Islamic states governed by legitimate Muslim rulers, as a means to achieving an Islamic way of life.¹⁰ However, it is important to note that not everyone who subscribes to the idea of Islam and an Islamic way of life are jihadists. Many Muslims, or for that matter Islamists, have different ideological understandings of jihad and seek to achieve this vision through peaceful or democratic means.¹¹

Jihadists hold the conviction that non-Muslims would never allow Muslims to live in peace and that armed jihad is the only means of attaining Islamic supremacy as pronounced by Usāmah ibn Lādin (a.k.a Bin Laden), “There is no way to obtain faithful strength but by returning to this jihad.”¹² In fact, in today’s context, jihadist groups consider jihad as *fard `ayn* (personal obligation) upon all Muslims due to the occupation and transgression over all lands from Andalusia (Spain) to Mindanao (Southern Philippines) that were previously part of the Islamic caliphate or under Muslim rule. Jihad, they believe, has to continue until all these lands have been returned to the domain of *Dār Al-Islām* (Land of Islam).¹³

⁹Meshal and Rosenthal (2005); Roshandel and Chadha (2006), pp. 17–37, 81.

¹⁰Kepel (2005), pp. 41–59; Gabriel (2006), pp. 65, 79, 81, 84, 89, 93; Roshandel and Chadha (2006), pp. 52, 53, 57, 62, 63; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (date not cited). *The 9/11 Commission Report*, pp. 50, 51.

¹¹Gerges (2005), p. 117; Desai (2006), pp. 23–27; Roshandel and Chadha (2006), p. 11.

¹²Arnett (1997). See also Al-Sa`di, AAA (1424 Hijrah calendar), pp. 26–27. Fas`alū Ahl Al-Dhikr: Fatāwā Fī Al-Jihād Wa Al-Siyāsah Al-Shar`iyah (1425 Hijrah calendar), pp. 37–38; Gabriel (2006), pp. 95, 102–105; Roshandel and Chadha (2006), pp. 6, 44–49.

¹³Declaration of war against Americans occupying the land of the two holy places. *PBS Online Newshour* (August 1996); World Islamic Front statement on jihad against Jews and crusaders, *Al-Quds Al-`Arabiy*, February 23, 1998; *Al-Jazeera* (2001); Text of Al-Qaeda’s statement (2001). *AP*, October 9; Bayān Min Al-Mujāhidīn Ilā Al-Ummah Al-Islāmiyah (1424 Hijrah calendar), pp. 25–30; Faraj (2010). Faraj was a leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad Organisation which Ayman Al-Zawahiri also belonged to, before its merger with Al-Qaeda. The book was the organisation primary reference for its ideology; Al-Baghdādīy (2010); Al-Ḥumaydiy, HAA (1423 Hijrah calendar); Roshandel and Chadha (2006), pp. 66, 67.

In waging armed jihad against the enemy, jihadist groups argue that targeting civilians and non-combatants is justified for the following reasons:

1. To avenge the blood of Muslim civilians shed by the enemy;
2. Because civilians in enemy states are responsible for the acts of their government by virtue of their voting their leaders to power and paying taxes, which are used against Muslims; and
3. It is necessary or an unavoidable evil for a greater good.¹⁴

On the issue of suicide bombing, jihadist groups generally regard it as *'amalīyat istishhādīyah* — martyrdom operations — and not suicide. Al-Qaeda's endorsement of martyrdom operations is clear, in both word and deed. Bin Laden specifically addresses this issue in one of his statements, "We stress the importance of the martyrdom operations against the enemy — operations that inflicted harm on the United States and Israel that have been unprecedented in their history, thanks to Almighty God."¹⁵

Jihadist groups also share some common perceptions. They see the world and world events in three ways: as binary views of "us versus them," i.e., *Dār Al-Islām* (Land of Islam) versus *Dār Al-Ḥarb* (Land of War); as conspiracies against them and through simplifications and generalisations.

On this binary view, Bin Laden expounds, "these incidents divide the world into two regions; one of faith where there is no hypocrisy and another of infidelity...."¹⁶ This binary view and its inherent hostility towards all non-Muslims poses a serious social problem in both Muslim and non-Muslim countries because it hampers peaceful and harmonious coexistence between Muslim and non-Muslim communities.

¹⁴*Ibid.*; Miller (1998); Text of Osama's message to US. *AFP*, October 30, 2004; Exclusive interview: Conversation with terror (1999). *Time*, January 11; Mir (2001); *Al-Jazeera* (2001). Text of Al-Qaeda's statement (2001). *AP*, October 9; Gabriel (2006), pp. 56, 57; Roshandel and Chadha (2006), pp. 76–80, 87–91.

¹⁵Bin Laden tape: Text (2003); Gabriel (2006), pp. 53–55; Roshandel and Chadha (2006), pp. 82–86.

¹⁶Bin Laden rails against crusaders and UN (2001); Bin Laden's warning: Full text (2001); Text of Al-Qaeda's statement (2001); Roshandel and Chadha (2006), p. 62.

The perception of an alliance of Jews and Christians against Muslims is prevalent and continuously emphasised in rhetorical discourse. All Jews and Christians are viewed in a simplistic, one-dimensional way, neglecting the heterogeneity and pluralistic nature of each community.¹⁷

International institutions like the United Nations and its conventions are seen with cynicism and are believed to be part of the Crusader-Zionist conspiracy against Muslims. They are viewed as *kufṛ* (infidel) systems. In 2004, Bin Laden even offered a gold reward for the killing of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.¹⁸

Jason Burke has described Al-Qaeda as “less an organization than an ideology,”¹⁹ a view that is shared by many other scholars.²⁰ Al-Qaeda uses its ideology to attract followers and win sympathy from Muslims. Al-Qaeda emphasises that it strives for Islam and represents true Islam by quoting verses from the *Qurān*, Prophet Muḥammad's traditions (*ḥadīth*) and opinions of classical Muslim scholars. It continuously uses *fatwā* (religious rulings) of various contemporary (and like-minded) Muslim scholars and would proffer its own opinion as *fatwā* for the Muslim *ummah*.²¹

¹⁷Declaration of war against Americans occupying the land of the two holy places (1996); World Islamic Front statement on jihad against Jews and crusaders (1998); *Al-Jazeera* (2001); Bin Laden rails against crusaders and UN (2001); Text of Al-Qaeda's statement (2001); Yūsuf ibn Ṣalīh Al-ʿUyayrīy, Al-Ṭarīq Ilā Arḍ Al-Maʿrakah (1425 Hijrah calendar), p. 36; ʿAbd Allāh ibn Nāṣir Al-Rashīd, Maqāṣid Al-Jihād: Al-Maqṣad Al-Thālith — Al-Nayl Min Al-Kāfirīn Wa Irhābihim (1425 Hijrah calendar), pp. 18, 46, 47; Gabriel (2006), pp. 87, 88; Roshandel and Chadha (2006), pp. 60, 61.

¹⁸Miller (1998); Translation of Bin Laden's audio message by Bioud (2004); Purported Bin Laden tape offers gold for Bremer (2004).

¹⁹Burke (2004), pp. 18, 19; Burke (2004).

²⁰Meshal and Rosenthal (2005), p. 290; Habeck (2004), p. 170; Desai (2006), p. viii; The Australian Government (2006), p. 8.

²¹Declaration of war against Americans occupying the land of the two holy places (1996); World Islamic Front statement on jihad against Jews and crusaders (1998); *Al-Jazeera* (2001); Bin Laden rails against crusaders and UN (2001); Text of Al-Qaeda's statement (2001); Full transcript of Bin Laden's speech (2004); Blanchard (2004); Brachman and McCants (2006), p. 315; Desai (2006), p. 19.

Even after a leader of Al-Qaeda is killed or captured, the ideology lives on, continuing to lead many others to strive and be ready to replace the fallen leaders.²²

The profiles of members of Al-Qaeda and the Al-Qaeda-linked Indonesian Jemaah Islamiyah²³ also reveal that they are ideologically driven. Ayman Al-Zawāhirīy, Al-Qaeda's current leader, was a physician. Khālīd Shaykh Muḥammad, head of Al-Qaeda's operations, obtained an engineering degree from an American university. Azahari Husin, the Jemaah Islamiyah bomb expert killed by Indonesia's anti-terrorism unit, had a doctoral degree from Britain's University of Reading,²⁴ and was a lecturer at Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (University of Technology Malaysia). At least two of the Jemaah Islamiyah members detained in Singapore had diplomas in engineering.²⁵ Jason Burke describes these jihadists as "intellectual activists"; "men who can justify their attraction to radical Islam in relatively sophisticated terms."²⁶ This trend can also be found in many jihadist groups apart from Al-Qaeda and its sister organisations.²⁷

The current information and communication technology, the Internet in particular, has facilitated the dissemination and accessibility of jihadism to youths who are increasingly frustrated with world events. Increasingly, individuals have collaborated on acts of terrorism on an ad hoc basis such as in Madrid on March 11, 2004, in London on July 7 and July 21, 2005, the attempted car bombing attacks in London on June 29, 2007 and Glasgow International Airport on June 30, 2007. On June 2, 2007, Singapore authorities announced the arrest of a Singaporean who was on route to Afghanistan to participate in jihad against the coalition forces after he was influenced by radical ideas via the Internet.²⁸

²²Al-`Irāqīy (2006); Scheuer (2008); Ali (2006).

²³International Crisis Group (2002).

²⁴Royal Malaysian Police (2002).

²⁵Ministry of Home Affairs (2002).

²⁶Burke (2004), p. 281.

²⁷Roshandel and Chadha (2006), pp. 99, 102, 103.

²⁸Kirkby (2007), p. 426; Bowman (2003), pp. 16–18; Laqueur (1999), pp. 265–269; Groetzel (2002), p. 109; Nesser (2006), pp. 329, 334; Meshal and Rosenthal (2005), pp. 281, 282; Mascini (2006), p. 351; Brachman and McCants, p. 316; Newman (2006), p. 753; Gerges (2006), pp. 20–39; Roshandel and Chadha (2006), pp. 106–117, 122–128; Ministry of Home Affairs (2007).

1.2.2 *The importance of counter-ideology*

The ideology of jihadist terrorism has been central in two ways. Firstly, it has provided a clear vision and a set of objectives for the existence of the jihadist group. Secondly, the ideology has legitimised acts of terrorism, and has become a means of gaining sympathy and support for their continued struggle. The centrality of jihadist ideology within these groups has led many to argue that the key in defeating it is in formulating a counter-ideology.

Stephen Biddle has asserted that the real enemy in the war against terrorism is Al-Qaeda's radical ideology. Countering jihadist terrorism requires the means to incarcerate the jihadists and the formulation of ideas to rehabilitate them or prevent the spread of radical ideas among Muslims. He is convinced that the key in the war against terrorism is to win over the hearts and minds of the politically uncommitted Muslims.²⁹ The battle against jihadist groups themselves has become increasingly complex as the ideology has taken on a trans-national flavour and motivates individuals with little or no allegiance to any particular group to take up the call for armed jihad and perpetrate terrorist acts.

Counter-ideology should be undertaken for the following reasons:

1. To inoculate general Muslims against the ideology.
2. To persuade less fanatic members of terrorist groups to abandon the ideology.
3. To create doubts and dissension within the terrorist organisation.
4. To rehabilitate detained terrorist members.
5. To present alternatives to terrorist ideology so as to minimise and alleviate conflicts between Muslims and non-Muslims that may be exploited by the jihadist.³⁰

Unless the ideology is defeated, counter-terrorism will fail because the ideology will help the group to be replenished with new recruits or inspire others take their initiatives.³¹

²⁹Biddle (2002), pp. 7, 8; Habeck (2004), p. 170.

³⁰Hassan (2006), pp. 565, 566; Habeck (2004), p. 172; Gabriel (2006), pp. 164–167, 181–183.

³¹Saniotis (2005), pp. 540–542; Desai (2006), pp. 12, 89, 131; Her Majesty Government (2006), pp. 9–13.

The first step to countering the ideology is to understand the main ideas of the jihadist groups, especially Al-Qaeda and its regional affiliates like Jemaah Islamiyah.

Sun Tzu wrote, “Know yourself and know your enemy.” Clear understanding of the ideology would also help to better identify the characteristics of these groups. To facilitate the mapping of these ideas, serious efforts should be put in place to collate and compile materials produced by the jihadists themselves. Naturally, studies on the key ideologues that shape jihadism have to be carried out also.³²

1.3 A Case for a Case Study

While scholars regarded `Abd Allāh `Azzām as one of the contemporary key ideologues and advocates of armed jihad, there has been a dearth of scholarly studies specifically on `Azzām’s jihad ideology. Searches made at prominent dissertation databases covering major universities in the United States, United Kingdom and Australia have not produced a single study specifically focused on `Azzām.³³

This section seeks to demonstrate the important role that `Azzām had played in the development of jihadism. The section is divided into two. The first places us during the Soviet–Afghan war which is the context within which `Azzām emerged as a prominent jihad ideologue. The second part of this section gives a biographical account of `Azzām’s life, and his role during the Soviet–Afghan war.

1.3.1 *The important role of the Soviet–Afghan war*

Jihadist terrorism is not a post-September 11 phenomenon. Egypt has been experiencing jihadist terrorism since late 1960s. Algeria also has a similar experience since the early 1990s after the military launched a coup against the Islamic party which had won the general election. Some Palestinian groups also use terrorism in their struggle against Israel. However, these activities had been largely local phenomenon.

³²Hassan (2006), pp. 566, 567; Caracci (2002), p. 58; Brachman and McCants (2006), p. 318.

³³See footnote 1 of this chapter.

The ideology of jihadist groups developed partly as a result of Islamic revivalism experienced since the early 20th century. Individuals like Jamāl Al-Dīn Al-Afghānīy, Muḥammad 'Abduh³⁴ and Rashīd Riḍa have had tremendous influence.

Their efforts were later continued by Ḥasan Al-Bannā, the founder, in 1928, of the Muslim Brothers which has been regarded as the largest Muslim revivalist movement. The Jamaat Islami movement founded by Abū Al-A'lā Al-Mawdūdīy has had a significant presence and influence in the Indian sub-continent and in Islamic movements in the West founded by revivalist Muslims from the sub-continent.

In Egypt, the anti-colonial teachings of Al-Bannā and the Muslim Brothers drew harsh suppression from the ruling regime. Al-Bannā was assassinated while many of his followers and other activists were arrested and brutally tortured. The extent of the brutality left such deep hatred and vengeance in the hearts and minds of the detainees that they became even more determined to resist the regime through even more radical means. The ideas which

³⁴It must be noted that putting Al-Afghānīy and 'Abduh within the context of the development of jihadism here does not imply a causal link. They are included in the chain of development because the reform spirit that they propagated had tremendous impact on Muslim movements in the 20th century. Their call for reform, spurred Muslim activists to revive the ummah from decadence by returning to the religion's original sources — a mission shared by jihadists, albeit with some differences. The jihadists believe that Muslims can only bring back their past glory by strictly following the way of the early Muslims (*salaf*) and cleansing themselves from non-Muslim influences, whereas Al-Afghānīy and 'Abduh were open to learning from non-Muslims in facing modern challenges, despite their critique of the West. In fact, Al-Afghānīy and 'Abduh's ideas, as a whole, are in contradiction to the jihadists' to the extent that both men were branded by the militants as heretics. 'Azzām was one of the harshest critics. He denounced and accused both of them of collaborating with western colonial to westernise Muslims. 'Azzām claimed both were members of freemasonry which was a zionist cover. The merit of including Al-Afghānīy and 'Abduh in the chain here is that, it provides the bigger picture and brings a point that influences that shape radicalism are not restricted to the radical domain.

See El-Fadl (2006), pp. 37, 38, 75–94; Haykel (2009), pp. 45, 46; Meijer (2009), pp. 7, 8; Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Khaṭ Al-Taḥawwul Al-Tārīkhīy* (Point of historic transformation), pp. 3, 7, 17, 18; Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Tujjār Al-Ḥurūb* (War traders), pp. 17; 'Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Al-'Aqīdah Wa Atharuhā Fī Binā' Al-Jayl* (Islamic creed and its effects on development), p. 18.

fermented in these prison experiences were propagated by those who were released from detention. One of these important figures, Sayyid Quṭb, published *Maālīm Fī Al-Ṭarīq* (Milestones), which continues to be a manifesto for many extremist and jihadist groups.³⁵

Revivalism took on a new intensity at the end of 1960s and after 1973. In 1967, the Muslim world experienced extreme humiliation when Israel defeated Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian forces during the Six-Day war. Palestine, Sinai, the Golan Heights, West Bank and most importantly East Jerusalem, where the Al-Aqṣā Mosque is located, fell to Israel. This defeat was seen as proof of the failure of Arab socialist nationalism in safeguarding Muslim interests. The episode gave legitimacy to Muslim revivalist movements and many started looking towards Islam as the source of solutions for their problems. It was against this background that early jihadist groups emerged in Egypt.³⁶

The oil crisis of 1973 provided Muslim oil-producing countries with large financial gains which Saudi Arabia in particular used to propagate their brand of Islam all over the world and which concurrently heightened Islamic revivalism.³⁷ This movement intensified in 1979 with the success of the Iranian revolution, under the leadership of Ayat Allāh Khomeynī (a.k.a Ayatollah Khomeini), against a tyrannical ruler supported by major powers. Analysts have suggested that the fear of the spread of Islamic revivalism in the energy-rich Muslim-dominated region of Central Asia may have motivated the Soviet Union to invade Afghanistan.³⁸

It has been argued that the Soviet–Afghan war which began in 1979 was responsible for the widespread proliferation of jihadism and its transformation to a transnational movement.³⁹ David C. Rapoport, in describing what he calls the “religious wave” of

³⁵Kepel (2005), pp. 25–27, 40, 41, 57, 73; Gabriel (2006), pp. 20–26, 29–36, 39, 40; Kamāl (2002); Phares (2005), pp. 61–67; Roshandel and Chadha (2006), pp. 65, 103.

³⁶Gerges (2006), p. 11.

³⁷Desai (2006), pp. 29, 30; Roshandel and Chadha (2006), pp. 13, 14.

³⁸Johnson (2002), pp. xii–xiv.

³⁹Shay (2002), p. 40; Clarke (2004), p. 36; Phares (2005), pp. 115, 116; Roshandel and Chadha (2006), pp. 14–17.

terrorism views the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 as a “political turning point that was vital to launch the fourth [religious] wave.”⁴⁰ The other two key events were the Iranian revolution and the millennial expectations at the start of a new Islamic century. Mark Sedgwick, who takes a different approach in analysing the history of terrorism, classifies the Afghan wave as the fourth distinctive wave of terrorism after the Italian, German and Chinese waves.⁴¹

The invasion of Afghanistan was regarded not only as an act of aggression against Afghan Muslims but also as a serious threat to other Muslim countries and Islam due to the atheist character of the invading country and its track record in oppressing Muslims. The invasion became a rallying call for jihad and Muslims all over the world were mobilised for financial support and to participate directly as fighters. Jihad in Afghanistan became a cause that all Muslims, whether moderate or radical, identified with.⁴²

Tens of thousands of Muslims answered the call and joined the jihad in Afghanistan in the years after the invasion. Training camps, set up by various Muslim organisations, were constructed to host, train and indoctrinate them. Campaigns to support jihad in Afghanistan and the constant media coverage on it contributed in socialising the idea of armed jihad among Muslims. Those who volunteered became fascinated with armed jihad and embraced it as their way of life.⁴³ They were rewarded when the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989 and the Afghan communist regime fell in 1992. The experiences of these “Afghan alumni” reinforced their ideology and made their ideas more resilient.⁴⁴ The cross-fertilisation of ideas and the proliferation of political Islam among traditional Afghans, the people of the region and Muslims at large, evolved into

⁴⁰Rapoport (2004), p. 61.

⁴¹Sedgwick (2007), pp. 106, 107.

⁴²Kepel (2003), pp. 8, 144, 219, 315; Mamdani (2004), pp. 127, 129, 131; *A Century Foundation Task Force Report* (2004), p. 9.

⁴³Abuza (2003), pp. 6, 8, 10, 11, 91; Mamdani (2004), pp. 126, 129, 131; *A Century Foundation Task Force Report* (2004), p. 9; Shay (2002), p. 40.

⁴⁴Kepel (2003), pp. 9, 18, 219, 315.

jihadism and have had tremendous social and political impact in many parts of the world such as Palestine, Algeria and Sudan.⁴⁵

The formation of *Ḥamās* in the occupied territories of Palestine was inspired by the jihad in Afghanistan. `Azzām, a Palestinian, was reported to have contributed directly to its formation. The battlefields of Afghanistan allowed many *Ḥamās* activists and other Palestinians to acquire military skills and real combat experiences that were not possible in the occupied territories. The widespread proliferation of political Islam contributed to the popularity of *Ḥamās*, propelled the Islamic party's win in Algeria's general election and facilitated the military coup in Sudan in 1989.⁴⁶

The fall of Kabul in 1992 also made many foreign fighters redundant and the subsequent civil wars between various Afghan factions caused many of them to leave the country. However, many of them could not return to their country of origin for fear of arrest and persecution. Others wanted to continue their jihad adventure elsewhere. The dispersal of these battle-hardened and jihad-indoctrinated fighters contributed to the proliferation of political violence in places like Bosnia, Chechnya, Algeria, Somalia, Sudan, Central Asia and Kashmir.⁴⁷

The end of the Soviet–Afghan war also contributed to the existence of a small but significant mass of Muslims who were available for military recruitment.⁴⁸

The confidence gained from the successful jihad against a super-power also redirected the target of jihad. Before the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, the jihadist groups were more concerned with waging jihad against the “near enemies,” which were the local regimes, they viewed as corrupt, ruling Muslim countries. Since the near enemy's survival depended on support from the “far enemy,” namely the United States, it would be more effective —

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 9, 137, 142, 143, 233; Al-Zayyat (2004), pp. 10, 33; Gerges (2005), pp. 80–87, 118.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁴⁷Amanat (2001), pp. 140, 141; Shay (2002), pp. 123–131, 136, 137; Mamdani (2004), pp. 129, 130; Hut (2003), p. 79; Rapoport (2004), p. 62.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 140, 141, 147; *A Century Foundation Task Force Report* (2004), p. 9; Phares (2005), p. 115; Rashid (2001), pp. 130–140.

and economical — for them to confront the “far enemy.” They hope that its defeat will cause the subsequent collapse of the “near enemy,” just like the defeat of the Soviet Union. This was compounded by the continuous presence of the United States’ military forces in Saudi Arabia which Bin Laden wanted to be freed of infidels. This subsequently led to the occurrence of jihadist terrorism against the interests of the “far enemy” such as the attack on the USS Cole in Yemen and the bombings in Africa, Riyadh and Bali.⁴⁹

Thus, jihad in Afghanistan contributed directly to the emergence of prominent individuals and groups promoting and practicing jihadism. Among the individuals were Bin Laden, former head of Al-Qaeda and its current head Aymān Al-Zawahiri, leader of foreign fighters in Chechnya Ibn Al-Khattāb, and operational head of the first Bali bombing Imam Samudra. The prominent groups are Al-Qaeda, Taliban, Abū Sayyāf in Southern Philippines and Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia.⁵⁰

Like any other conflict, war in Afghanistan gave rise to millions of refugees and orphans, precipitating a humanitarian crisis. Most of the refugees were concentrated along the Afghan–Pakistan border. The magnitude of the crisis invited humanitarian assistance in the form of education for Afghan children and orphans. *Madrasah* (Islamic schools) mushroomed in the border areas. From these *madrasah*, emerged the Taliban (literally, “students”) who were responsible for much of the current threat of jihadist terrorism.

It was during the Taliban’s rule of Afghanistan that Al-Qaeda, under the leadership of Bin Laden, had a safe haven to train its fighters and to plan and execute terrorist attacks including the September 11 incident. Most of terrorist attacks after September 11 were also committed by Al-Qaeda.⁵¹

⁴⁹Gerges (2005), pp. 9–15; Bruce (1995), pp. 175–179; Roshandel and Chadha (2006), pp. 72, 73.

⁵⁰Mamdani (2004), pp. 132, 136, 155–158, 161–163; Shay (2002), pp. 138–140; Hut (2003), p. 76; Roshandel and Chadha (2006), pp. 17–37.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, pp. 136, 161–163, 155–158; Rashid (2001), p. viii; Al-Zayyat (2004), pp. 11, 52, 59; Brooks (2005), pp. 77, 78; Amanat (2001), pp. 37–39; Hut (2003), p. 78; Mohan (2004), pp. 206–220; Dunne (2002), p. 32; Roshandel and Chadha (2006), pp. 8, 9.

1.3.2 `Abd Allāh `Azzām: His life and role during the Soviet–Afghan War

As indicated in the preceding section, the Soviet–Afghan conflict captured the imagination of the entire Muslim world. Against this backdrop, `Azzām, whose jihad ideas are the subject of this study, emerged as the key protagonist. Rationalising this process of emergence, which this section seeks to address, requires the exposition of significant aspects of his past.

`Abd Allāh Yūsuf `Azzām (1941–1989) was born to Al-Ḥāj Yūsuf Mustafā `Azzām and Zakīyyah Ṣālih Ḥusayn Al-Aḥmad in a neighbourhood known as Ḥārat Al-Shawāhinah within Sāilat Al-Ḥārithiyah village in the Jenin district of central north Palestine. Today, it is located within the West Bank territory occupied by Israel. His mother died in 1988 and his father in 1990.

`Azzām was known to be an intelligent student and a pious child with an innately serious disposition. He participated in proselytising activities and joined the Muslim Brothers before he had even come of age. Even at a young age, `Azzām's intelligence shone brightly and he excelled so much that the leader of the Muslim Brothers in Jordan constantly visited the village to keep abreast of `Azzām's development.

`Azzām attended elementary and secondary schools in his village. He then continued his education at Khaḍūrīyyah Agricultural College in Tulkarem, where he obtained a diploma with distinction.

Upon graduating from college, `Azzām embarked on a teaching career. Due to differences between `Azzām and the dean of the college, he was posted far away to a village named Adr in the Kirk district of Jordan. A year later, he was transferred to another school in the West Bank. Because of his qualifications, `Azzām was also an agricultural supervisor in the village where he lived.⁵²

⁵²Fāyiz (1990), pp. 30, 31; Ismā`īl (1990), p. 54; Calvert (2007), pp. 85, 86; *azzam.com*; Omar (1996); Kamāl (2002); Ruthven (2002), p. 202; Muḥammad (1990), p. 55; Jarar (1990), pp. 17–19.

In 1965, `Azzām married a girl from Tulkarem whose father was a close family friend. He was blessed with five sons and three daughters from this marriage.⁵³

`Azzām had a strong religious disposition and was passionate about *sharī`ah* (Islamic law). He enrolled himself into the Faculty of *Sharī`ah* in Damascus University where he earned his first degree in *sharī`ah* in 1966.

His unwavering religious outlook during his study in Damascus brought him into contact with many Muslim scholars and leaders of the Islamic movement in the Levant (Syria) such as Dr. Muḥammad Aḍīb Al-Ṣāliḥ, Shaykh Sa`īd Hawwā and Dr. Sa`īd Ramaḍān Al-Buḥīy who were all prominent leaders of the Muslim Brothers in Syria, and Mullā Ramaḍān who was a distinguished scholar of the Shāfi`īy school of jurisprudence in the Levant. `Azzām also read the works of Hasan Al-Bannā and Sayyid Quṭb.

Upon graduation, `Azzām returned to the West Bank, but this turned out to be a short stay. In 1967, the West Bank was invaded and captured by Israel during the Six-Day war. `Azzām was determined to resist the occupation but the village elders prevented him for fear of their life and property. Unable to accept the fall of his birthplace and life under the occupation of Israel, `Azzām migrated to Jordan where he became a teacher in Al-Tāj secondary school for girls.

He travelled to Saudi Arabia to work as teacher there in 1968 but returned back to Amman a year later.

From Amman, `Azzām actively resisted the occupation in Palestine. He trained himself in weaponry and organised a group of youths after consulting with the Islamic movements in Jordan. He joined like-minded Islamic resistance groups at the Al-Shuyūkh base and also helped to train fighters under the leadership of Marwān Ḥaḍīd, who opposed the Syrian government. `Azzām became the commander of the Bayt Al-Maqdis base, a branch of the Al-Shuyūkh base.⁵⁴

`Azzām's exploits eventually received the attention of the Israeli forces that occupied the West Bank. His father was reported to

⁵³Ismā`īl (1990); Jarar (1990), p. 38.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*; Fāyiz (1990), pp. 31–33; Al-`Assāl (1990), p. 44; Calvert (2007), p. 86; *azzam.com*; Kamāl (2002); Al-`Āmir (1990), p. 55; Jarar (1990), p. 21.

have said that the occupying forces offered money for him to dissuade `Azzām from continuing his resistance. When this failed, they employed more aggressive methods and unsuccessfully urged `Azzām's father to lure him to Palestine.⁵⁵

`Azzām's involvement in resistance operations did not stop him from continuing his religious education. He enrolled, and later graduated at, Al-Azhar University's Master program in *sharī`ah*. In June 1970, rebellion by the Palestinian resistance groups erupted against the Jordanian government. After months of fighting, Jordanian armed forces expelled these Palestinian resistance groups. When armed resistance activities in Jordan against Israel were subsequently banned, `Azzām's jihad activities were seriously curtailed.⁵⁶ He became disillusioned when he found that the members of the resistance movements were not performing their obligations as Muslims, committed acts which were forbidden in Islam and were influenced by leftist ideology. His efforts in promoting Islam among the fighters were resisted and the last straw came when a Palestinian fighter told him that Fatah — the main faction within the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) — has no religion behind it. `Azzām ceased his involvement in Palestinian armed resistance activities⁵⁷ and took up teaching again as a lecturer at the Jordan University in Amman. In 1971, he pursued a PhD at Al-Azhar University and graduated in 1973 with a doctorate in *Uṣūl Al-Fiqh* (Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence).⁵⁸

While in Cairo, `Azzām got acquainted with the family of the late Sayyid Quṭb, who had a tremendous influence on him. `Azzām was reported to have said, "Four people influenced me in my life; Ibn Taymīyyah on creed and theology, Ibn Al-Qayyim on etiquette, Al-Nawawīy on jurisprudence and Sayyid Quṭb on worldview."⁵⁹

⁵⁵Ismā`īl (1990), p. 54; Hegghammer (2011), pp. 86, 87.

⁵⁶Fāyiz (1990), p. 32; Ismā`īl (1990), pp. 34, 35; Al-`Assāl (1990), p. 44; Al-`Āmir (1990), p. 57.

⁵⁷Schwartz (2003); Kamāl (2002).

⁵⁸Espósito (2002), p. 32; Ismā`īl (1990), pp. 34, 35; Al-`Assāl (1990), p. 44; *azzam.com*; Al-`Āmir (1990); Jarar (1990).

⁵⁹Al-Baghḍādīy (1990), p. 38; Calvert (2007), p. 87; McGregor (2003).

After completing his PhD in Cairo, `Azzām returned to Jordan University and had a short stint with the Jordanian Ministry of Religious Affairs and Endowment. He later joined the *Sharī'ah* Faculty at Jordan University where he became involved in Islamic movement activities. His outspoken manner in criticizing the Jordanian government got him expelled from the university in 1979.⁶⁰

He left for Saudi Arabia and was soon teaching at King `Abd Al-`Azīz University.⁶¹ It was in Saudi, in the grand mosque of Mecca, that `Azzām met with Kamāl Al-Sanānīrīy, an Egyptian member of the Muslim Brothers and the brother-in-law of Sayyid Quṭb. Al-Sanānīrīy was on his way to survey the situation in Afghanistan and organise assistance for the Afghan fighters on a full-time basis. He urged `Azzām to join his mission and take up a similar path.⁶² Although Al-Sanānīrīy was arrested in 1981 by the Egyptian authority and subsequently died in prison, his role in persuading `Azzām proved to be a significant turning point in mobilising Muslims for jihad in Afghanistan.⁶³

`Azzām soon made arrangements to fulfil his mission. In 1984, he joined the International Islamic University in Islamabad, Pakistan as a lecturer. It was reported that he got himself seconded from King `Abd `Al-Azīz University to the university,<sup>64</sup> so he could be closer to Afghanistan. There he became acquainted with the leaders of the Afghan resistance groups. In 1986, when his teaching contract expired and was not renewed by the Saudi University, `Azzām decided to take up jihad in Afghanistan as his full-time profession.

To facilitate his mission, he relocated to Peshawar, a town in the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan, closer to the border of Afghanistan and where most Afghan fighters groups were based.⁶⁵

⁶⁰Fāyiz (1990); Ismā'īl (1990).

⁶¹Al-`Assāl (1990); McGregor (2004), p. 275.

⁶²Fāyiz (1990).

⁶³Al-Sanānīrīy (1990).

⁶⁴*Minbar Al-Tawhīd Wa Al-Jihād*, Short biography of `Abd Allāh `Azzām; Calvert (2007); *azzam.com*; Coll (2004).

⁶⁵Al-`Assāl (1990); Omar (1996).

`Azzām was responsible for mobilising Muslims for the jihad in Afghanistan. He travelled all over the world highlighting that the problems in Afghanistan were that of the whole Muslim *ummah* as well. In his tours, he raised the Muslims awareness about jihad and encouraged them to join the fight. Thousands of Muslims answered his call to jihad.⁶⁶

In describing `Azzām, Chris A Suellentrop wrote:

“Political Islam’s Great Communicator and traveling salesman, Azzam trotted the globe during the 1980s to promote the Afghan jihad against the Soviets. By the time of his death in 1989, he had recruited between 16,000 and 20,000 mujahideen from 20 countries to Afghanistan, visited 50 American cities to advance his cause, and dispatched acolytes to spread the gospel in 26 US states, not to mention across the Middle East and Europe.”⁶⁷

`Azzām frequently travelled to Afghanistan to motivate the fighters in the frontlines, get updates and understand the conditions inside the country. He travelled to the mountainous region of Hindukush and lived for a month with Aḥmad Shah Mas`ūd, the famous Afghan commander known as the Lion of Panjsher, and wrote a special book about his experience with him.

It was reported that after resigning from the International Islamic University in Islamabad, `Azzām worked for a Saudi-based organisation, *Rābitat Al-`Ālam Al-Islāmīy* (Muslim World League). He ran its aid operations that provided financial assistance to the Afghan people in Pakistan.⁶⁸

Later, he founded his own independent aid agency known as *Maktab Al-Khidmāt Li Al-Mujāhidīn* (Office for *Mujāhidīn* Services). The aid agency was a front for other activities such as creating awareness and support for jihad in Afghanistan, and providing

⁶⁶Fāyiz (1990); Ismāīl (1990); Al-Baghdādīy (1990); Ruthven (2002); Conboy (2006), p. 40; McDermott (2005).

⁶⁷Suellentrop (2002).

⁶⁸*Minbar Al-Tawhīd Wa Al-Jihād*, Short biography of `Abd Allāh `Azzām; Omar (1996); Kamāl (2002).

services for the foreign volunteers in Afghanistan. This agency had a sister agency, an affiliate in the United States known as *Al-Kifāh* Afghan Refugee Centre in Brooklyn. It was from this set up that a core group of individuals under the leadership of Bin Laden emerged, and later formed what is known today as *Qa'idāt Al-Jihād* or Al-Qaeda.⁶⁹

'Azzām used the media to spread his campaign for jihad in Afghanistan. He wrote books about Afghanistan. Three of his most important works are *Al-Difā' 'An Araḍī Al-Muslimīn* (Defence of the Muslim Lands), *Ilhaq Bī Al-Qāfilah* (Join the Caravan) and *Ayāt Al-Rahmān Fī Jihād Al-Afghān* (The Signs of Al-Rahmaan in the Jihad of the Afghan). These books were widely distributed and translated into various languages. His book, *Defence of the Muslim Lands* was endorsed by many Muslim scholars at that time such as 'Abd Al-'Azīz ibn Bāz, the Grand Muftī of Saudi Arabia; Muḥammad Najīb Al-Mu'tīy, a renowned Egyptian scholar; Sa'id Hawwā, a leader of the Syrian Muslim Brothers; 'Umar Sayyāf, Grand Chair of the 'Ulamā' in Sanaa, Yemen; and 'Abd Allāh Nāṣih Al-'Ulwān, a Professor in Jeddah.⁷⁰

He also published an Arabic monthly magazine, *Al-Jihād*, with the primary objective of disseminating news and developments in the armed operations of Afghan and foreign fighters. The magazine was distributed to many Muslim countries. A weekly newsletter *Lahīb Al-Ma'rakah* (In the Heat of Battle) was published to meet readers' demand for quick updates from Afghanistan. These publications played significant roles in creating jihad awareness, mobilising support and recruiting volunteers. Maktab Al-Khidmāt also internationally distributed hundreds of cassettes containing 'Azzām's sermons, speeches, and videos of jihad operations in Afghanistan. These materials were freely copied and redistributed

⁶⁹Brooks (2005), pp. 66, 71, 77, 78; Rapoport (2004); Suellentrop (2002); Calvert (2007); McGregor (2003); Steven and Gunaratna (2004); Nokhcho and Howard (2004); Ruthven (2002); Conboy (2006), p. 40; Brachman (2006); Beitter (2006); Schwartz (2003).

⁷⁰'Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Al-Difā' 'An Araḍī Al-Muslimīn Aham Furūd Al-A'yān. Minbar Al-Tawhīd Wa Al-Jihād*; Kamāl (2002).

again. All these efforts helped to finance and recruit volunteers for his campaign.⁷¹

`Azzām also commissioned the 11-volume *Mawsūat Al-Jihād Al-Afghanīy* (The Encyclopaedia of the Afghan Jihad), but was unable to witness its completion. The encyclopaedia became an important training manual for jihadists.⁷²

Among the important individuals who were recruited into jihad in Afghanistan through `Azzām's efforts was Bin Laden, the son of a wealthy Saudi building contractor who later inherited a fortune after his father's death. Bin Laden reportedly had his first contact with `Azzām when he studied in the same university in Jeddah where `Azzām was a lecturer. Later, Bin Laden joined `Azzām in Peshawar for a short period before returning to Saudi Arabia. After making some preparation and arrangement, Bin Laden travelled again to Peshawar to dedicate himself fully to jihad, just like `Azzām.

In the beginning, the relationship between `Azzām and Bin Laden was excellent. Bin Laden benefited from `Azzām's spiritual guidance and ideological indoctrination and `Azzām benefited from Bin Laden's strong financial assistance that poured into his agency *Maktab Al-Khidmāt*.

After a few years, there were disagreements on the management of foreign volunteers, the use of aid resources and the employment of battle tactics. `Azzām felt that the foreign volunteers should not operate independently from local Afghan jihad organisations, commanders and fronts. He also considered that the money and materials donated by Muslims all over the world for jihad in Afghanistan should only be used for the intended purpose and cannot be diverted for jihad in other places. Furthermore, the gravity of the situation in Afghanistan necessitated that priorities for jihad be given to Afghanistan. `Azzām believed that all Muslims must join jihad in Afghanistan unless they were already in Palestine.

⁷¹ Al-Baghdādīy (1990), p. 37; Zaydān (1990); *azzam.com*; McGregor (2003); Kamāl (2002).

⁷² McGregor (2003).

`Azzām was also against the indiscriminate killings of innocent lives practiced by the Egyptian groups.⁷³

Bin Laden, however, wanted to run his jihad operations independently. This was partly due to prevalent views among Arabs volunteers that the Afghans were inferior to the Arabs in religious disposition and character. His close association with leaders of Egyptian groups led by Ayman Al-Zawāhirīy had also led him to channel some of the resources for jihad to Egypt. This implicitly endorsed the tactics already used there. In 1986, Bin Laden left Maktab Al-Khidmāt and stopped his financial assistance. He set up his own guesthouses for foreign volunteers, training camps and fronts. Both `Azzām and Bin Laden, however, maintained a cordial relationship and mutual respect for one another. At a later period, Bin Laden reportedly sided with Hekmatyar, a leader of an Afghan fighting group known as Hezb Islami, against Aḥmad Shāh Mas`ūd, a prominent field commander of the Afghan Jamaat Islami group who was popularly known as the Lion of Panjshir Valley, while `Azzām's position was to mediate between them.⁷⁴

`Azzām's efforts for jihad in Afghanistan were not without criticism. Some criticised him for highlighting only the positive aspects of jihad in Afghanistan in order to recruit volunteers and supports. His fellow Palestinians criticised him for giving priority to jihad in Afghanistan instead of Palestine. Others felt that the Afghans needed material support rather than more manpower.⁷⁵

Although `Azzām was busy with jihad in Afghanistan, he did not forget his homeland, Palestine. He constantly reminded Muslims about the obligation of jihad in Palestine. He kept himself updated with the developments there and used his work to build networks with the Palestinian Islamic groups. He trained members

⁷³Roshandel and Chadha (2006); Steven and Gunaratna (2004); Nokhcho and Howard (2004); Ruthven (2002); Conboy (2006), p. 40, McDermott (2005), pp. 102, 121, 125, 155; Clarke (2006), p. 153; Coll (2004), pp. 155, 156, 163, 164; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (date not cited). *9/11 Commission Report*, pp. 50, 51; Gerges (2006), pp. 122, 123.

⁷⁴The will of `Abd Allāh `Azzām (Arabic); Suellentrop (2002); Kamāl (2002); Ramakrishna (2006); Coll (2004); Rashid (2001).

⁷⁵Al-Baghdādīy (1990); Al-Hārithīy (1990); `Ādil (1990); Kamāl (2002).

of the Palestinian Islamic groups in Afghanistan with the clear objective that they would be fighting for Palestine. He helped to found Ḥamās, which later become a potent Islamic resistance front against the Israeli occupying forces and one of many platforms that promoted jihad awareness among Muslims all over the world.⁷⁶

`Azzām also played an important role in maintaining unity among various Afghan groups. He often mediated between the Afghan groups as most Afghan leaders respected his status as a scholar, foreign volunteer and for the assistance that he provided.⁷⁷

Naturally, the prominent role played by `Azzām made him a target for assassination. He escaped at least one attempt on his life at a mosque frequented by Afghan Arabs where an anti-tank mine rigged with two kilograms of TNT was found and defused. It was planted under the pulpit of the mosque from which `Azzām was to deliver a Friday sermon few weeks before his assassination. In November 24, 1989, however, his enemy got him. He was killed with two of his sons, Muḥammad and Ibrāhīm, and the son of his best friend Shaykh Tamīm Al-`Adnānīy, who was the manager at *Maktab Al-Khidmāt*, while they were on their way to *Sab`i Al-Layl* mosque for Friday prayer. `Azzām was driving his car in a congested lane when few bombs were detonated.⁷⁸

Until now, there has not been any conclusive evidence pinpointing the perpetrator behind the assassination. The list of suspects includes, (1) the United States who feared that `Azzām's jihad ideology and anti-Americanism threatened its interests; (2) Israel's Mossad because of `Azzām's influence on Ḥamās; (3) the Soviet Union because of `Azzām's role in Afghanistan; (4) Pakistan's security services; (5) Afghan communist factions; (6) Iran or Shiite (*Shī'ah*) communities; (7) Other Afghan Arabs who had ideological differences with `Azzām and saw him as a

⁷⁶Suellentrop (2002); Kamāl (2002).

⁷⁷Rafiq (1990); Coll (2004).

⁷⁸`Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Al-As'ilah Wa Al-Ajwibah Al-Jihādīyah* (Questions and answers on jihad), 8–9, p. 4; Fāyiz (1990); *azzam.com*; Kamāl (2002).

stumbling block to their future ambitions. There were also those who accused `Azzām of being a CIA agent which made him an apostate for collaborating with the non-Muslim enemy and, thus, a legitimate target.⁷⁹

To conclude, `Azzām's role during the Soviet–Afghan war period had tremendous contributions to the current state of national and international security, and can be described thus:

1. A jihad advocate who raised jihad awareness among Muslims all over the world and rallied them to participate and support jihad in Afghanistan.
2. A commander for foreign volunteers in Afghanistan, training them for jihad and deploying them to various fronts.
3. An ideologue who constructed jihad ideology to mobilise Muslims and indoctrinate fighters.
4. The founder of *Maktab Al-Khidmāt* which, whether intended or not, later transformed into Al-Qaeda.
5. A mentor to Bin Laden who went on to become the leader of Al-Qaeda, the leading jihadist organisation today.⁸⁰

Although there were other individuals such as scholars and preachers who contributed to jihad in Afghanistan, none of them could compare to the roles that `Azzām played.⁸¹

`Azzām left behind ideological legacies in jihad books, articles and audio cassette materials. Some of his cassettes have been transcribed into reading material for publication and distribution, and many of these are available online.

`Azzām also left behind an institutional legacy, the *Maktab Al-Khidmāt*, including its networks of support, thousands of trained

⁷⁹McGregor (2003); Zaidān AM (1410 Hijrah calenda). *Qatl Al-Shaykh `Abd Allāh `Azzām: Khuṭwah Nahw Afghinat Al-Jihād Al-Afghāni Al-Bayān*, 26; Calvert (2007); Kamāl (2002); Khan (2004); Ruthven (2002), p. 211; McDermott (2005), pp. 96, 97.

⁸⁰Al-Baghdādīy (1990); Al-`Assāl (1990); Al-Ḥalabawīy (1990); Rafiq (1990); *azzam.com*; McGregor (2004); Ruthven (2002); Clarke (2006); Esposito (2002); Roshandel and Chadha (2006).

⁸¹Al-Baghdādīy (1990).

and battle-hardened fighters and thousands more of ordinary Muslims who were sympathetic to his idea and ever willing to offer their support.⁸²

Unfortunately, his intellectual legacies have been manipulated to promote jihadism that has led to the September 11 incident.

`Azzām's biography has raised a few interesting issues for research, one of which is the differences which he had with Bin Laden and other key players during the Afghan jihad period. These differences had been raised by academicians and individuals who were involved in jihad during the same period, and can also be found in `Azzām's works. The questions of whether Al-Qaeda and other jihadist organisations today are based on `Azzām's jihad construct, have "deviated" from it or mutated into more radical forms, have not been sufficiently studied and explored.

The period of dormancy, as far as armed jihad activities in `Azzām's life are concerned, also raises the question of whether `Azzām was really a hardcore jihadist. There are no reports or evidence that `Azzām, while he was studying in Egypt, was involved in jihadist organisations like the Egyptian Al-Jamā`ah Al-Islāmiyah and Al-Jihād, which waged armed jihad against the Egyptian authority. `Azzām was distinctly different from the general trend of known jihadists who constantly looked for jihad fronts and, for that matter, Al-Qaeda, which not only looks for jihad fronts but also strives to create new ones.

`Azzām's exploits were conducted within the context of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, justifying armed resistance under international law and defensive jihad under Islamic jurisprudence. This raises the issue of dynamic relations between the context and `Azzām's idea of jihad. The question of the extent to which the strategic context influenced `Azzām's idea of jihad, whether `Azzām's idea of jihad was constructed independently or that both were inter-related, could raise different research hypotheses and have different theoretical and policy impacts on how jihadist terrorism should be countered.

⁸²Roshandel and Chadha (2006).

The issues raised above makes `Azzām a compelling research subject, particularly, for counter-jihadism work. Two particular issues are of interest:

1. Sustained counter-jihadism work requires deep understanding of the ideology and the ideologues of jihadist groups. Because `Azzām is regarded as the person responsible for the initial construction of the modern jihad idea, it is logical, then, to study his jihad construct and its possible impact on national security so as to provide better understanding of the current jihadism trend and to inform more effective counter-ideology work.
2. Since `Azzām continues to be revered within the jihadist fraternity, an in-depth study of his jihad construct and the ideological differences that he had with Bin Laden could provide insights, together with the traditional Islamic jurisprudence, on the deviationist tendency of Al-Qaeda, such an approach could potentially minimise its appeal and subsequently its threat.

Despite his prominent role, `Azzām remains an understudied jihad ideologue, with only minimal references made to him in books or articles on terrorism, Muslim extremism or political Islam.<sup>83</sup> Only three articles so far have been focused on `Azzām.

One, by Andrew McGregor, entitled “Jihad and the Rifle Alone: Abdullah Azzam and the Islamist Revolution,” was published in *Conflict Studies Journal* in Fall, 2003.⁸⁴ The second article entitled “Abdallah Azzam” was written in French by Thomas Hegghammer as a chapter in *Al-Qaida dans le texte: Ecrits d'Ousama ben Laden, Abdallah Azzam, Ayman al-Zawahiri et Abou Moussab al-Zarqawi* (Al-Qaeda and the Text: The Writing of Usamah ibn Ladin, `Abd Allāh `Azzām, Ayman Al-Zawāhirīy and Abū Muṣ`ab Al-Zarqāwīy) edited by Gilles Kepel. The book was published in 2005 by Presses Universitaires de France, and has been translated into English by Pascale Ghazaleh and published

⁸³See footnote 1 in this chapter.

⁸⁴McGregor (2003).

under the title *Al-Qaeda in Its Own Words*.⁸⁵ The third article, entitled “The Striving Shaykh: Abdullah Azzam and the Revival of Jihad” by John CM Calvert, was published in the *Journal of Religion & Society* (Supplement Series 2) in 2007. The writer in this article admitted, “there is presently no full critical biography of Abdullah Azzam” and that “a rudimentary account of his life can be assembled from the largely hagiographical portraits that his followers posted on the internet beginning in the late 1990s,” which nonetheless had been used by some writers in short articles about `Azzām.⁸⁶

McGregor’s article describes `Azzām as “the most influential figure in modern times,” the man who “was responsible for internationalizing the Islamist struggle against secularism, socialism and materialism” and the founder of “the agency that would evolve into Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda.”⁸⁷ In view of the eruption of jihad in many parts of the world, the article asserted that “it is important to understand the man whom so many mujahideen cite as their inspiration.”⁸⁸

McGregor’s article illustrated `Azzām’s ideas and traced his thought through his most important influences so as to understand how “the Sheikh’s ideology transformed radical Islam from a group of disparate movements defined by national borders into a potent (if scattered) force in the international arena.”⁸⁹ As the focus of the article was on `Azzām’s ideas on jihad, it did not provide much details on `Azzām’s biography. Where relevant, his biography was included in between descriptions of the ideas. A significant portion of the article illustrated the ideas of Sayyid Quṭb, Ibn Taymīyah and Muḥammad `Abd Al-Salām Faraj, from which `Azzām’s own ideas were shaped. The article also traced the roots of his ideas to Ḥasan Al-Bannā, Muḥammad `Abduh, and Al-Mawdūdīy.⁹⁰ Only about a third of the

⁸⁵Kepel and Millelli (2008).

⁸⁶Calvert (2007).

⁸⁷McGregor (2003).

⁸⁸*Ibid.*

⁸⁹*Ibid.*

⁹⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 93–98.

article dealt with `Azzām's own ideas based, on his book *Join the Caravan*. The remainder was based on his article *Martyrs the Building Blocks of Nations* and `Azzām's biography written by others.⁹¹

Hegghammer's chapter in *Al-Qaida dans le texte* attempted to present Al-Qaeda's views based on excerpts of translated works and pronouncements made by individuals closely related to it i.e., Bin Laden, `Abd Allāh `Azzām, Ayman Al-Ṣawāhirīy and Abu Muṣ`ab Al-Zarqāwīy. Hegghammer's chapter on `Azzām begins with his biography and included excerpts from three of `Azzām's works along with a letter to young Muslims of the United States.⁹²

Hegghammer again emphasised that "no serious biography of Abdallah Azzam [*sic.*] has been published up till now... A certain number of biographies in English, which are short, incomplete and mediocre, are available on the Internet."⁹³

Calvert's article attempts to understand the dynamic relationship between Islam and violence and how Islam "whose doctrines were formulated in contexts of confrontation or political triumphalism" could be a source for activist to express "deeply held social and political aspirations" and mobilise resources "for many different kinds of activism, including nationalist, anti-colonial struggles or civilization confrontation."⁹⁴ Calvert explains his reasons for writing about `Azzām:

"[`Azzām] arguably did more than any other person to create the theoretical underpinnings of the contemporary Jihadist movements. `Azzam formulated much of the Islamist ideology of war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, recruited Arab fighters to implement his vision of a reborn caliphate, and established the foundation for the international network that his disciple, Usama bin Laden, would inherit and turn into Al-Qaeda."⁹⁵

⁹¹*Ibid.*, pp. 99–108.

⁹²Hegghammer (2008).

⁹³*Ibid.*, pp. 2, 294.

⁹⁴Calvert (2007).

⁹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 85.

“What I hope to make clear is that in reviving the classical doctrine of jihad, Azzam connected significant numbers of young Muslim men to paradigmatic moments of their past, which had the effect of both enhancing and directing their incentive to challenge forces seen as responsible for the decline of Muslim fortunes in the modern world.”⁹⁶

Calvert then proceeds with `Azzām’s biography, which made up half of the article.<sup>97</sup> The most significant part of the article describes `Azzām’s jihad ideas which unfortunately cannot be said to be comprehensive.⁹⁸ In the bibliography, the writer lists six of `Azzām’s works (three books and three articles).<sup>99</sup> But upon analysing the article, the bulk of Calvert’s description of the jihad ideas is based on only one of `Azzām’s work, *The Defense of the Muslim Lands*. The section on jihad ideas was more descriptive than analytical, perhaps due to the limitations of space for an article in a journal.

There is thus, much more that can be said about `Azzām, something which this study seeks to achieve.

1.4 The Research Plan

This section will outline the research plan, aims, objectives and methodology of this research.

Despite the works on `Azzām mentioned earlier, there is still more that needs to be studied on `Azzām’s idea of jihad including tapping into a vast resource of Arabic literature. To date, there has not been any comprehensive description of `Azzām’s jihad ideas written in English. An English language narrative on `Azzām, based on Arabic sources, will enable scholars of various fields to make a more meaningful analysis.

⁹⁶*Ibid.*

⁹⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 85–92.

⁹⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 92–97.

⁹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 100.

1.4.1 *Aim and objective*

A comprehensive study on `Azzām's idea of jihad in English will be an invaluable contribution to academic fields such as security, terrorism, jihadism, Muslim radicalism and strategic studies.

The objective of this study has already been mentioned in the beginning of this chapter. In short, the study aims to establish a comprehensive view of `Azzām's jihad ideas based on his writings and transcripts of his speeches and sermons, both published and unpublished, many of which have yet to be translated into other languages. The second aim is to offer analytical commentaries and insights from a security and theological perspective; and to extract key lessons for counter-ideology work within the framework of counter-terrorism.

1.4.2 *What the study can offer*

This study is significant, not only because of the important role that `Azzām played in the Soviet–Afghan war and his contribution to jihadism, but also because:

1. It will help to foster a deeper appreciation of the ideological dimension within the context of the Soviet–Afghan war.
2. It will explain the dynamics mobilising the Muslims masses for the Soviet–Afghan war, which could provide a better understanding of contemporary jihadist groups and offer insights to counter them.
3. It will explore the implications of `Azzām' jihad ideas from a contemporary security perspective, on state or international systems.

1.4.3 *Methodology*

The primary approach of this study is that of a qualitative literature review. `Azzām's books, articles and transcripts of sermons and speeches as listed in the bibliography have all been reviewed.

Other related published and unpublished materials available in open sources, online, in print, video and audio have also been reviewed.

In analysing the text, the study applies the framing method, used in the study of social movements as the key analytical tool. The framing method is a “schemata of interpretation” that enables individuals “to locate, perceive, identify and label” occurrences within their life space and the world at large.” A frame is thus an “interpretative schema that simplifies and condenses the ‘world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of action.” The frame’s functions are “to organize experience and guide action, whether individual or collective.”¹⁰⁰

Gregory Bateson first used the concept of the frame in 1954 in an essay about epistemology and animal behaviour. This method has now been used in various fields such as linguistic studies, social psychology, media studies and policy studies. In sociology and political science, it is used inter-alia, to study social movements.¹⁰¹

Erving Goffman has been regarded as the first person to introduce the concept into sociology in his study of everyday interaction and communicative acts. Later, it was introduced into the study of social movements by Todd Gitlin in his study of the media’s treatment of the Students for Democratic Society in the United States in the 1960s. This was later reinforced by William Gamson, Bruce Fireman and Steven Rytina’s works that shifted the focus from media to political actors by examining how people constructed alternative explanations to events in relation to official versions.¹⁰²

Today, framing has become one of the key approaches underpinning cultural perspectives to the study of social movements.¹⁰³

¹⁰⁰Snow *et al.* (1986); Snow and Benford (1988; 2000).

¹⁰¹Johnston and Noakes (2005), p. 3.

¹⁰²*Ibid.*; Snow and Benford (2000), pp. 611, 612; Oliver and Johnston (2000).

¹⁰³Tarrow (2006), pp. 15–19; Buechler (1993).

Framing has become increasingly important in the study of social movements “because of its potential to provide insight into the various forms of interpretation that are parts of the dynamics of social movement.”¹⁰⁴ It brings in socio-psychological dimensions to the study and the role of human agency in the rise of social movements. Framing allows researchers to understand how individuals are transformed from bystanders to participants in collective action through the interpretation of political issues and the use of culture, religion and ideology in negotiating meaning within a political context. It helps researchers to understand how social entrepreneurs use meanings to mobilise people in order to achieve political objectives. It also allows the understanding of the content of the idea and the processes taken to construct it concurrently.¹⁰⁵

There are various models of framing in the study of social movements. This research has adopted Snow *et al.*'s model of framing. Unlike other models, this model focuses on the strategic level in which social movement entrepreneurs operate. Social movement entrepreneurs are “people who exhibit strategic initiative in spreading the word about their cause and promoting its message” whose primary role is “to communicate the movement's frame to current and potential constituents.”¹⁰⁶ This is very relevant to the study because social entrepreneur fits Azzam's role as jihad mobiliser during the Soviet–Afghan war period.

The central idea of framing under Snow *et al.*'s model is the concept of collective action frames.¹⁰⁷ Collective action frames are “action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimise the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization (SMO)”¹⁰⁸ or, in other words, collective action frames are interpretations of issues by the social movement entrepreneurs

¹⁰⁴Johnston and Noakes (2005).

¹⁰⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 3–5, 7; Oliver and Johnston (2000).

¹⁰⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 7, 8.

¹⁰⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 5, 11.

¹⁰⁸Snow and Benford (2000), p. 614.

that are intended to mobilise people to act.¹⁰⁹ Collective action frames have three basic tasks:

1. Diagnostic framing. Its function is to provide interpretation of issues and events to the targeted audience. It basically tells us what is wrong, and why.
2. Prognostic framing. This frame offers solutions highlighted in the diagnostic frame.
3. Motivational framing. This frame provides people with reasons to join collective action to effect the solutions and overcome the problems.¹¹⁰

As frames in social movements have been constructed with the objective of mobilising people to effect change, they must resonate well with the target audience. Frame resonance is, thus, essential in the study of frames. Snow *et al.* use the term “frame alignment,” which refers to “the linkage of individual and SMO interpretive orientations, such that some set of individual interests, values and beliefs and SMO activities, goal, and ideology are congruent and complementary.”¹¹¹

Under this model, the effectiveness of framing judged by its resonance to the target audience, requires the examination of six alignment processes:

1. Frame consistency. This refers to the frame’s logical complementariness in its different aspects, i.e., tactics, diagnosis, prognosis, core values and beliefs.
2. Empirical credibility. This is to ascertain whether the frame makes sense to the target audience’s view of the world or event.
3. Credibility of the frame’s promoters. This holds the view that credibility of the promoters has significant persuasive power and affects the resonance of the frame.

¹⁰⁹Johnston and Noakes (2005), p. 5.

¹¹⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 5, 6; Snow and Benford (2000), pp. 614–618.

¹¹¹Snow *et al.* (1986).

4. Experiential commensurability. This is to examine the congruency of the frame with the target audience's daily experiences.
5. Centrality. This holds the view that the more central the core values and beliefs articulated by the frames to the lives of the target audience, the more they resonate with them.
6. Narrative fidelity. This refers to how the frame resonates well with the dominant culture of the target audience, its narratives, myths and basic assumptions.¹¹²

The model also proposes four strategies for effective resonance of the frames which Snow *et al.* call frame alignment processes:

1. Frame bridging. This occurs when two or more frames that have an affinity but were previously unconnected are linked, e.g., Islam + Politics = Political Islam.
2. Frame amplification. This involves highlighting some issues, events, beliefs or values as being more salient than others. It is usually manifested in catchphrases or slogans, e.g., "Islam is the solution." This can be done by value amplification, which is "the identification of, idealisation and elevation of one or more values presumed basic to prospective constituents but which have not inspired collective action for any number of reasons"; or belief amplification. The former refers to "the goals or end-states that movements seek to attain or promote" and the latter refers to the "ideational element that cognitively support or impede action in pursuit of desired values."
3. Frame extension. This occurs when the frame is extended beyond the social movements' interest to areas that are presented to be of importance to the target audience.
4. Frame transformation. This refers to "changing old understandings and meanings and/or generating new ones" to generate support and mobilise the target audiences. This occurs when the programs and values promoted by social movements "may not resonate with, and on occasion may even appear

¹¹²Johnston and Noakes (2005), pp. 11, 12; Snow and Benford (2000), pp. 619–622.

antithetical to, conventional lifestyles or rituals and extant interpretive frames.” This is of two types; (a) transformation of domain-specific interpretive frames which refers to “fairly self-contained but substantial changes in the way a particular domain of life is framed, such that a domain previously taken for granted is reframed as problematic and in need of repair, or a domain seen as normative and acceptable is reframed as an injustice that warrants change,” (b) transformation of global interpretive frames, akin to radically changing the target audience’s worldview or ideology.¹¹³

The framing approach is very relevant to the current study for the following reasons:

1. The approach is capable of providing not only an understanding of `Azzām’s jihad ideas but also their construction.
2. In writing and propagating jihad, `Azzām was not acting as an ordinary Muslim scholar. He was not a passive supporter but an activist who sought to mobilise his target audience for jihad. In this respect, `Azzām did not produce his works on jihad for academic reasons, unlike many traditional Muslim scholars. He produced them to serve an agenda that could not be said to be purely religious or theological but rather political and as a response to a problem that was deemed critical at the time. This again makes the framing method very relevant and in particular Snow *et al.*’s model, which is designed to examine frames produced by social movement entrepreneurs.
3. The Snow *et al.*’s model helps in the understanding of the dynamic relationship between events, ideas, beliefs, culture and audience, where each influences the other, resulting in meanings and ideas that affect mobilisation. This will be helpful in examining the `Azzām’s jihad ideas. As the framer, he has embedded certain beliefs, ideas, values and cultures. The context within which `Azzām operated in — the Soviet–Afghan war and the

¹¹³*Ibid.*, pp. 11, 12; *Ibid.*, pp. 623–625; Snow *et al.* (1986), pp. 467–470, 472–475.

audience he was addressing his ideas to — were already embedded with certain beliefs, ideas, values and cultures. This is relevant because, although, ideas, values, beliefs, etc. are prone to changes due to circumstances and counter-arguments from opposing parties, individuals usually maintain certain core beliefs. These core beliefs guide the interpretation of events. They are not mere frames constructed to mobilise people. Rather, frames and contexts are used to promote these beliefs and values among people.¹¹⁴

4. `Azzām's idea of jihad was a response to the context. It is also important then to understand `Azzām's interpretation or framing of the context. The other side of the framing approach, as mentioned before, concerns the conversion of passive bystanders into supporters and activists through the interpretation (or reinterpretation) of events and issues. Thus, the approach is relevant in investigating `Azzām's frame of the context, which contributed to the role he played, and subsequently in understanding his construction of the mobilisation for jihad.

In *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, Quintan Wiktorowicz makes a relevant remark:

“... the study of Islamic activism has, for the most part, remained isolated from the plethora of theoretical and conceptual developments that have emerged from research on social movements and contentious politics. Instead most, publications on Islamic activism are either descriptive analyses of the ideology, structure, and goals of various Islamic actors or histories of particular movements. Other sociological dynamics typically remained unexamined or are downplayed as contingent upon the unique ideological orientation of Islam, thus implicitly essentializing Islamic activism as unintelligible in comparative terms and

¹¹⁴Snow *et al.* (1986), pp. 469–472, 473–476; Snow and Benford (2000), pp. 625–627; Oliver and Johnston (2000), pp. 37–54.




Figure 1. Illustrates Snow *et al.*'s model of framing.

perpetuating beliefs in Islamic exceptionalism... scholarship has tended to ignore developments in social movement research that could provide theoretical leverage over many issues to Islamic activism.”¹¹⁵

This study will fill the gap. There are indeed various methods that can be used to analyse `Azzām's ideas of jihad such as operational tools analysis, critical discourse analysis and political ideology approaches. However, based on the above explanation, it is asserted that the framing approach is a viable tool for the proposed study. It offers a comprehensive and stable paradigm to examine `Azzām's jihad ideas. Like any other approach, it has imperfections and is not without criticism but it is a well-established approach that has been used by many other researchers to study various movements, individuals and ideas.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁵Wictorowicz (2004).

¹¹⁶*Ibid.*, Part 3; Tarrow (2006), pp. 106–122; Johnston and Noakes (2005); p. 5. Meyer, Whittier and Robnett (2002); Morris and Mueller (1992).

1.4.4 Unit of analysis, research questions, assumptions and structure

The unit of analysis of this study is, (1) `Azzām's jihad ideas — the primary unit of analysis of this study, (2) `Azzām's interpretation of the event, i.e., the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan — a subsidiary unit of analysis to support the understanding of `Azzām's jihad ideas.

The study will be divided into the following chapters, not including this introduction chapter.

1.4.4.1 Chapter 2: Shades of jihad ideas and trail of militant viewpoint

This chapter provides the literature review for this research. It will reconstruct the findings of scholarly work on the evolution of jihad ideas since the first century of Islam till recent times. It will provide a theoretical and historical understanding of jihad ideas as a background and foundation to this research topic.

The chapter will begin with the concept of jihad as it is understood from Islam's primary sources and conventionally held by scholars of this study. It will then look into the evolution of the construction and invocation of jihad ideas across different and important periods of Islamic history. It will give special attention to the evolution of the current extreme strand by tracing its sources to individuals, groups and events.

The topic of jihad has often held the interests of Muslim and non-Muslim scholars alike contributing to massive works from the classical period till now. As it is not possible to offer an exhaustive review of all scholarly works on jihad, the chapter will focus on the more recent works.

1.4.4.2 Chapter 3: `Abd Allāh `Azzām's jihad ideas

This chapter will highlight `Azzām's jihad ideas based on books, articles and transcripts from his audio cassettes. It would encompass the following:

- Definition of jihad,
- Status of jihad in Islam,

- Other ideas relevant to jihad,
- Types of jihad,
- Ruling of jihad in today's context,
- Stages of revelation,
- Objective of jihad,
- Legitimate fighter,
- Ethics and rules of jihad,
- Martyrs,
- Jihad and *irhāb* (terrorism), and
- The idea of *Al-Qa`idāh*.

1.4.4.3 Chapter 4: Framing jihad for mobilisation

This chapter will investigate the following research questions, (1) How did `Azzām frame his jihad ideas? (2) How did the context in which he lived influence his ideas? (3) How did he use that context to frame his ideas in order to achieve his objectives?

Based on `Azzām's jihad ideas and the understanding of context, this section will explain the working of the idea using the framing perspective of social mobilisation theory (SMT). The assumption is that what is critical in `Azzām's jihad ideas and the views of other jihadists are not the ends *per se* but it is rather in how these ideas function as ideologies that mobilise the mass in order to achieve their political objectives.

1.4.4.4 Chapter 5: The implications of `Azzām's ideas for national security

This chapter will investigate the following research questions, (1) What are the implications of `Azzām's jihad ideas for national security? (2) In what ways could his ideas pose a security problem?

Here, the study will analyse the impact of `Azzām's ideas on national security and the international system. The section will also analyse his ideas from the perspective of contemporary terrorism studies.

1.4.4.5 *Chapter 6: `Azzām & beyond: Insights for current counter-jihadism work*

This chapter seeks to analyse `Azzām's ideas and practices of jihad that would have, (1) negative impacts on the national security of many non-Muslim countries and could potentially have serious repercussions on global security; (2) the potential to counteract current jihadist ideology.

It also analyses some of the structural factors that were responsible for `Azzām's popularity and the proliferation of his ideas, seeking a way to mitigate them.

Despite its focus on `Azzām, this study also seeks to uncover lessons that would contribute to the existing work against jihadist groups. In this regard, this chapter addresses the findings and all other issues arising from this study with the objective of providing insights to de-legitimise the current jihadist ideology, thereby mitigating its threat to national and global security.

1.5 Conclusion

This chapter has traced the cause of the dramatic September 11 incident to an important event — the mobilisation of Muslims for jihad against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It has also identified `Azzām's jihad ideas as the key to the mobilisation process. The Soviet–Afghan war mobilisation has a causal link to the emergence of the current strand of jihadism that threatens security today.

The chapter has asserted that the threat of jihadism can only be overcome through the understanding of what is jihadism and what are its historical roots. Despite the important role that `Azzām played and the effect of his jihad ideas, he has been hitherto an under-studied figure.

The chapter has identified the framing approach and Snow *et al.*'s model as the appropriate tools for analysis and reconstruction tool of `Azzām's jihad ideas. It has set out the aim of this study, which is to significantly contribute to the academic field, in particular to the study of Islamism, jihadism, and counter-terrorism.

Chapter 2

Shades of Jihad Ideas and Trail of Militant Viewpoint

2.1 Introduction

The previous chapter has demonstrated the academic and practical value of this study and its relevance to contemporary counter-terrorism work.

This chapter offers a literature review of the study and attempts to reconstruct and collate the findings of scholarly work on various jihad ideas from the 7th century till today so as to provide the theoretical and historical basis for understanding `Azzām's jihad ideas.

The chapter will explore the concept of jihad from Islam's primary sources and widely held perspectives of scholars in this field. It will illustrate, based on the relevant literature, four major strands of jihad ideas: classical, traditionalist, reformist and militant. The chapter is thus divided in accordance to these four strands. Each section provides a literature review of each strand. The chapter then ends with comments from various scholars. The comments offer nuanced insights on the study of jihad and the evolution of jihad ideas in Islamic tradition that would be useful when analysing `Azzām's ideas and the phenomenon of jihadism in the subsequent chapters.

The classical strand of jihad ideas refers to those found in major works on jihad or Islamic jurisprudence during the period right after the Prophet until the introduction of modern ideas to the Muslim world by the West from the 18th century onwards. It is an

important strand because it provides the foundation for all other strands. None of the other three strands is totally free from the influence of the classical strand.

Reformists seek to reconcile classical jihad ideas with modern concepts of war and peace. Radical reformists however, see little relevance for classical Islamic thinking in the contemporary period. Traditionalist and militant jihadists share a common objective, which is to preserve all classical Islamic ideas and bring Muslims back to its earliest principles.

As this study will be explored through the prism of national security, this chapter will give special attention to the militant strand of jihad and trace the individuals, groups and events significant to its development. However, as the volume of work on jihad is extensive, this chapter will focus on the more recent literature.

2.2 Classical Strand of Jihad

This section will provide an overview of jihad ideas in classical works. These works are still revered by Muslim scholars and remain as the main texts on the subject. To a certain extent, classical jihad ideas continue to be disseminated to the Muslim public.¹

Revisions and reinterpretations by the traditionalist, reformist and militant strands will be highlighted where appropriate.

2.2.1 *Meaning of jihad*

All classical scholars agreed that the word “jihad” carries general and specific meanings. The term “jihad” is derived from the Arabic word *jahada*, which means “to strive.” The etymological meaning (and, for our purposes, the general meaning) of jihad is to strive to carry out God’s commands, be it in performing righteous deeds or in restraining oneself from evil. The specific meaning of jihad is armed striving. There has been ceaseless discussion by Muslim

¹Firestone (1999).

scholars on the objective and target of armed jihad. These discussions will be summarised in the following sections.²

Classical Muslim jurists (*fuqahā'*) often used the word "jihad" as a synonym for armed conflict and would refer it to armed conflict when it is followed by "*fī sabīl Allāh*" (in the path of Allah).³

2.2.2 Fundamental prerequisite

Classical scholars agreed that for armed conflict to be recognised as jihad, it must be done *fī sabīl Allāh* where the intention must be purely to promote the religion of Allah or *li i`lā' kalimāt Allāh* (to elevate the word of Allah), and comply with the *sharī'ah* as revealed in the *Qur'ān* and exemplified by the Prophet in the *ḥadīth* (Prophetic traditions). Any actions conducted for worldly gain is not recognised as jihad.⁴

2.2.3 Various forms of jihad

There are various forms of jihad recognised in classical works. Personal jihad, also known as the greater jihad, encompasses self-development and the purification of the self from evil desires. Verbal jihad means to offer advice to those who need it, while jihad with the hand, refers to performing community services or even armed jihad. Hence, armed jihad, also known as the lesser jihad, is just one of the many forms of jihad in Islam.⁵

2.2.4 Theological basis

The theological basis of jihad is clearly stated in the verses of the *Qur'ān*. Furthermore, the permissibility of armed jihad is reinforced through the verbal pronouncements, encouragements and actions of

² Haykal (1996); Al-Māwardī (1982), p. 7; Sachedina (1990), p. 37; Lewis (2004), p. 28.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, pp. 40, 44, 45; Khadduri (1962), pp. 53–57; Firestone (1999), pp. 16–18.

⁴ Sābiq (1987), pp. 22, 23; Ibn Nuḥās (date not cited), pp. 71–73.

⁵ Al-Jawzīyah (1992), pp. 5, 8–12, 72–74.

the Prophet as reported in many *hadiths*. This proves that jihad — and indeed armed jihad — is an integral part of the *sharī`ah*.

2.2.5 Stages of jihad

Classical scholars agreed that jihad had been introduced in stages. While there is disagreement on the number of stages, the overall picture is as follows:

Before the *hijrah* (migration to Medina), Muslims only carried out the jihad of self-purification (greater jihad) and peaceful propagation of Islam. This was despite the fact that the early Muslims in Mecca were being abused and persecuted by the pagan Arabs. After the *hijrah*, *Qur`ānic* revelation brought about the second stage, that armed jihad as a form of self-defense was permissible but not obligatory. The third stage is marked by the obligation to perform armed jihad, specifically as an act of self-defense against those that had initiated hostilities. The fourth and final stage called upon Muslims to wage armed jihad against non-Muslims, even outside the context of self-defense. The final stage has been a subject of much debate among scholars, even to this day.⁶

2.2.6 The importance of jihad

Jihad is necessary to defend against the onslaught of the enemies of Islam as well as in pursuing the interests of Islam. It is also regarded as the pinnacle of Islamic devotion.⁷ However, classical scholars disagreed on whether greater or lesser jihad was more important. Those who considered greater jihad more important, argued that jihad of self-purification must precede participation in armed jihad (lesser jihad) so as to ensure the sincerity of one's intention.⁸

⁶ *Ibid.*, Vol. 3, pp. 70, 71; Sābiq (1987), p. 209; Firestone (1999), pp. 50–65.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Vol. 3, pp. 76–88; Ibn Nuhās (date not cited). *Mashārī` Al-Ashwāq Ilā Maṣārī` Al-`Ushāq*, pp. 8–11.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Vol. 3, pp. 6, 7.

Those who attributed greater importance to armed jihad pointed out that Muslims martyred in armed jihad would be rewarded with the expiation of all sins, entry to God's heaven without undergoing trial and the privilege to intercede for seventy relatives.⁹

2.2.7 Ruling of armed jihad

A majority of classical scholars regarded armed jihad as *farḍ kifāyah*, a communally obligatory act, in which the obligation is lifted from the community when a member of the community performs it.¹⁰

However, armed jihad becomes *farḍ `ayn*, or personally obligatory, in the following circumstances:

1. When they are in the midst of a battle, Muslim fighters are prohibited from deserting the battlefield.
2. Where the enemy forces have transgressed or occupied parts of Muslim land, Muslims living in the occupied land are obligated to retaliate by arms. If they are unsuccessful, the obligation then falls upon Muslims living within the vicinity and so on until the enemy has been successfully defeated. However, some scholars consider it *farḍ kifāyah* for Muslims who are not in the immediate vicinity of the enemy-occupied territory.
3. When there is a general mobilisation for armed jihad by a Muslim ruler, the obligation applies on all Muslims.¹¹

⁹ Sābiq (1987), pp. 16–21, 24–26; Ibn Qudāmah (1984), pp. 362, 363; Ibn Qudāmah (1984), pp. 364, 365; Ibn Nuhās (date not cited). *Mashāri` Al-Ashwāq Ilā Maṣāri` Al-`Ushāq*, Chapters 2 and 3; Khadduri (1962), pp. 62–65; Firestone (1999), p. 100.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Vol. 3, p. 10; *Ibid.*, Vol. 10, pp. 359, 360; *Ibid.*, p. 11; Al-Sharḥīnīy (date not cited). *Mughnī Al-Muhtāj* (The enriched source for understanding *Al-Minhāj*), pp. 207–209; Khadduri (1962), p. 60; Al-Qurṭubīy (date not cited). *Bidāyat Al-Mujtahid Wa Nihāyat Al-Muqtaṣid* (The legal handbook for the learned and student), Vol. 1, p. 278.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Vol. 3, pp. 11, 12; *Ibid.*, Vol. 10, pp. 361, 362; *Ibid.*, Vol. 10, pp. 360, 364; *Ibid.*, p. 219; *Ibid.*; *Ibid.*, pp. 12, 13.

2.2.8 On fighters

According to classical scholars, armed jihad is obligatory when a person meets the following criteria:

1. Muslim,
2. Male,
3. Free (defined as someone who is not enslaved),
4. Of sane mind,
5. Has attained puberty,
6. Has sufficient means to prepare himself and support his dependents,
7. Has no physical disability, and
8. Has attained permission from his parents and creditors so that his debts would not become a liability to his family should he be killed in battle or become physically disabled.¹²

Women may participate in non-combat duties such as in the treatment of the wounded and the preparation of food, subject to the permission of the authority and their respective *mahram* (immediate male guardians) or husbands.¹³

However, when a Muslim territory is under attack, and armed jihad becomes *fard `ayn*, all the above mentioned criteria are lifted. Children, women and slaves may be mobilised, or they may join the jihad without permission from their respective parents, *mahram*, husbands, creditors, and according to some scholars, the authority.¹⁴

¹² *Ibid.*, Vol. 3, pp. 12, 14; Al-Sharbīnī (date not cited). *Mughnī Al-Muḥtāj* (The enriched source for understanding *Al-Minhāj*), Vol. 4, pp. 216, 217; Al-Qurṭubī (date not cited). *Biḍāyat Al-Mujtahid Wa Nihāyat Al-Muqtaṣid* (The legal handbook for the learned and student), Vol. 1, pp. 278, 279; Ibn Qudāmah (1984), pp. 361, 362, 514, 515; Ibn Qudāmah (1984); Al-Māwardī (1982), p. 36; Ibn Nuhās (date not cited). *Mashāri` Al-Ashwāq Ilā Maṣāri` Al-`Ushāq*, p. 12; Khadduri (1962), pp. 83–86.

¹³ *Ibid.*, Vol. 3, p. 13; Ibn Qudāmah (1984), pp. 361, 362; Ibn Qudāmah (1984), pp. 384–386; Ayyūb (1983), pp. 136, 137.

¹⁴ Al-Sharbīnī (date not cited), p. 219; Ibn Qudāmah (1984), pp. 376, 377; Ibn Nuhās (date not cited). *Mashāri` Al-Ashwāq Ilā Maṣāri` Al-`Ushāq*, p. 12.

Classical scholars divided legitimate participants of armed jihad into two categories: *murtaziqah* (paid fighters) and *muṭawwi`ah* (volunteer fighters). The former are those who have been registered as fighters and receive payment for their services from the *ghanīmah* (war booty), while the latter are those who participate in armed jihad on a voluntary and ad hoc basis. The volunteer fighters may be given some form of remuneration for their services based on the authority's discretion.¹⁵ However, they are all required to obey the policy and commands of the authority and military commanders. The fighters may themselves offer advice or feedback to the authority or commanders, where needed.¹⁶

2.2.9 On the enemy

The classical works have specified those who may be considered enemies and opposed in armed struggle as:

1. Non-Muslims who may be pagans (animists and idol worshippers) or the People of the Book (initially referring to the Christians and the Jews, but later including the Zoroastrians).
2. Apostates, those who have renounced Islam.
3. *Bughāh*, those who are armed rebels defecting or challenging the authority.
4. *Muḥārib*, those who are armed and involved in crimes, banditry or acts that may threaten the security of a country.

All classical scholars agreed that fighting hostile non-Muslims is a jihad, even if originally they were *dhimmīy* (subjects of Muslim rule). They disagreed however on whether armed jihad can be waged against non-Muslims who do not have peace agreements with Muslims and are not hostile. The basis of this disagreement is

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Vol. 4, pp. 216, 217; *Ibid.*, Vol. 10, pp. 361, 514, 515; Sābiq (1987), p. 12; Al-Māwardīy (1982), p. 36.

¹⁶ Ibn Qudāmah (1984), pp. 436, 437.

whether non-Muslims were to be fought for their hostility or for their disbelief in Islam.¹⁷

All classical scholars also agreed that apostates should be offered the opportunity to repent and would only be dealt with through *sharī`ah* law should they refuse. However, should they become threatening and form an armed group, then it becomes an obligation for Muslims to subdue them with jihad.¹⁸ This ruling also applies to the Muslim *bughāh* and *muḥārib*. However, it has been ruled that Muslim *bughāh* should not be pursued if they are defeated in battle, unless there is a possibility that they would regroup and resume fighting. They should not be enslaved, their properties should not be confiscated as *ghanimah*, and non-Muslims should not be engaged in fighting them. As fellow Muslims, *bughāh* should not be treated harshly for it may be that they might have legitimate political grievances for dissenting.¹⁹

When dealing with an unjust ruler, classical scholars preferred to use counsel or to find ways to replace the ruler through non-violent means. An exception, however, is made when the ruler commits a flagrant act of apostasy.²⁰

2.2.10 Rules before battle

A majority of classical scholars held the view that armed jihad may only be waged under the banner of a Muslim authority.²¹ However, armed jihad may be carried out without the permission of the authority when Muslims are attacked in their territory. Other times

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, Vol. 10, pp. 365, 366, 424; Ibn Qudāmah (1984), Vol. 10, pp. 365, 368; Al-Qurṭubīy (date not cited). *Bidāyat Al-Mujtahid Wa Nihāyat Al-Muqtaṣid* (The legal handbook for the learned and student), Vol. 1, p. 279; Khadduri (1962), pp. 75, 76, 80; Hashmi (1999), p. 162.

¹⁸ Haykal (1996), pp. 57–59; Khadduri (1996), pp. 195, 205; Al-Māwardīy (1982), pp. 55–58; Al-Sharbīnīy (date not cited), *Mughnī Al-Muḥtāj*, Vol. 10, pp. 133–143; Khadduri (1962), pp. 76, 77.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, pp. 65–69; *Ibid.*, p. 232; *Ibid.*, pp. 58–61; El-Fadl (1999); Hashmi (1999).

²⁰ *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, pp. 119–137; Kelsay (2007), p. 129; Sonn (1990), pp. 133–138.

²¹ Ibn Qudāmah (1984), Vol. 10, pp. 368, 387; Ibn Qudāmah (1984), Vol. 10, p. 367; Kelsay (2007); p. 101; Donner (1991), p. 51; Ibn Nuhās (date not cited). *Mashāri` Al-Ashwāq Ilā Maṣāri` Al-`Ushāq*, p. 121.

when jihad may be carried out without official leave include when there is fear of escalating danger while waiting for permission to fight, when the authority has been clearly neglectful of the requirements of armed jihad, or when the authority has collapsed.²² Although maintaining an army for jihad is regarded as the primary duty of the authority, in the circumstances cited earlier, individuals may take the initiative and organise armed jihad.²³ One example is the establishment of *ribāṭ* (frontier posts and guards) at the borders of Muslim lands.²⁴

Classical scholars ruled that armed jihad remains obligatory, even if the ruler is impious or religiously corrupt. The rationale is that more harm could result from disregarding armed jihad than the harm resulting from the ruler's character flaws.²⁵

Nonetheless, classical scholars encouraged peaceful propagation so as to bring non-Muslims into the fold of Islam (through conversion) or to submit to Muslim rule.²⁶ The Muslim authority has to ensure that non-Muslims are provided with the message of Islam. Alternatively, non-Muslims may become the subjects of a Muslim authority, or ratify peace agreements with the Muslims, while maintaining their faith. If non-Muslims are found to be hostile to Muslims, then the Muslim authority is required to make the appropriate declaration of war before initiating hostilities.²⁷

Some classical scholars considered making a declaration of war obligatory before waging an armed jihad, while others considered it

²² *Ibid.*, Vol. 10, p. 369; *Ibid.*, Vol. 10, p. 367; Al-Sharbīnīy (date not cited). *Mughnī Al-Muhtāj* (The enriched source for understanding *Al-Minhāj*), p. 220.

²³ *Ibid.*, Vol. 10, p. 368; *Ibid.*, Vol. 10, p. 367; *Ibid.*, Vol. 4, p. 40; Al-Māwardīy (1982); Al-Jawzīyah (1992), pp. 95–102.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. 10, p. 370; *Ibid.*, Vol. 10, pp. 368, 369, 418; *Ibid.*, Vol. 4, pp. 46–51; Khadduri (1962), pp. 81, 82.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, Vol. 10, p. 364; *Ibid.*, Vol. 10, p. 366; Ibn Nuhās (date not cited). *Mashāri` Al-Ashwāq Ilā Maṣāri` Al-`Ushāq*, p. 122.

²⁶ Al-Sharbīnīy, MA (date not cited). *Mughnī Al-Muhtāj* (The enriched source for understanding *Al-Minhāj*), p. 210.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, Vol. 4, p. 223; Ibn Qudāmah (1984), pp. 379, 387; Ibn Qudāmah (1984); Al-Māwardīy (1982), p. 37; Al-Qurṭubīy (date not cited). *Bidayat Al-Mujtahid Wa Nihayat Al-Muqtasid* (The legal handbook for the learned and student), pp. 282, 283; Al-Jawzīyah (1992), p. 100; Haykal (1996), pp. 779–789; Khadduri (1962); Martin (1991), p. 99.

as only recommended. A third opinion is that it is obligatory to make the declaration of war on those who have no knowledge of Islam while it is recommended to make the declaration for those with prior knowledge of Islam or are in a situation when Islam is commonly known.²⁸

2.2.11 Rules during battle

While Muslims are prohibited from indiscriminately attacking people or property, classical scholars disagreed on the specific groups of people and circumstances which may necessitate going against this rule. In general, non-combatants, women and children should not be targeted in armed jihad except when the enemy ruler is a woman. There is disagreement on the status of monks, the elderly, farmers and serfs,²⁹ but should they contribute to a battle, either through direct or indirect means, the scholars agree that these people would immediately lose their immunity.³⁰

In the event that non-combatants and Muslims are used as human shields or in situations where it is difficult to differentiate them from enemy fighters, then it is permissible for Muslim fighters to attack, while taking measures to minimise harm on non-combatants and Muslims. Weapons are to be aimed at the fighters rather than the human shields, hostages or places of refuge for non-combatants.³¹ Restrictions are also placed on the targeting of properties, trees,

²⁸ Sābiq (1987); Al-Zuhayfī (1996).

²⁹ *Ibid.*, Vol. 3, pp. 28, 41, 42; Al-Sharbīnī, MA (date not cited). *Mughnī Al-Muḥtāj* (The enriched source for understanding *Al-Minhāj*), Vol. 4, pp. 222, 223; Ibn Qudāmah (1984); Ibn Qudāmah (1984), pp. 390, 391; Ibn Nuhās (date not cited). *Mashāri' Al-Ashwāq Ilā Maṣāri' Al-'Ushāq*, pp. 122, 123; Khadduri (1996), p. 257; Al-Māwardī (1982), p. 41; Al-Qurṭubī (date not cited). *Bidāyat Al-Mujtahid Wa Nihāyat Al-Muqtaṣid* (The Legal Handbook for the Learned and Student), Vol. 1, pp. 280, 281; Al-Jawzīyah (1992), p. 99; Kelsay (2007), p. 114; Lewis (2004), p. 33.

³⁰ Ibn Qudāmah (1984), pp. 534, 535; Ibn Nuhās (date not cited). *Mashāri' Al-Ashwāq Ilā Maṣāri' Al-'Ushāq*, pp. 122, 123; Kelsay (2007), p. 118; Takrūrī (2003), pp. 238–241.

³¹ *Ibid.*, Vol. 10, pp. 495–497; *Ibid.*, p. 133; Ibn Qudāmah (1984), pp. 383, 395, 396; Al-Sharbīnī (date not cited). *Mughnī Al-Muḥtāj* (The enriched source for understanding *Al-Minhāj*), Vol. 4, pp. 223, 224; Sābiq (1987), p. 42; Al-Māwardī (1982), pp. 41, 42; Khadduri (1996), pp. 95, 100–102; Al-Zuhayfī (1996), p. 423; Kelsay (2007), p. 108.

farms, cattle and buildings, unless out of necessity or in the interest of war, as determined by the authority or military commander.³²

Desertion from battle is considered a major sin, according to classical scholars. Retreat and withdrawal are forbidden, except in the following situations:

1. When the balance of forces is numerically, or in terms of weaponry, unfavourable for the Muslim army.
2. When a rational assessment concludes that remaining in battle would cause greater harm to the interests of Muslims.
3. When the objective of the retreat is to regroup and reorganise the existing forces, or to wait for reinforcements or for the purpose of tactical deception.³³

Classical scholars prohibited the mutilation of dead enemy fighters as this goes against the belief in the sanctity of the human body as accorded in Islam.³⁴

While all types of weapons may be used, the Prophet had specifically prohibited the use of fire as a method of killing. Classical scholars also cautioned against any indiscriminate or disproportionate destruction in war.³⁵

2.2.12 Rules after battle

Armed jihad or hostility should cease, according to classical scholars, in the following situations:

1. When the Muslim army has achieved victory.
2. When the enemy has embraced Islam and ceased hostilities.

³² *Ibid.*, Vol. 10, pp. 497, 498; *Ibid.*; *Ibid.*, Vol. 10, pp. 384–389; *Ibid.*, Vol. 4, p. 226; *Ibid.*, Vol. 3, pp. 41, 42; Al-Qurṭubiy, MR (date not cited). *Bidāyat Al-Mujtahid Wa Nihāyat Al-Muqtaṣid* (The legal handbook for the learned and student), Vol. 1, p. 283; Lewis (2004), p. 33; Hashmi (1999), p. 171.

³³ *Ibid.*, Vol. 10, pp. 541–545; *Ibid.*, pp. 69, 70, 124; *Ibid.*, Vol. 10, p. 379; *Ibid.*, Vol. 4, pp. 224–226; *Ibid.*, Vol. 3, pp. 38–40; Al-Māwardiy (1982), p. 45; Al-Jawzīyah (1992), pp. 104, 105.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. 10, pp. 555, 556; *Ibid.*, p. 128; *Ibid.*, Vol. 10, pp. 452, 453; Sābiq (1987), p. 41; Al-Qurṭubiy (date not cited), p. 281; Khadduri (1962), pp. 102–108; Lewis (2004), p. 33.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, Vol. 10, p. 495; *Ibid.*; Ibn Qudāmah (1984), p. 383; Al-Sharbinīy (date not cited). *Mughnī Al-Muhtāj* (The enriched source for understanding *Al-Minhāj*), pp. 223, 226; Al-Māwardiy (1982), p. 52; Khadduri (1996), p. 102.

3. When the enemy has accepted a truce or peace agreement.
4. When *al-amān* (a guarantee of protection) has been granted.
5. When the Muslim army has unilaterally decided to end armed jihad or withdraw from battle.
6. When both parties have agreed to resolve the conflict through mediation or arbitration by a third party.³⁶

Classical scholars ruled that those who had immunity during battle (as discussed in the Section 2.2.10 on *Rules during battle*) should still be protected when the enemy has been defeated. This is discussed further in the section on prisoners of war.³⁷ While classical scholars permitted the enslavement of women and children captured during battles,³⁸ contemporary scholars find this ruling redundant today.³⁹

The territories of the defeated enemy would become part of *Dār Al-Islām* (Land of Islam), the administration of which will be discussed in a later section on war booty.

Non-Muslim inhabitants of the conquered territory may remain and retain their lands if they agree to become *dhimmīy*. By entering into this contract, they become the subjects of *Dār Al-Islām* with its respective rights and obligations. Among these obligations is the *jizyah* (poll tax). The elderly, those with physical disabilities or are poor, are exempt from *jizyah*. Non-Muslims who choose to serve in the military, which is only compulsory for Muslims, are also exempt from *jizyah*.⁴⁰

³⁶ *Ibid.*, Vol. 10, pp. 536, 537; *Ibid.*, pp. 42, 78–82; Ibn Qudāmah (1984), pp. 412–416; Al-Sharbīnīy (date not cited). *Mughnī Al-Muḥtāj* (The enriched source for understanding *Al-Minhāj*), pp. 237–239, 260–264; Al-Māwardīy (1982), p. 51; Khadduri (1996), pp. 158–194; Khadduri (1962), pp. 133–137.

³⁷ Ibn Qudāmah (1984), pp. 396, 397; Khadduri (1996), pp. 100, 101; Al-Zuhayfīy (1996), pp. 470–472.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, Vol. 10, pp. 413–415; Ibn Qudāmah (1984), pp. 393–401; Al-Sharbīnīy (date not cited). *Mughnī Al-Muḥtāj* (The enriched source for understanding *Al-Minhāj*), Vol. 4, p. 227; Al-Qurṭubīy (date not cited). *Bidāyat Al-Mujtahid Wa Nihāyat Al-Muqtaṣid* (The legal handbook for the learned and student), Vol. 1, p. 279.

³⁹ Islam and Slavery (2007); Enslavement of POWs (2004); Torturing Iraqi POWs: Legal and juristic view (2006).

⁴⁰ Ibn Qudāmah (1984), pp. 242–245, 572–578, 586–588; Sābiq (1987), pp. 42, 43; Khadduri (1996), pp. 142–157; Al-Zuhayfīy (1996), p. 445; Al-Mawdūdīy (date not cited). *Ḥuqūq Ahl Al-Dhimmah Fī Al-Dawlah Al-Islāmīyah* (Rights of non-Muslim subjects under Islamic state), pp. 26–28.

Most classical scholars ruled that only the People of the Book may become *dhimmīy* and be subject to the *jizyah*. This rule has been extended to include Zoroastrians. Other non-Muslims (i.e., pagans), had to embrace Islam or leave for non-Muslim territories — where they may be targets of armed jihad again.⁴¹ The Muslim authority is obligated to treat its *dhimmīy* subjects justly, protect them, and guarantee the freedom to practice their respective religions and laws within *Dār Al-Islām*.⁴² However, the *dhimmīy* contract dissolves when the *dhimmīy* subject embraces Islam, flees to an enemy territory or commits acts that breaches the contract.⁴³

Classical scholars ruled that only a Muslim authority may seek a truce and ratify peace agreements with enemies.⁴⁴ These agreements should not exceed 10 years or whatever is the discretion of the authority.⁴⁵ It is considered a major sin for a Muslim to breach the terms of a peace agreement. Truces and peace agreements may only be terminated when there has been a clear breach or when there is a real prospect of betrayal by the enemy, in which case the enemy must be explicitly notified.⁴⁶

In order to ensure commitment to the terms, the agreement may include tributary payment to the Muslim authority or the exchange of collaterals. Scholars disagreed on whether it is permissible for Muslims to offer tributary payment to the enemy in order to effect a truce or peace agreement.⁴⁷

⁴¹ Ibn Qudāmah (1984), pp. 357–365, 382; Al-Zuhayfīy (1996), pp. 295–297; Ibn Nuhās (date not cited). *Mashārī` Al-Ashwāq Ilā Maṣāri` Al-`Ushāq*, p. 122.

⁴² Sābiq (1987), p. 46; Al-Zuhayfīy (1996), p. 450.

⁴³ Ibn Qudāmah (1984), pp. 578, 596–599, 612; Ibn Qudāmah (1984), pp. 623–625; Al-Jawzīyah (1992), pp. 136, 137, 153, 154.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. 10, pp. 513–3; *Ibid.*, Vol. 10, pp. 565–575; Al-Qurṭubīy, MR (date not cited). *Bidāyat Al-Mujtahid Wa Nihāyat Al-Muqtaṣid* (The legal handbook for the learned and student), p. 283; Al-Zuhayfīy (1996), pp. 437–439.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, Vol. 10, p. 510; *Ibid.*, Vol. 10, pp. 567, 568; *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, pp. 283, 284; *Ibid.*, Vol. 6, p. 441; Al-Jawzīyah (1992), p. 421.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, Vol. 10, pp. 508, 574; *Ibid.*, Vol. 10, pp. 573, 574; Al-Jawzīyah (1992), pp. 300–315.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, Vol. 10, pp. 509, 600–602; Sābiq (1987), p. 42; Al-Qurṭubīy (date not cited). *Bidāyat Al-Mujtahid Wa Nihāyat Al-Muqtaṣid* (The legal handbook for the learned and student), p. 283; Khadduri (1996), pp. 154, 155; Khadduri (1962), pp. 202–222.

Al-Amān is a guarantee of protection to non-Muslims who are not subjects of *Dār Al-Islām*, entering the territory for legitimate purposes such as business, social visit or diplomatic duties. The maximum period of stay under *al-amān* is one year.⁴⁸

While there was a consensus among classical scholars that the Muslim authority has the power to offer *al-amān*, there was disagreement on whether individuals within *Dār Al-Islām* may offer *al-amān* without the permission of the authority. A majority of the scholars ruled that individuals have this authority as long as they are Muslim men or women who have reached puberty and are of sound mind. *Al-Amān* may be granted verbally, in writing or through actions that can be construed as such an accord. However, *al-amān* should not give rise to any harm to Muslims.⁴⁹

The difference between *al-amān* and a truce or peace agreement is that the latter is an agreement to cease hostility while the former is a guarantee of security to travel into *Dār Al-Islām*. The latter does not necessarily entail the former, as the subjects of a territory with peace agreements would still need *al-amān* when travelling into *Dār Al-Islām*.⁵⁰

2.2.13 Management of war booty

Classical scholars have divided war booty into three types: (1) *ghanīmah*, (2) *ḡay'* and, (3) *salb*.

Ghanīmah refers to all properties, such as food, weapons and valuables, which are obtained from the enemy through direct combat, during or after the battle. The *Qur'ān* has laid down a clear

⁴⁸ Ibn Qudāmah (1984), pp. 547, 548; Sābiq (1987), p. 42; Khadduri (1996), pp. 158–194; Al-Sharbīnī (date not cited). *Mughnī Al-Muḥtāj* (The enriched source for understanding *Al-Minhāj*), Vol. 4, pp. 237–239; Al-Zuhayfī (1996), pp. 430–434.

⁴⁹ Al-Zuhayfī (1996), pp. 431–433; Ibn Qudāmah (1984), p. 474; Ibn Qudāmah (1984), pp. 546, 547; Al-Qurṭubī (date not cited). *Bidāyat Al-Mujtahid Wa Nihāyat Al-Muqtaṣid* (The legal handbook for the learned and student), Vol. 1, p. 280; Khadduri (1996), pp. 158–160.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, Vol. 6, p. 434; Sābiq (1987), pp. 73, 74.

injunction on the distribution of *ghanīmah*. Traditionally, one-fifth should be set aside and allocated for the following:

1. *Fi sabil Allāh* — for any purpose that serves the interests of Islam and Muslims.
2. The Prophet's livelihood.
3. The Prophet's family.
4. Orphans.
5. The poor.
6. Wayfarers.⁵¹

After the death of the Prophet, allocations for the Prophet and his family were stopped. A minority of classical scholars suggested that the portion should be allocated, at the discretion of the authority, to the interest of Muslims.

The remaining four-fifth of *ghanīmah* is meant for the Muslim fighters. In general, one share is given to each non-cavalry fighter, while two shares are given to cavalry fighters as they have to maintain themselves as well as their mounts.

Classical scholars disagreed on the entitlement of *ghanīmah* to non-Muslims, women, children and slaves who contribute to the war effort. They proposed that the authority should provide these people with some token payment in recognition of their contribution. The value of the payment should not exceed the value of a share of *ghanīmah*.⁵²

Fay' refers to any property obtained from the enemy through non-direct combat such as the enemy's assets confiscated from civilian ships travelling in open seas. All *fay'* were to be deposited in the *Bayt Al-Māl* (public treasury) for the general

⁵¹ The *Qur'ān*, 8:41.

⁵² Ibn Nuhās (date not cited). *Mashāri` Al-Ashwāq Ilā Maṣāri` Al-`Ushāq*, pp. 117, 118; Ibn Qudāmah (1984), pp. 434, 442–446; Ibn Qudāmah (1984), pp. 478, 479, 485–503; Sābiq (1987), pp. 57–59; Al-Qurṭubī (date not cited). *Bidāyat Al-Mujtahid Wa Nihāyat Al-Muqtaṣid* (The legal handbook for the learned and student), Vol. 1, pp. 285–287; Khadduri (1996), pp. 106, 254, 255; Al-Zuhaylī (1996), pp. 459, 460, 465; Al-Jawzīyah (1992), p. 342; Ibn Nuhās (date not cited). *Mashāri` Al-Ashwāq Ilā Maṣāri` Al-`Ushāq*, p. 117.

interest of Islam and Muslims, under the discretion of the Muslim authority.⁵³

Salb refers to weapons, body armour or any war equipment found on dead enemy soldiers, and according to some classical scholars, this includes their mounts. Provided that there is no objection by the authority, *salb* may be claimed by the person who killed or disabled the enemy soldier in the battle. Unclaimed *salb* is distributed as *ghanīmah*.⁵⁴

Apart from these three types of booty, there is a special reward to motivate fighters to perform extraordinary combat operations during battle. This is known as *nafl*⁵⁵ and it is encouraged by classical scholars that part of the booty be set aside for this. Mercenaries and those who are promised material rewards are not entitled to *ghanīmah* and *fay'*. They are entitled only to what is promised to them.⁵⁶

A majority of classical scholars ruled that conquered lands should remain in the hands of the original owners and should not be included as *ghanīmah*. Instead *kharāj* (land tax), which would go into the *Bayt Al-Māl*, should be imposed on the owner by the authority. However, conquered lands without clear owners are to be retained by the Muslim authority.⁵⁷ Classical scholars warned that it is a major sin to steal war booty.⁵⁸

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 117; Ibn Qudāmah (1984), pp. 537, 545; Sābiq (1987), pp. 72, 73; Khadduri (1996), pp. 106–112; Al-Qurṭubīy (date not cited). *Bidāyat Al-Mujtahid Wa Nihāyat Al-Muqtaṣid* (The legal handbook for the learned and student), Vol. 1, pp. 294, 295.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 119, 120; *Ibid.*, Vol. 10, pp. 440, 441, 485; *Ibid.*, Vol. 3, 60; *Ibid.*, pp. 113, 258; *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, pp. 294, 295; Ibn Qudāmah (1984); pp. 411–414; Al-Zuhayfīy (1996), pp. 453, 454; Al-Jawzīyah (1992), pp. 493–495.

⁵⁵ Ibn Qudāmah (1984), pp. 428–436; Sābiq (1987), p. 40; Khadduri (1996), p. 113; Khadduri (1962), pp. 120–125; Ibn Nuhās (date not cited). *Mashārī' Al-Ashwāq Ilā Maṣāri' Al-'Ushāq*, p. 118.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, Vol. 10, pp. 407, 408, 425, 512–515; Al-Sharbīnīy (date not cited). *Mughnī Al-Muhtāj* (The enriched source for understanding *Al-Minhāj*), Vo. 4, p. 222.; Al-Jawzīyah (1992), pp. 100–104.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, Vol. 10, pp. 529–537; *Ibid.*, Vol. 4, pp. 234, 235; Khadduri (1996), pp. 256, 269–273, 278–283; Sābiq (1987), pp. 70, 71; Al-Qurṭubīy (date not cited). *Bidāyat Al-Mujtahid Wa Nihāyat Al-Muqtaṣid* (The legal handbook for the learned and student), Vol. 1, pp. 293, 294.

⁵⁸ Ibn Qudāmah (1984), p. 524; Sābiq (1987), p. 63; Ibn Nuhās (date not cited). *Mashārī' Al-Ashwāq Ilā Maṣāri' Al-'Ushāq*, pp. 118, 119; Al-Māwardīy (1982), p. 47.

2.2.14 *Management of prisoners of war*

All classical scholars have empowered the Muslim authority to manage prisoners of war in the following ways:

1. Unconditional release.
2. Release by ransom.
3. Release through the exchange of prisoners.
4. Enslavement.

While there was disagreement on whether the captured enemy combatants could be executed, a majority of classical scholars ruled that the Muslim authority has the discretion to determine their outcome. However, they agreed that captured women and children are not to be executed unless they were involved in the battle. Any ransom received for the release of prisoners will form part of the *ghanimah*.⁵⁹

Modern scholars agree that enslavement is no longer relevant in today's context after the worldwide abolition of slavery.⁶⁰

2.2.15 *Participation of non-Muslims in armed jihad*

Classical scholars ruled that non-Muslims may participate in armed jihad whether on a voluntary basis or with the promise of rewards. However, non-Muslim subjects of *Dār Al-Islām* should not be mobilised for armed jihad unless it had been agreed upon in their *dhimmiy* contracts. In such situations, those who are mobilised or volunteer to serve should be exempt from the *jizyah*.

In this respect, classical scholars ruled that it is permissible to enter into a defence alliance with non-Muslims or seek their

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, Vol. 10, p. 393; *Ibid.*, Vol. 3, pp. 65–67; *Ibid.*, pp. 120, 121; Al-Qurṭubīy, MR (date not cited). *Bidāyat Al-Mujtahid Wa Nihāyat Al-Muqtaṣid* (The legal handbook for the learned and student), Vol. 1, p. 279; Ibn Qudāmah (1984), pp. 396–401, 529; Al-Zuhayfiy (1996), pp. 470, 471; Al-Sharḥīnīy (date not cited). *Mughnī Al-Muhtāj* (The enriched source for understanding *Al-Minhāj*), p. 228; Khadduri (1996), pp. 100–102, 257–259; Khadduri (1962), pp. 126–133; Thomas (1997), pp. 46–51; El-Fadl (1999), pp. 153–155; Hashmi (1999), pp. 174, 175; Bertosa (2007), pp. 20–23.

⁶⁰ Islam and Slavery (2007); Enslavement of POWs (2004); Torturing Iraqi POWs: Legal and juristic view (2006); Islam's stance on prisoners of war (2006).

assistance for armed jihad as long as there are no risks anticipated by their involvements.⁶¹

2.2.16 *Martyrdom*

Classical scholars regarded as martyrs any Muslim killed during armed jihad, whether in battle or subsequently from an injury. Martyrs are believed to be accorded with privileges and rewards that they will enjoy in the afterlife.⁶²

2.2.17 *Classical Shiite (Shī`ah) view of jihad*

All these views on jihad are based on the Sunni classical tradition. In general, the classical Shiite view of jihad does not depart too widely from the Sunni's except in one important aspect.⁶³ Classical Shiites hold the view that offensive jihad with the purpose of expanding the domain of Islam is not permissible after the occultation of the last (twelfth) imam.⁶⁴ Traditionally, classical Shiites primarily directed jihad against *bughāh*, in this case referring to the

⁶¹ Sābiq (1987), p. 14; Ibn Qudāmah (1984), pp. 407, 408, 420–425, 521–525; Khadduri (1996), p. 258; Al-Sharbīnī (date not cited). *Mughnī Al-Muḥtāj* (The enriched source for understanding *Al-Minhāj*), Vol. 4, pp. 221, 222.

⁶² Al-Jawziyah (1992), pp. 89–95; Ibn Nuhās (date not cited). *Mashāri` Al-Ashwāq Ilā Maṣāri` Al-`Ushāq*, Chapter 12.

⁶³ The key issue splitting Muslims into camps of Sunni and Shiite is the succession of political leadership (*imām*) after the Prophet's demise. To Sunni, there was no divine determination on who should succeed the Prophet; the issue was left to Muslims via the process of *shūrā* (consultation) and popular mandate. Conversely, the Shiite view that the succession was divinely ordained as the exclusive right of the Prophet's family (*ahl al-bayt* or *āl al-bayt*); this begins with `Alīy, his son-in-law and subsequently Ḥasan and Ḥusayn, the Prophet's grandchildren. They were known as the *imāms*. The Shiite, however, disagree among themselves on the full list of the *imāms*. See also footnote 64. See Jafri (1995).

⁶⁴ The majority of Shiites are referred to as Twelver Shī`ah (*Ithnā `Ashariyyah*). They believe that `Alīy, the son-in-law and cousin of the Prophet Muḥammad, was the first of the 12 *imāms* appointed by God to succeed the Prophet as leader of the Muslim community. They also believe that the last *imām*, Muḥammad ibn Ḥasan, has been in occultation and will emerge before the Last Day as the *Mahdī* with Jesus the Messiah in order to fulfill their mission of bringing peace and justice to the world. See Sachedina (1995).

Sunni, until this was changed by Ayāt Allāh Khumaynī who directed jihad against their own ruler, namely the Shah of Iran, Muḥammad Riḍa Pahlavi (a.k.a Shah Reza Pahlavi).⁶⁵

2.2.18 *Justification for armed jihad*

Despite their extensive contribution to Islamic jurisprudence, and exegeses or *hadith* commentaries, classical scholars did not fully discuss the justification for armed jihad. A particular ambiguous issue is whether it was justified to wage armed jihad just because the enemies are unbelievers. Similarly vague also their stand on the use of armed jihad for the expansion of Muslim rule into other territories, and for propagating Islam.

Sometimes classical works may be found to be contradictory. For example, most classical works emphasised that there should be no compulsion in religion, that Islam should be propagated through sound arguments, that the Muslim authority is obligated to give non-Muslims the freedom to practice their religions, and that in a battle, Muslims are prohibited from killing non-combatants, enemy fighters who cease fighting or are incapacitated. However, in these same works, or in the works by these same scholars, one could find conflicting messages. For example jihad has been defined as fighting non-Muslims so as to make the word of God supreme, even without any hostility on the part of non-Muslims. There are also instructions that the People of the Book should embrace Islam and submit to Muslim authority by paying *jizyah* or risk armed jihad. Pagans have to embrace Islam or face armed jihad, while the Muslim authority is obligated to wage jihad against non-Muslim territories at least once a year.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ Esposito (2002), p. 39; Khadduri (1962), pp. 66–68; Cook (2005), p. 111; Kelsay (2007), pp. 122–124; Lawrence (1991), p. 147; Sachedina (1990), pp. 40–46; Moghadam (2003), pp. 1–6; Lambton (1970), pp. 182, 183, 188, 189.

⁶⁶ Al-Qurṭubī, MR (date not cited). *Bidāyat Al-Mujtahid Wa Nihāyat Al-Muqtaṣid* (The legal handbook for the learned and student), Vol. 1, pp. 284, 285; Ibn Nuhās (date not cited). *Mashārī` Al-Ashwāq Ilā Maṣārī` Al-`Ushāq*, p. 11; Esposito (2002), p. 35; Khadduri (1962), pp. 14–17, 59, 60, 62–65, 144, 145; Cook (2005), pp. 30, 47; Kelsay (2007), pp. 100, 101; Donner (1991), p. 51; Mayer (1991), p. 202; Lewis (2004), p. 27; El-Fadl (1999), p. 150; Hashmi (1999).

Rudolph Peters attributes this perfunctory treatment and intellectual disinterest on the issue of justifications for jihad to the fact that most of the classical works were written during the golden period of Islamic civilisation when Muslims did not encounter any serious intellectual or political challenges. Hence there was little need for scholars to rationalise, defend or apologise for their views.⁶⁷

The result of these ambiguous and contradictory ideas on jihad was the development of a variety of perspectives, interpretations and strands of thinking from scholars, both Muslims and non-Muslims, of subsequent periods, who attempt to understand jihad for academic purposes or to offer practical guidance.

Thus, most of the works on the justification of jihad that are available today have originated from contemporary scholars. Often these views represent the scholars' views or their interpretation of classical works. The following sections will describe various contemporary thoughts on jihad that has generally departed from classical ideas. In most cases, they are attempts by scholars to reconstruct classical works or to respond to them within new contexts.⁶⁸

2.3 Traditionalist Strand of Jihad

Traditionalist scholars are contemporary scholars who strive to maintain views that are found in classical works with minimal adaptations to modern contexts or thinking.⁶⁹

According to traditionalists, the justifications for armed jihad are to oppose any incursions into Muslim land or hostilities against any Muslims, or for the propagation of Islam to all non-Muslims who had refused invitations to either become Muslims or submit to Muslim rule.⁷⁰ Nonetheless, traditionalists do not practice or actively advocate aggressive jihad against non-Muslims. They rule that the jihad against the self must supersede armed jihad (lesser jihad).⁷¹

⁶⁷ Peters (2005), pp. 112, 119.

⁶⁸ Hashmi (1999), p. 158.

⁶⁹ The Royal Aal Al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought (2007).

⁷⁰ Zaydān (1981), pp. 262–266; Ayyūb (1983), pp. 86–89, 140–142; Haykal (1996), pp. 583–604.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*; *Ibid.*, pp. 32, 33; Al-Bannā (2006), pp. 248, 249, 251, 252.

Unlike extreme jihadists, traditionalists do not see the establishment of an Islamic state as central to Islamic teachings or that armed jihad is the way to achieve such a state.

Nevertheless, one should be wary of the truth claim of the classical position on the justification of jihad; indeed, it is merely an exposition of classical works by contemporary traditionalists. Accordingly, as much as the classical texts are too diverse in nature, the rulings of traditionalist scholars are often too ambiguous to afford a clear-cut resolution.

2.4 Reformist Strand of Jihad

A key characteristic of the reformist strand of jihad has been its attempt to adapt the classical ideas on jihad to the prevailing modern ideas of war and peace, and to some extent to international relations.⁷² Although reformists do not consider all ideas in classical works to be valid in the modern context, it still maintains reverence towards classical works. Some reformist scholars even seek to rationalise classical ideas in order to make them consistent with modern thinking.⁷³

Three main points on jihad have been found amongst reformists on the justification for jihad, the broader meaning of jihad and the status of armed jihad *vis-à-vis* other types of jihad.

Reformists justify jihad as a defense against any aggressions to life, property or territory. Some of the prominent Sunni figures who are of this view were two past Grand Shaykhs of Al-Azhar University, Shaykh Muḥammad `Abduh and Shaykh Maḥmūd Shaltūt, and `Abduh's student, Rashīd Riḍa. However, some reformists do not limit defensive jihad to fighting against an invading force.⁷⁴

Sa`īd Ramaḍān Al-Būḩīy, among others, permits armed jihad to protect Islamic missionaries confronted with hostilities, and to

⁷² Peters (2005), pp. 132, 133, 145, 148; Hashmi (1999), p. 158.

⁷³ The Royal Aal Al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought (2007).

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 21, 22; Haykal (1996), pp. 583–604; Shaltūt (2005); Peters (2005); Al-Būḩīy (2005), p. 125, pp. 107–111; Ali (2002), pp. 72, 83; Lewis (2004), pp. 25, 26; Hashmi (1999), pp. 165–168.

reinstate the freedom of religion for Muslims faced with religious persecution.⁷⁵

Some reformists even make armed jihad incumbent upon Muslims to save all human beings threatened with gross and serious injustices such as genocide.⁷⁶ In their view, another legitimate reason for armed jihad is to retaliate against the breach of peace agreements.⁷⁷

Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān, however, prohibited armed jihad so long as Muslims were able to perform their religious obligations. This was in particular for Muslims in India under British colonial rule. However, a majority of reformists rule that armed jihad was a legitimate, although not necessarily the only means, to oppose colonial rule.⁷⁸

To support their views, reformists assert that Islam seeks to win people over mainly through sound and rational arguments as enjoined in the *Qur'ān*. Thus, the idea that Muslims are to wage armed jihad against non-Muslims to force them to embrace Islam or submit to the rule of Islamic authority is anathema to this principle.⁷⁹ Islam also guarantees freedom of belief and is ready to co-exist peacefully based on amity and mutual respect.⁸⁰

Reformist scholars insist that all *Qur'ānic* verses that relate to jihad should be understood with due consideration to the chronology of revelation, and that verses calling for unconditional jihad against all non-Muslims must be read alongside verses that permit jihad only against aggression or for self-defence.⁸¹ Nonetheless this does not mean that Muslims cannot take any aggressive action

⁷⁵ Al-Buḥārī (2005), pp. 113, 291.

⁷⁶ Haykal (1996), pp. 593, 594; Esposito (2002), p. 33; Siba'i (date not cited). *Some Glittering Aspects of the Islamic Civilization*, pp. 100–102.

⁷⁷ Peters (2005), p. 121.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 123, 124, 132.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 62–70, 121; The Royal Aal Al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought (2007); Al-Sharīf (2008), pp. 307, 308, 311.

⁸⁰ The Royal Aal Al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought (2007), pp. 20–28; Al-Sharīf (2008), pp. 307, 308, 311; Al-Buḥārī (2005), pp. 52–54; Firestone (1999), pp. 51–65, 88–90.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 33–37; *Ibid.*; *Ibid.*, pp. 55–63, 98–107, 265; Haykal (1996), pp. 586–597; Shaltūt (2005), pp. 80–82; Peters (2005), pp. 125–127; Ali (2002), pp. 73–81; Hashmi (1999), p. 165.

against hostile parties. Al-Būṭī believes that it is permissible to strike at the hostile party first if there is strong evidence of imminent aggression, not unlike the strategy of pre-emptive strikes seen today.⁸²

There are a number of Muslim scholars who hold this view of defensive jihad. Muḥammad Khayr Haykal, in his comprehensive study of jihad, has listed more than 20 names and books in this category.⁸³

Both reformist and classical scholars concur that the use of force is the exclusive right of the state. Al-Būṭī asserts that armed jihad is not permissible in the absence of the proper authority but should not be used for the purpose of establishing such an authority. He points out that armed jihad was permitted only after the establishment of the first polity by the Prophet in Medina which was established through skillful diplomacy rather than force of arms.⁸⁴

The reformists use jihad in its wider context, stressing the importance of jihad against the self before armed jihad.⁸⁵ Armed jihad is not seen as an act of supreme devotion. Depending on the context, non-violent jihad such as educational jihad, jihad for development, jihad against poverty or illiteracy, should be given greater priority.⁸⁶

Hence, the reformist concept of martyrdom is not limited to death resulting from fighting against non-Muslims. Muḥammad `Abduh asserts that any person who dies while performing any good deed for the sake of Allāh is a martyr.⁸⁷

The reformists argue that the basis of the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims, or between Muslim and non-Muslim polities should be peace. All Muslim countries which are members of the United Nations are regarded to have

⁸² *Ibid.*, pp. 23–25; Al-Būṭī (2005), pp. 107–111; Hashmi (1999), pp. 165–168.

⁸³ Haykal (1996), pp. 583–604.

⁸⁴ Al-Būṭī (2005), pp. 196–201; Al-Zuhayfī (1996), p. 419; Ibn Qudāmah (1984), pp. 368, 369; Al-Māwardī (1982), p. 35; Kelsay (2007), p. 101.

⁸⁵ The Royal Aal Al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought (2007).

⁸⁶ Peters (2005), pp. 116, 117.

⁸⁷ Al-Sharīf (2008), pp. 68, 69.

entered into a peace agreement with other members and are bound by the United Nations' charter and other international conventions. They support the classical view that waging armed jihad against corrupt and unjust rulers is forbidden.⁸⁸ They seek to reinterpret concepts in classical works closely related to jihad such as the binary classification of polities, treatment of prisoners of war, *dhimmī* status and *jizyah* payments to suit modern contexts.

Reformists find that the binary classification of *Dār Al-Islām* and *Dār Al-Ḥarb* is a product of the classical scholars' interpretation of scriptural texts in relation to their political context rather than from any *Qur'ānic* injunction. Some reformists argue that this binary classification has become obsolete and should be discarded. Hence, law on jihad should be built upon the contemporary state system.⁸⁹ The concept of neutrality, founded in modern international law, has been introduced into the study of Muslim inter-state relations and jihad. Muhammad Hamidullah's book *The Muslim Conduct of State* is an important reference.⁹⁰

In line with international conventions, reformist scholars rule that no prisoners of war should be killed, unless they are found guilty of committing offences that are punishable by death.⁹¹

Reformists also regard the *dhimmī* status found in classical works as contingent to a bygone context. With changing realities, all non-Muslim citizens of Muslim countries should be recognised as co-citizens with equal rights and responsibilities. While the payment of *jizyah* has its basis in the *Qur'ān* and the practice of the Prophet, reformists argue that it as a matter for the authority's discretion.⁹²

⁸⁸ The Royal Aal Al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought (2007); Mawlawī (date not cited). *Al-Mafāhīm Al-Asāsiyah Li Al-Da'wah Al-Islāmīyah Fī Bilād Al-Gharb* (Basic understanding for Islamic propagation in Western countries).

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 26–29; Saqr (2002); Ramadan (2002), pp. 123, 124, 130.

⁹⁰ Hamidullah (1987), pp. 284–288.

⁹¹ Peters (2005), p. 146; Hashmi (1999), pp. 175, 176; Torturing Iraqi POWs: Legal and juristic view (2006); Islam's stance on prisoners of war (2006); Al-Qaradawi (2004).

⁹² Huwaydī (1999), pp. 123–126.

Reformist scholars who maintain the concept and vocabulary of *dhimmīy* and *jizyah* in their works argue that these terms are not meant to make non-Muslims second-class citizens. They agree with the classical view that non-Muslims, other than the People of the Book, cannot be considered *dhimmīy* and have to choose between Islam and the sword.⁹³

Unlike classical scholars, reformists believe that civilians and non-combatants should not be targeted in armed conflict, a view that is closely related to contemporary understanding and rooted in international convention. Thus, reformists reject the militant strand (discussed later) that permits the targeting of civilians. As a corollary to this, reformists condemn as war crimes any deliberate attacks on civilians committed by non-state armed groups or conventional forces.⁹⁴

The reformists, however, are divided on the issue of suicide bombings. Some have condemned the act based on the prohibition of suicide in Islam, while others permit its use against legitimate combatants or military targets. An exception is the Palestinian struggle against Israeli occupation where it is argued that the Palestinians have the right to oppose the atrocities committed against them. Moreover, Israeli society do not comprise of civilians in a conventional sense as individuals are armed and may be mobilised at any time for military service.⁹⁵

Some reformists have even called for a reconceptualisation of jihad or a review of its use in Muslim political practice.

In view of the abuse and misuse of the concept of jihad throughout history, Mohammed Ayoob, a Muslim Professor in International Relations has called for “the removal of the word jihad from the vocabulary of politics.” It was not sufficient, in his view, for the reformists to emphasise the importance of personal (greater) jihad

⁹³ Peters (2005), p. 122; The Royal Aal Al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Through (2007); Jizyah and non-Muslim minorities (2003).

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 134, 149–170; The Royal Aal Al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought (2007), pp. 37–39; Peters (2005), pp. 178, 179.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 107–113; Takrūrī (2003), pp. 102–222; Cook (2005), pp. 144–149; Kelsay (2007), p. 141.

above political (lesser and armed) jihad. Instead, "Muslims must totally abjure the use of the term 'jihad' in the contemporary context." The way to achieve this is "for the scholars of Islam to reach a consensus and declare publicly that the term "jihad" no longer applies in a world of nation-states where conflicts take place over issues of territory and ethnicity rather than on the basis of the simple dichotomy between *Dar Al-Islam* and *Dar Al-harb*."⁹⁶

A similar view was also expressed in *The Jakarta Post* by Guntur, an Indonesian alumnus of Al-Azhar University. He calls for the abrogation of the verses on war in the *Qur'ān*. He writes, "Islam acknowledges a method called *nasakh* or the abrogation of law. It is not a popular approach but we can take the step when certain stipulations are no longer applicable to the contemporary context... texts endorsing war and violence will still be there but we will regard them as historical facts." He also urges Muslims to return to the pre-Medinan (period before the Prophet's migration from Mecca to Medina) teachings of Islam.⁹⁷

Abdullahi An-Na'im, a Professor of Islamic Law who wrote the article "Why should Muslims abandon jihad?" refers to a specific form of jihad defined as "the unilateral use of force by Muslims in pursuit of political objectives and outside the institutional framework of international legality and the rule of law in general." He does not reject jihad in the form of self-defence as recognised by the international conventions and other reformists or the use of its vocabulary in politics, but integrates the rule of jihad in Islam into the available international conventions on war and peace with a view that both are compatible with one another. This, according to him, is in line with the present changes that require a rethink on the classical view of jihad.⁹⁸

Generally, reformist scholars view that classical works should be understood not only through textual analysis, but also through contextual understanding of different phases of the classical period.

⁹⁶ Ayooob (2006).

⁹⁷ Khouw (2008).

⁹⁸ An-Na'im (2006).

For example, Al-Būṭī, in reviewing the position of classical scholars on the justification of jihad, argues that jihad for defensive purposes was the position taken by a majority of scholars of the *Hanafīy*, *Mālikīy* and *Hanbalīy* schools of jurisprudence. Only the *Shāfi`īy* school viewed jihad as fighting against *kufr* (disbelief).⁹⁹

Reformists suggest that the binary classification of *Dār Al-Islām* and *Dār Al-Ḥarb* had been used by classical scholars to ensure that the laws pertaining to jihad were applied to the appropriate social and political environment.¹⁰⁰ The concept was also shaped by the period when Islamic law was being codified, during which time Muslims were dominant in the international political scene, and hence bore an air of superiority.¹⁰¹

Reformists argue that the existence of *Dār Al-Ḥarb* does not necessarily mean a state of war with *Dār Al-Islām*. From a linguistic perspective, *Dār Al-Ḥarb* could also mean a land that could potentially be hostile unless it guarantees non-hostility through peace agreements. The term need neither be an indication of, or itself bring about hostility and animosity against non-Muslims.¹⁰²

Zaid Shakir argues that such nuances in classical works clearly reject the idea of Muslims being at perpetual war with non-Muslims, and that jihad is essentially a battle against non-Muslims because of their disbelief.¹⁰³

On the classical view of *dhimmīy* status and *jizyah*, the reformists rationalise that these were originally applied to defeated enemies and their subjects, and therefore not applicable to the non-Muslim citizens in contemporary Muslim countries. They point out the fact that during the early period of the Prophet's migration to Medina and before the revelation on *jizyah* payment, an agreement known as the Medina Charter between the Prophet, the Jews and Pagan Arab tribes contained similar elements that characterised *dhimmīy* status in most classical works. However, the non-Muslims

⁹⁹ Al-Būṭī (2005), p. 94.

¹⁰⁰ The Royal Aal Al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought (2007).

¹⁰¹ Hassan (2006), p. 51.

¹⁰² Donner (1991), pp. 34, 35, 108, 109.

¹⁰³ Shakir (2003–2004).

in the agreement were regarded as one nation with the Muslims. It was only when the Jews breached the agreement that the verses on *jizyah* were revealed. Also, the *hadīth* records that the Prophet did not impose *jizyah* on certain non-Muslims.¹⁰⁴

As mentioned before, the reformists believe that classical works cannot be understood fully without analysing the contexts from which they emerged. Similarly, reformist thinking on jihad is not without any influence from these contexts. In the late 19th and 20th centuries, reformist thinking was, to a large extent, a reaction to the orientalist scholars who painted a very negative image of Islam. The concept of jihad in classical works were depicted by orientalist as a justification for Islamic imperialism, discriminative treatments against non-Muslims and war; a concept which was regarded as anathema to the Western idea of a just war. This negative view of Islam was spread widely to Muslim countries through the Western education systems, media, publications and institutions of higher learning which were established or facilitated by colonial powers that occupied most of the Muslim countries then.¹⁰⁵

One such defensive reaction could be discerned from Shaltūt's work when he wrote:

"After this exposé nobody can vilify Islam anymore or misinterpret the Koranic verses and maintain as some ignoramus have done, that Islam has taken up fighting as a means of propagating its Mission and as an instrument for conversion, and that its Mission and creed were founded on and propagated by suppression and the use of force."¹⁰⁶

This can also be seen in `Abduh's exchanges with Farah Anṭūn, a Lebanese journalist, novelist and political writer based in Egypt,

¹⁰⁴ Asad (1980), p. 262; Huwaydī (1999), pp. 142–145; The Royal Aal Al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought (2007), pp. 46–50; Al-Būṭī (2005), pp. 131–137.

¹⁰⁵ Ali (2002), pp. 71, 82–92; Esposito (2002), p. 66; Peters (2005), pp. 109, 110, 123–125.

¹⁰⁶ Shaltūt (2005), p. 79; Esposito (2002), p. 66.

and Gabriel Hanotoux, a French historian and Minister of Foreign Affairs (1894–1898).¹⁰⁷

Colonial powers had also brought modern Western ideas to Muslim countries. Despite their commitment to Islam, reformists Muslims have not been spared from these new ideas. They began to use modern vocabularies and concepts to illustrate classical ideas or frame classical terminology in accordance to modern concepts borrowed from international law and other disciplines. An example is the use of the terms “civilian,” “combatant” and “non-combatant,” which were non-existent in classical terminology and conceptually different from the classical understanding of those who may or may not be killed.¹⁰⁸

Some of these contexts have had special impacts on reformist ideas. In the aftermath of the Sepoy Mutiny (1857) in India, Aḥmad Khān forbade armed jihad against British colonial rule so long as the Muslims were not prevented from performing their religious obligations. Before the mutiny, Muslims enjoyed relatively privileged status in the army and the bureaucracy, relative to the Hindus under British rule. However, Muslims began to lose their positions to the Hindus when Muslim sepoys mutinied against their British commanders, due to dissatisfaction over their treatment and fuelled by many *fatwā* of jihad against the British rule that were propagated during that period.¹⁰⁹

Scholars regarded Aḥmad Khān’s ideas as his attempt to reinstate Muslim loyalty towards British rule and to appease the rulers with the objective of reclaiming the status enjoyed by Muslims before the mutiny. This was in addition to his own belief that Muslims must change some aspects of their understanding of Islam if they are to have a better future. Fearing that Muslims would lose out to the Hindus if India gained independence, Khān became highly suspicious of the independence movement in India.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁷ Al-Sharīf (2008), pp. 62–71.

¹⁰⁸ Peters (2005), pp. 145–148; Habeck (2004), p. 27.

¹⁰⁹ Bonney (2004), pp. 192, 193.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 123, 124, 132.

Unlike their early counterparts, the reformists of the late 20th century had to respond primarily to the issue of religious extremism within the Muslim society which had led to revolts against rulers in the name of jihad. This forced the reformists such as Al-Būṭīy, to reiterate the essentially defensive views of jihad in their works.¹¹¹

2.5 Militant Strand of Jihad

The adjective “militant” here does not necessarily connote the tendency for violence. Here it is used to describe a strand of jihad that is strident and confrontational, and that seeks to achieve political or social change. The methods used could be radical or extreme and sometimes violent.¹¹²

Militants believe that Muslims are obligated to proactively wage jihad against non-Muslims until Islam rules supreme. They classify armed jihad into two: *jihād al-dafʿ* (defensive jihad) and *jihād al-ṭalab* (offensive jihad).

While the traditionalists also acknowledge the aggressive characteristics of jihad, the militants go further by viewing armed jihad as being superior to non-violent jihad. It is seen as the ultimate act of devotion, the pinnacle of Islamic teachings and the solution to the current subjugation of the Muslims by the West, which they attribute to the neglect of the duty of armed jihad.¹¹³

Much of the militant view on jihad has been mentioned in Chapter 1 in the section describing jihadist ideology. Although jihadists make up the extreme group in this category, the illustration given also applies to non-jihadist militants. Although

¹¹¹ Al-Būṭīy (2005).

¹¹² See *Collins Cobuild English Dictionary* (1995); *Oxford Dictionary* (Concise) (1999); *Macmillan English Dictionary for Advanced Learners International Student Edition* (2002). For a broad perspective of Militant Islam, see also Jansen (1979).

¹¹³ Peters (2005), pp. 128, 160, 161; Al-Sharīf (2008), p. 312.

non-jihadist militants have not been known to be involved in actual armed activities against the perceived enemy or authority, or to belong to any jihadist organisation, they exist symbiotically with jihadists. One example of non-jihadist militants was Sayyid Qutb.

To reiterate, jihadists believe that:

1. Armed jihad is the ultimate act of devotion.
2. Unless otherwise stated, jihad means fighting against non-Muslims.
3. Jihad is a perpetual war against non-Muslims until they embrace Islam, or submit to Muslim rule.
4. The world is divided into two (binary) — *Dār Al-Islām* and *Dār Al-Harb*.
5. Waging armed jihad in the present day is considered *fard `ayn* for all Muslims until the rule of *sharī`ah* prevails, all non-Muslim forces leave Muslim lands and all lands that were historically under Muslim rule are reclaimed.
6. Suicide bombing is a commendable act for seeking martyrdom.
7. It is legitimate to target of non-Muslim civilians in order to avenge the blood of Muslim civilians and as punishment for their support of hostile non-Muslim governments.¹¹⁴

The militants consider that it is legitimate to wage jihad against the rulers of Muslim countries today, because they believe that these leaders have become apostates for not ruling in accordance to the *sharī`ah*. Muslim civilians who support their apostate rulers are also considered apostates and are therefore legitimate targets in jihad attacks.¹¹⁵

The militants divide their enemies into two categories; the near and far enemy. The near enemies refer to local regimes which do not rule in accordance to the *sharī`ah* and the far enemies are the

¹¹⁴ Gerges (2005), pp. 3–15.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 5; Peters (2005), p. 154; Al-Sharīf (2008), pp. 309–313; Kelsay (2007), pp. 131, 132.

non-Muslim countries in the West. There has been no consensus on which should be targeted first in jihad.¹¹⁶

The militants once held the view that jihad against the near enemy must supersede jihad against the far enemy. They had even been prepared to suspend armed jihad against Israel and work towards establishing legitimate rule based on *sharī'ah* so that jihad could be waged under the appropriate leadership. This view has since changed with the emergence of Al-Qaeda as the main proponent of global jihad. Al-Qaeda's rationale is that the far enemy is guilty of backing the local regimes, which have been suppressing local militant groups. If the far enemy is defeated, as the Soviet Union had been in Afghanistan, then the fall of the local regimes would be inevitable.¹¹⁷

Fawaz Gergez, however, offers more nuanced explanations. His explanations, among others, relate to the internal conflict within militant circles such as competition for prominence among various groups and the remobilising of Muslims and the militants for a new cause after the jihad against local regimes had failed, and some of the militants reviewed their previous ideas and called for unilateral ceasefire.¹¹⁸

The militants are usually very critical of the reformists and the traditionalists. They accuse the reformists of portraying a certain image of Islam just to placate non-Muslims, and they disapprove of the traditionalist pre-occupation with non-violent jihad at the expense of armed jihad.¹¹⁹

Although classical works remain as the militants' primary source of reference in developing their ideas on jihad, they also differentiate themselves from classical scholars in many ways. They frame their ideas using modern vocabulary and concepts such as "state," "revolution" and "vanguard." It is also observed that the militants' ideas bore a strong resemblance to modern revolutionary and leftist ideology.¹²⁰

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 9–15; *Ibid.*, pp. 160–163, 175.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*; *Ibid.*, p. 174; Mandaville (2007), pp. 253, 254; Faraj (2000), pp. 42–49.

¹¹⁸ Gergez (2005).

¹¹⁹ Peters (2005), pp. 130, 165; Al-Sharīf (2008); Euben (2002), pp. 17, 18.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 129; *Ibid.*; *Ibid.*, pp. 21, 22; Roy (1996), pp. 3, 40; Habeck (2004), pp. 17–19; Gergez (2005), p. 4.

The militants often reinvent and reinterpret classical ideas in order to achieve their grand political vision, i.e., to establish Islamic rule. Some examples are:

1. The classical view that permitted the killing of any person contributing to a war against the Muslims has been used as a justification in the present era for targeting civilians who support a government through their taxes or votes.
2. The permissibility of extreme acts in the midst of a battle has been the justification for suicide bombing operations outside the battlefield.
3. The justification for sacrificing Muslims civilians while conducting military operations is based on the permissibility of killing Muslims in *tatarrus* situations, which is often discussed in classical works. *Tatarrus* is a situation where the enemy uses Muslim hostages as human shields to deter the Muslim army from attacking.
4. The justification for killing civilians is based on the principle of an eye for an eye, although in fact, such justification was never found in classical works.
5. The justification for seizing the properties of non-Muslim citizens in Muslim countries.

2.5.1 *The context*

The context, from which the militant viewpoint emerged, as illustrated in Chapter 1, is summarised below:

1. The militant viewpoint emerged from the movement for Islamic revivalism and independence during the 19th and early 20th centuries.
2. The harsh treatments, tortures and injustices experienced by Muslim reform activists by local regimes contributed to the mutation of reform movements into militant and jihadist groups.
3. The emergence of early jihadist movements can be traced to Egypt, when the Arab armies experienced a humiliating defeat during the 1967 Six-Day war.

4. The success of jihad in Afghanistan against the Soviet invasion provided fertile ground for proponents of militant jihad to validate and spread their ideas, widen their support base, transform their struggle to a global jihad, multiply their core members and gain confidence to take on the superpowers of the day. This event also provided a new lease of life for core jihadist movements in Egypt which had been effectively suppressed by Jamāl `Abd Al-Nāṣir (and later by Ḥusnī Mubārak).

In addition to the above, the use of suicide bombs by Muslim militants can be traced to the 1983 attack on the American and French UN peacekeeping army in Lebanon by Shiite militia, following a *fatwā* issued by Shiite scholars. The ideas, practice and “know-how” were later transferred to a group of Palestinian leaders who had been banished by Israel during the First *Intifāḍah* (1987–1993).¹²¹

Like any ideology, militant ideas evolved over time. In the beginning, their main target was the near enemy which, to them, referred to the “apostate” rulers of Muslim countries. This idea can be attributed to Muḥammad `Abd Al-Salām Faraj, a leader of the Egyptian *Al-Jihād*, who wrote *Al-Farīḍah Al-Ghā'ibah* (The Absent Obligation).¹²²

However, after decades of struggle with little success, and witnessing the defeat of the Soviet army in the hands of the mujahidin in Afghanistan, the militant idea of targeting the far enemy — chiefly by the United States and Israel — began to take centre stage. Proponents of this view attributed their failure in defeating the near enemy to the constant support the near enemy received from the far enemy. This strand was popularised by Al-Qaeda through its emir, Bin Laden, the main protagonist of the global jihad movement until his death in 2011.¹²³

According to Peters, the militant viewpoint is characterised by its refusal to acquiesce to the context, its self-assertiveness, and

¹²¹ Bonney (2004), p. 310.

¹²² Faraj (2000), pp. 42–49.

¹²³ Gerges (2005).

unbending commitment to the ideals which has led them to wage jihad against all who stand in their way.¹²⁴

Peters asserts that both the reformist and militant viewpoints represent two different reactions to Western influence in the Muslim world. The former is defensive while the latter is assertive.¹²⁵

2.5.2 *The ideologues*

To better understand the militant idea on jihad, it would be appropriate to look at the key figures and the contexts which have contributed to its evolution.

Some of the figures who have had profound impacts on its ideology are Ibn Taymīyah, Muḥammad ibn `Abd Al-Wahhāb, Rashīd Riḍa, Ḥasan Al-Bannā, Al-Mawdūdīy, Sayyid Quṭb, Muḥammad `Abd Al-Salām Faraj and `Abd `Allāh `Azzām.¹²⁶

The following sections will offer biographical accounts of these individuals, with special attention to their ideology and their contributions to militant ideas on jihad.

2.5.3 *Ibn Taymīyah (1263–1328)*

Taqīy Al-Dīn ibn Taymīyah was a respected 13th century Sunni scholar of the *Hanbalīy* School. He has had the most influence on modern radical ideology.¹²⁷ The ideologues of the modern period revere him and make references to his work. He is often quoted by Faraj in his influential book, *The Absent Obligation*. `Azzām wrote, “Four people influenced me in my life; Ibn Taymīyah on creed and theology, Ibn Al-Qayyim on etiquette, Al-Nawawīy on jurisprudence and Sayyid Quṭb on worldview.”¹²⁸

Ibn Taymīyah had issued a *fatwa* making it legitimate to wage jihad against the Muslim Mongols who were then ruling Baghdad and were threatening other Muslim lands. Ibn Taymīyah argued

¹²⁴ Peters (2005), pp. 132, 133.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

¹²⁶ Habeck (2004), pp. 17–19, 29; Kepel (2005), pp. 5, 23.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 19; Benjamin and Simon (2002), p. 44.

¹²⁸ Al-Baghdādīy (1990); p. 38; Calvert (2007); p. 87; McGregor (2003), p. 93.

that since the Mongols ruled by their customary *Yāsā* laws instead of the *sharī'ah*, he was of the opinion that their status as Muslims was nullified, based on the *Qur'ānic* verse that states that whoever governed by laws other than those revealed by God has fallen into disbelief. It thus became obligatory for Muslims to defend and liberate their lands through armed jihad.¹²⁹ This *fatwā* became the foundation for many ideas which mutated into jihadism. Because belief in Allah as the only God requires Muslims to accept that He is the only Being that deserves their devotion and submission; observing the five pillars of Islam and abiding by the *sharī'ah* in its entirety, Ibn Taymīyah concluded in the *fatwā*:

- It is incumbent upon all Muslim rulers i.e., the Mongols, to implement the *sharī'ah*, especially those rulings concerned with the social, political and economic sphere.
- Since the full implementation of the *sharī'ah* requires political authority, religion and politics cannot be separated.
- To replace the *sharī'ah* with other rules (like the *Yāsā*) is considered an act of *kufr* (disbelief) because it contradicts the basic concept of belief in, and submission to, Allah.
- Since Islam came to abolish *kufr*, it is incumbent upon Muslims to bring about this abolishment by waging armed jihad against the Mongols.

Ibn Taymīyah's *fatwā* and the ideas mentioned above subsequently became the basis for the jihadists' militancy. The jihadists saw the parallel between the Mongols and the contemporary regimes in Muslim countries. It was thus not only legitimate but also obligatory to wage armed rebellions against all regimes in Muslim countries who ruled by secular law.¹³⁰

Ibn Taymīyah made a departure from the dominant classical view in that he considered jihad as the most important *fard 'ayn*

¹²⁹ Esposito (2002), pp. 45, 46.

¹³⁰ Benjaman and Simon (2002), pp. 43, 50; Habeck (2004), pp. 19–22; Esposito (2002), pp. 45, 46; Kepel (2003), p. 47.

after belief and that it is the best of all devotions. He also brought into prominence the view held by a minority of classical scholars that jihad should be waged against non-Muslims as well as sinful Muslims and heretics. A few scholars also suggest that Ibn Taymīyah had extended this view to include even the Muslims who neglected their jihad duty.¹³¹ Hence, Ibn Taymīyah is seen as being responsible for planting the seeds of revolutionary violence.¹³²

Ibn Taymīyah was not just a scholar who wrote on jihad as an intellectual exercise. His role in mobilising Muslims against the threat of the Mongols provides inspiration to modern militants. His participation in battle has also provided greater credibility to his ideas on jihad.

Ibn Taymīyah was a forceful proponent of returning to the way of the original *salaf* (pious predecessors) — a way characterised by strict adherence to the literal interpretation of the *Qur'ān* and the *sunnah* (Prophetic tradition), and the opinions of scholars with sound arguments that conform to the textual inference of the *Qur'ān* and the *sunnah*. His harsh criticism of the *ṣūfī* practitioners and rationalist thinkers have influenced the way modern *salafī* (followers of the way of salaf) critique anyone who does not subscribe to their views.¹³³

However, not everyone who has been influenced by Ibn Taymīyah or who is a *salafī* is a militant. In fact, one could find many ideas from within Ibn Taymīyah's works that would discredit contemporary militant ideas on jihad.¹³⁴

2.5.4 *Muḥammad ibn `Abd Al-Wahhāb (1703–1792)*

Muḥammad ibn `Abd Al-Wahhāb was an 18th century scholar from Najd in the central Arabian Peninsula in what is today Saudi Arabia. He is the founder of the movement, commonly known as

¹³¹ Ibn Taymīyah (2005); Benjamin and Simon (2002), pp. 49, 50; Habeck (2004), pp. 20, 21; Kelsay (2007), p. 126; Kepel (2005), p. 205.

¹³² Phares (2003), p. 56; Benjamin and Simon (2002), p. 50; Kepel (2003), pp. 50, 51.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 54, 55.

¹³⁴ Bonney (2004), pp. 121–126.

Wahhabism that is closely associated with the official religious establishment in present-day Saudi Arabia.¹³⁵

Ibn 'Abd Al-Wahhāb was responsible for reviving Ibn Taymīyah's ideas after a lapse of 500 years. He brought these ideas to the centre of Islamic theology, eventually making a profound impact on the global Muslim community. The growth of the Wahhabi movement was accomplished with the help of Ibn 'Abd Al-Wahhāb's ally, Muḥammad ibn Sa'ūd, and later with the support of Ibn Sa'ūd's heirs who now rule Saudi Arabia.¹³⁶

Although both Ibn 'Abd Al-Wahhāb and Ibn Taymīyah were, according to scholars, bent on using violence in establishing true Islam, the former was more concerned with purifying the rituals and social domains of the Muslim community, whereas the latter was pre-occupied with the political turmoil during his lifetime.¹³⁷ Ibn 'Abd Al-Wahhāb did not have the political experience of Ibn Taymīyah. Moreover, in the late 18th century, the House of Sa'ūd was not regarded as a rightful authority to sanction any armed jihad, due to the existence of the Ottoman caliphate. In the beginning, Ibn 'Abd Al-Wahhāb and his followers operated like a vigilante movement to purify the Muslim community from what they perceived as superstitious and heretical practices, as well as against tribes that competed with the House of Sa'ūd for power in the Arabian Peninsula.

While Ibn Taymīyah's jihad could be regarded as self-defense, sanctioned by a righteous authority, i.e., the Mamlūks, the jihad led by the House of Sa'ūd and its Wahhabi ally against the Ottoman authority in Arabia seemed more like an armed rebellion by a local militia against the ruling caliphate.¹³⁸

In this respect, it could be said that the jihad practices of Ibn 'Abd Al-Wahhāb and his followers were a departure from the dominant classical view that firstly forbade the use of violence

¹³⁵ Pharees (2003), p. 73; Esposito (2002), pp. 6, 47; Benjamin and Simon (2002), pp. 50–54; Kepel (2005), pp. 50, 51

¹³⁶ Esposito (2002), p. 47; Mandaville (2007), pp. 44, 245–247; Habeck (2004), p. 22.

¹³⁷ Habeck (2004), p. 25.

¹³⁸ Kelsay (2007), p. 127; Bonney (2004), pp. 160, 161.

as a means for social reform unless mandated by the authority, and secondly armed rebellion against a legitimate Muslim ruler. This provides insights into the prevalent vigilante culture and rebellious tendency seen in contemporary militant/extremist groups.¹³⁹

Ibn `Abd Al-Wahhāb's ideas were to influence the radical Muslim reformists who sought refuge in Saudi Arabia from countries that persecuted them such as Egypt and Syria almost a century later. They were welcomed by the regime, filling manpower needs due to the rapid development in the country following the 1973 oil crisis, and were seen as a counter to the Nasserist socialism that was threatening the Saudi monarchy.¹⁴⁰

During this period, cross-fertilisation occurred between the reformists and the politically conservative Saudis. The result was the adoption of Wahhabi salafism by the activists in their theology and the cultivation of the culture of social and political activism among local Saudis. The promotion of this cross-fertilised idea as a counter-weight to Nasserist socialism in Muslim countries contributed subsequently to the emergence of Islamic movements that were founded on strong Wahhabi-salafīy theology and modern socio-political activism.¹⁴¹

2.5.5 *Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍa (1865–1935)*

Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍa was a Syrian Muslim scholar. He was the most prominent student of Muḥammad `Abduh, a Muslim reformist and Grand Shaykh of Al-Azhar. Riḍa settled in Egypt in 1897 to support `Abduh in his reform work.

In the beginning, Riḍa's ideas mirrored his mentor's reformist thinking. However, he later became an admirer of Ibn `Abd Al-Wahhāb, and took on a more conservative and traditional outlook. He believed that the reformists had gone too far in their attempt

¹³⁹ Habeck (2004), pp. 23, 24.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 25; Esposito (2002), p. 7; Kepel (2003), pp. 50–52, 62, 73, 118–120.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*; *Ibid.*, p. 47; *Ibid.*, pp. 63, 67; Mandaville (2007), pp. 159–161, 245–251.

to revive the Muslim *ummah* and may have caused Muslims to lose their faith due to their Westernised thinking and lifestyles. Just like Ibn `Abd Al-Wahhāb and Ibn Taymīyah, Riḍa called on all Muslims to return to the ways of the *salaf* (pious predecessors) and to live entirely by the *sharī`ah*.¹⁴²

Although Riḍa was not known to have promoted militant jihad ideas or indeed incited jihad, he was important for promoting Ibn `Abd Al-Wahhāb's ideas, and as a result, also those of Ibn Taymīyah to early Muslim reform activists. It was against this backdrop the militant strand emerged.¹⁴³

Mary Habeck writes that Riḍa was the person who rediscovered Ibn Taymīyah. This, opened up the opportunity for the Mongol analogy as a justification for jihad against a Muslim regime.¹⁴⁴

According to Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, Riḍa employed the term *jāhilīyah*, which was used by the Prophet Muḥammad to refer to the state of widespread ignorance and disbelief before revelation, to describe the state of the Muslims in his time. Riḍa held the view that governance that was not in accordance with the *sharī`ah* was *kufr* (disbelief). This was the same idea that has become the basis of armed jihad against local regimes by militant groups.¹⁴⁵

Riḍa was also a teacher for Ḥasan Al-Bannā, whose role we shall turn to now.

2.5.6 *Ḥasan Al-Bannā (1906–1949)*

An Egyptian school teacher, Ḥasan Al-Bannā was the founder of the Muslim Brothers (founded in 1928). The organisation was a popular Islamic movement that had branches in many countries. It has influenced almost all other Islamic movements founded after it and it is presently the largest Islamic movement.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴² Mandaville (2007), p. 52; Habeck (2004), p. 28; Benjamin and Simon (2002), pp. 56, 57.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 248.

¹⁴⁴ Habeck (2004), p. 28.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 68, 85, 89, 100; Esposito (2002), p. 50; Pharees (2003), pp. 64, 65; Kepel (2005), p. 20.

Al-Bannā was regarded by many scholars as being responsible for the spread of Islamism and Islamist movements in the 20th century. Islamism was different from jihadism and not all Islamist were jihadists. The brand of Islamism promoted by Al-Bannā and the Muslim Brothers held the view that Islam was a comprehensive religion where politics and religion cannot be separated. They believe that it is necessary to establish an Islamic state to realise Islam as a way of life, that Islam is the solution to all problems and that Muslims should return to the fundamental sources of Islam, which are the *Qurʾān* and the *sunnah*. These were also the foundational ideas of jihadists. Hence, the Islamism promoted by Al-Bannā and the Muslim Brothers provided the intellectual groundwork which subsequently metamorphosed into jihadism. Indeed, many early militant and jihadist groups sprang from the the Muslim Brothers as well as other Islamist movements. These movements include the *Al-Jamāʿah Al-Islamīyah* (Egypt), *Al-Jihād* (Egypt), *Al-Takfīr Wa Al-Hijrah* (Egypt), *Ḥamās* (Palestine) and *Ḥizb Al-Taḥrīr* (Palestine).

Although Riḍa revived the ideas of Ibn Taymīyah and Ibn ʿAbd Al-Wahhāb, Al-Bannā is credited for popularising their ideas through the Muslim Brothers. Mary Habeck has credited Al-Bannā for rediscovering all three ideologues; Ibn Taymīyah, Ibn ʿAbd Al-Wahhāb and Riḍa.¹⁴⁷

Al-Bannā's jihad ideas were largely neo-classical. To him, non-violent means must be explored before violent ones and armed jihad can only be waged after an extensive preparation in all dimensions i.e., spiritual, political and economical.¹⁴⁸ However, he did not hold the view that armed jihad should be limited to defence.¹⁴⁹

Al-Bannā categorised armed jihad against the occupiers of Muslim lands as *farḍ ʿayn*. With no apologies, he saw armed jihad as an integral part of Islam in order to save mankind from the ignorance

¹⁴⁷ Habeck (2004), p. 29.

¹⁴⁸ Al-Bannā (2006), p. 239; Al-Bannā (2006), pp. 248, 249, 251, 252; Pharees (2003), p. 73; Mandaville (2007), p. 66.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 232–236; Sonn (1990), p. 140.

of disbelief, free them from “enslavement,” and guide people to the truth of Islam. He dismissed the view that jihad was a means of converting people to Islam and colonising non-Muslims as the attempt of orientalist to tarnish and distort the true teachings of Islam.¹⁵⁰

Some scholars suggest that he even put his ideas on jihad into practice through the military and secret organisations which he formed and operated in Egypt against the British, and in Palestine against Israel.¹⁵¹

There is no doubt about Al-Bannā's significance in the genealogical chain of militant jihad ideology. This can be seen from the fact that the early jihadist groups like the Egyptian *Al-Jamā'ah Al-Islāmiyah* and *Al-Jihād* emerged from the Muslim Brothers' milieu and the similarities in the worldview of the militants, Al-Bannā and the Muslim Brothers organisation he founded.¹⁵² However, it must be pointed out that putting Al-Bannā in the militant jihad ideological genealogy does not imply a causal link for three main reasons.

Firstly, many more non-violent Islamic movements than jihadist groups have been inspired by Al-Bannā's ideas. Unlike Muḥammad 'Abd Al-Salām Faraj, Al-Bannā's ideas are open to different interpretations. Secondly, and to reinforce the first reason, the Muslim Brothers founded by Al-Bannā has successfully evolved into a mainstream and non-violent movement since 1965, and has become one of the strongest critics of Al-Qaeda's militant jihad ideology.¹⁵³ The Muslim Brothers has posed serious challenges to Al-Qaeda's attempts at winning over Muslim audiences. This explains some of the harsh criticisms against them by the militants, as exemplified by Ayman Al-Zawāhirī's book *Al-Ḥaṣād Al-Mur*.¹⁵⁴ Thirdly, the fact that Al-Bannā and the Muslim Brothers were harshly denounced means any person who subscribes to the Brothers' ideology would not be easily accepted into the fold of

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 235–239; Habeck (2004), p. 32; Esposito (2002), pp. 51–53.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 30–35.

¹⁵² Roy (1996), pp. 1, 2; Kepel (2003), pp. 9–20; Blaydes and Rubin (2008), p. 464; Cottee (2010), p. 336; Kepel (2003), pp. 27–32.

¹⁵³ Ashour (2009), p. 44. See Lynch (2010), pp. 467–487.

¹⁵⁴ Al-Zawāhirī (Unpublished). *Al-Ḥaṣād Al-Mur: Al-Ikhwān Al-Muslimūn Fī Sittīn 'Āman*.

militant groups, and the harsh criticism against them would naturally turn them off militant jihad propagated by jihadists.

Thus, in today's context, Al-Bannā's ideas propagated by the Muslim Brothers function more as a barrier to militancy and extremism than as a conveyor belt. Some researchers would even attribute the Egyptian *Al-Jamā'ah Al-Islāmiyah*'s denouncement of violence since 1997 to the influence of the Muslim Brothers' non-violent Islamist ideology.¹⁵⁵

2.5.7 *Abū Al-A`lā Al-Mawdūdīy (1903–1979)*

Abū Al-A`lā Al-Mawdūdīy was an Indian-born Muslim thinker. After the partition of the Indian sub-continent he migrated to Pakistan where he worked as a journalist and wrote many books on Islam and politics. He founded the *Jamaat-e-Islami* in Pakistan, a movement analogous to the Muslim Brothers in Egypt.

Al-Mawdūdīy had many ideas in common with Al-Bannā and was also regarded as the person responsible for providing the ideological and intellectual foundation for Islamism.¹⁵⁶

In addition to being a pioneer of Islamism, he is important for his role in the spread of Islamism in the Indian sub-continent through *Jamaat-e-Islami*, and subsequently in Western countries via the migration of Indo-Pakistani Muslims.

Scholars credit Al-Mawdūdīy for introducing and/or promoting the following concepts:

- *Hākimiyyah*: Allah is the only sovereign. Only Allah holds the right to legislate what is *ḥalāl* (permissible) and *ḥarām* (forbidden). Man as Allah's vicegerent is only responsible to rule and judge in accordance to Allah's decree. Otherwise he is claiming what is the exclusive right of Allah, the consequence of which is *kufr* (disbelief).

¹⁵⁵ Hamzawy and Grebowski (2010); Blaydes and Rubin (2008), p. 469.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 50; Mandaville (2007), pp. 62–64, 68; Roy (1996), pp. 1, 2, 40–43, 60; Kepel (2003), pp. 24, 34, 35; Habeck (2004), p. 39; Sonn (1990).

- *Jāhiliyah*: This refers to a state of ignorance where unIslamic practices prevail. Although the term originally referred to the state of the Arabs before the prophethood of Muḥammad, Al-Mawdūdīy believes that its meaning is not limited to any time or place.¹⁵⁷
- Vanguard: Core cadres of the Islamic movement must be produced through the process of extensive *tarbiyah* (education and training) in order to lead Islamic reform successfully.¹⁵⁸

Al-Mawdūdīy also wrote a small book on jihad which held the same unapologetic view as Al-Bannā. He regarded jihad as being both offensive and defensive. It is offensive because its objective is to liberate humanity from state of *jāhiliyah* to Islam, and it is defensive because of its role in defending humanity from the sway of *jāhiliyah*.¹⁵⁹

But Al-Mawdūdīy's biggest contribution to the development of the militant strand of jihad was his influence on Sayyid Quṭb.

2.5.8 Sayyid Quṭb (1906–1966)

Sayyid Quṭb was an Egyptian thinker and a leading ideologue for the Muslim Brothers in the 1950s and 1960s. He was hanged in August 1966 for allegedly plotting to overthrow the government and assassinate Jamāl 'Abd Al-Nāṣir, the president of Egypt.

Quṭb is regarded as the ideological godfather of Muslim revolutionaries. According to Gilles Kepel, Quṭb's book, *Māālīm Fī Al-Ṭarīq* (Milestones) is the manifesto for the jihadists' struggle, and responsible for the intellectual gestation of radical Islamist movements from the 1960s onwards.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁷ The same concept was also introduced by Rashīd Riḍa. It is not clear, however, whether the similarity is by coincidence or one was influenced by the other.

¹⁵⁸ Al-Mawdūdīy (1991), pp. 72–76, 94, 95, 116, 120–123, 135–142, 290, 291; Al-Mawdūdīy (1980), pp. 11–20, 71–82, 158; Al-Mawdūdīy (1994); Al-Mawdūdīy (2002); Mandaville (2007), pp. 64–68.

¹⁵⁹ Al-Mawdūdīy (date not cited). *Al-Jihād Fī Sabīl Allāh* (Jihad in the way of Allah), pp. 15, 16; Al-Mawdūdīy (1991); Mandaville (2007), p. 52.

¹⁶⁰ Kepel (2005), pp. 21, 36. See also Kepel (2003), p. 34; Mandaville (2007), p. 241; Gerges (2005), p. 7; Lewis (2004). *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror*, pp. 65, 66, 69.

Another of Quṭb's work that is equally influential is his exegesis of the whole *Qur'ān* entitled *Fī Zilāl Al-Qur'ān* (Under the Shades of the *Qur'ān*) which brought together the ideas of all the idealogues discussed earlier. Kepel suggested that Quṭb was particularly influenced by Al-Mawdūdīy from whom he borrowed the concept of '*ubūdīyah* (devotion, submission and obedience to *Allāh* only) and *hākīmīyah*.¹⁶¹

Both *Milestones* and Quṭb's exegesis were written during his imprisonment from 1954 to 1964. While in prison, he endured brutal treatment and torture. This experience hardened his hostility towards the Egyptian regime.¹⁶²

In *Milestones*, Quṭb asserts that societies and their regimes are in the state of *jāhiliyyah* because they are not manifesting true '*ubūdīyah* and submitting to the *hākīmīyah* of *Allāh*. In short, they are on the verge of *kufr*. The solution, according to Quṭb, is to wage jihad by first carefully grooming individual Muslims with the correct understanding of Islam into what he called the *Qur'ānic* generation, which are in essence similar to the first generation of Muslims. These individuals are to be the vanguards that would bring down *jāhiliyyah* in all its manifestations, after which true Islam can be re-established.¹⁶³ Quṭb's diagnosis of the current state of Muslims and essentialist analysis had tremendous influence on the worldview of the militants.¹⁶⁴

Although Quṭb agreed that jihad was not limited to armed struggle and acknowledged the role of non-violent jihad, he was not apologetic about the necessity of armed jihad in the struggle against *jāhiliyyah* even if it was not a defensive jihad. He argues that waging offensive armed jihad against the forces of *jāhiliyyah* is legitimate because it is not intended to subjugate or enslave people but to bring them back to their natural state of Islam. He believed jihad is not a means of converting people to Islam, but

¹⁶¹ Kepel (2003), pp. 26, 34. See Mandaville (2007), pp. 78–80; Esposito (2002), p. 59; Habeck (2004), pp. 38, 39.

¹⁶² Kepel (2005), p. 25.

¹⁶³ Esposito (2002), pp. 58–61; Kepel (2005), p. 36; Mandaville (2007), pp. 78–83; Habeck (2004), pp. 37, 38; Lewis (2004), p. 68.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 58; *Ibid.*, p. 35; Kepel (2005), p. 35; Roy (1996), pp. 41, 60; Gerges (2005), pp. 5, 6.

a means of creating an environment where true freedom of choice could exist.¹⁶⁵

Although Quṭb did not explicitly recommend the use of bombs and weapons, his ideas, packaged in revolutionary language, radicalised a segment of Muslim youths who were extremely angered by their regime's brutality towards Muslim activists and were disillusioned by the mainstream Muslim Brothers' plodding strategy. For these youths, it was a call to arms.¹⁶⁶

With the lack of ideological leadership after the death of Al-Bannā, many youths were drawn to Quṭb's ideas. His simple diagnosis of the problem and his articulate solution filled the vacuum. In their eyes, his steadfastness in the face of brutal torture and his martyrdom brought to mind the suffering of early Muslims who were persecuted by the *jāhiliyyah* inhabitants of pagan Mecca at the dawn of Islam.

The reverence that Quṭb gained from the Muslim youths made him the lens through which they understood Al-Bannā and Al-Mawdūdīy. However, Al-Bannā's approach, which favoured gradual change through *da'wah* (peaceful propagation of Islam), and Al-Mawdūdīy's non-violent open political participation were skipped over in favour of Quṭb's revolutionary and rejectionist stand. In this regard, Quṭb is regarded as the person who reconstructed and radicalised the ideas of both these figures.¹⁶⁷

2.5.9 *Muḥammad 'Abd Al-Salām Faraj (1954–1982)*

Muḥammad 'Abd Al-Salām Faraj was an Egyptian founding member of the *Al-Jihād* organisation. He was executed in April 1982 for his role in the assassination of Anwār Sādāt, the President of Egypt. His influence on militant thinking came through his book *The Absent Obligation*. The book is regarded as the "constitution" for *Al-Jihād* and is used as reference for many other jihadist groups.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 60; Roy (1996), pp. 41, 60; Mandaville (2007), pp. 78–83, 252.

¹⁶⁶ Esposito (2002), pp. 56, 58; Mandaville (2007), p. 81; Kepel (2005), p. 29.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 25; Kepel (2003), pp. 24–27, 35, 36; Esposito (2002), pp. 56–59; Habeck (2004), p. 25.

¹⁶⁸ Cook (2005), p. 110; Kelsay (2007), p. 130; Sonn (1990); Gerges (2005), pp. 9, 10.

In his book, Faraj made an assessment of all Islamic movements before him such as the Muslim Brothers and *Al-Takfir Wa Al-Hijrah*. He concluded that the approaches taken previously, i.e., political participation, social welfare and the policy of gradual change through *da'wah*, *hijrah* and education, were all futile. According to him, some of these approaches contradicted the teachings of Islam and the fact that none of them had succeeded in bringing down *jāhiliyyah* seemed to affirm his assessment.¹⁶⁹

He suggested that the way to stop the Muslim decline was to return to the true Islam as exemplified by the early (*salaf*) generation and advocated by Islamist ideologues before him, as well as by opposing the *jāhiliyyah* forces. Armed jihad, according to him, was the only effective way to bring down the *jāhiliyyah* after which the Islamic state, with the full implementation of the *sharī'ah*, could be established. Faraj considered jihad as the sixth pillar of Islam.¹⁷⁰ Kepel sees Faraj's book as not only a theological or ideological work, but also as a programme for Muslim activist action against "infidel" rulers.¹⁷¹

Faraj, who was clearly influenced by Ibn Taymīyah, often cited the scholar's *fatwā* on the obligation of armed jihad against the Mongols. He considered the ruling Egyptian regime and its apparatus as the 'modern Mongols' who were not ruling in accordance to the *sharī'ah*. Thus, his book represents a new and important shift in militant ideology since *Milestones*. Islam, in his mind, can only be established from the ruins of *jāhiliyyah* and *jāhiliyyah* can only be brought down by armed jihad revolution.¹⁷²

Before the emergence of Al-Qaeda, jihadist movements focused their jihad struggle on the near enemy, defined as the immediate ruling regimes where jihadist movements existed. Faraj argued that jihad against the near enemy must supersede the far enemy because

¹⁶⁹ Faraj (2000), pp. 37–41, 44, 45, 59–64; Kepel (2005), pp. 206–209; Kepel (2003), p. 86; Mandaville (2007), p. 241.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 14–19; Kepel (2005), pp. 206–209; Esposito (2002), p. 62; Gerges (2005), pp. 10–12.

¹⁷¹ Kepel (2005), pp. 206–209.

¹⁷² Faraj (2000), pp. 21, 23–36, 47, 69; Kepel (2005), pp. 201, 203, 205; Kepel (2003), p. 86; Kelsay (2007), pp. 126, 131, 132.

of its proximity and also that jihad against the far enemy could only be waged under a proper Islamic authority, i.e., after the establishment of the Islamic state. Even jihad against Israel in Palestine, according to Faraj, must wait until an Islamic state is established in Egypt.¹⁷³

All the above scholars lay the foundation upon which `Azzām built his jihad ideas. And this is the subject of the next chapter.

2.6 Concluding Comments

2.6.1 *Diverse views of jihad*

The strands of jihad ideas can be categorised as broad and ideal types. In reality, there are sub-categories for each strand as members of each strand disagreed among themselves when it came to the finer points.¹⁷⁴

However, it is not the objective of this review to identify the differences within each strand. Rather, this review seeks to provide a categorisation of jihad ideas based on shared principles held by influential members of each strand, reflecting the diversity and dynamism among Muslims.

Any researcher on Islam has to acknowledge that the differences of opinion in Islamic theology and jurisprudence are the rule, and that consensus (*ijmā`*) is always an exception. From the *Qur'ānic* perspective, this is because God, in his wisdom, has decreed that diversity and plurality shall be the law of the universe. More specifically, the *Qur'ān* states that there will always be divergence of views and differences among mankind. The *Qur'ān* says, "If thy Lord had so willed, He could have made mankind one people: but they will not cease to dispute. Except those on whom thy Lord hath bestowed His Mercy: and for this did He create them..." (The *Qur'ān*, 11:119).

The verse does not preclude divergence and differences among Muslims in understanding Islam and the *Qur'ān* in particular. It is

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, pp. 42–49; *Ibid.*, pp. 11–15; Kepel (2005), p. 209.

¹⁷⁴ Bonney (2004), p. 340; Bonner (2006), p. 14.

in this light that the different strands of jihad ideas should be understood. In fact, divergent views on jihad have not been restricted to contemporary Muslims.¹⁷⁵

A majority of scholars of the subject have agreed that jihad is fundamentally complex and due to this complexity, it has become a much contested area of study.¹⁷⁶ Esposito finds that Muslims have consistently discussed and disagreed about jihad. Not only are there diverse views on jihad at any particular time, its definition has also evolved over a period of time.¹⁷⁷ Thus, according to Richard Bonney, no single, all-embracing concept of jihad has existed and has been applied throughout the long course of Islamic history.¹⁷⁸

In this regard, any attempt to single out one trend or viewpoint and use it to generalise the Muslim stand on jihad must be treated with caution. In other words, any study of jihad must reflect the diversity of views.¹⁷⁹

2.6.2 *Factors contributing to the diversity*

Scholars have identified three factors, namely text, context and actors, which contribute to the diverse strands of jihad ideas.¹⁸⁰

Text refers to the scripture upon which all matters pertaining to Islamic theology and jurisprudence are built upon. Specifically, it refers to the *Qur'an*, the primary reference agreed upon by all Muslims. Scholars agree that the *Qur'an*'s position on jihad as a whole is far from coherent. It talks about peaceful propagation but also calls for armed jihad against the disbelievers. It enjoins patience and forgiveness in the face of persecution and harassment, but also makes self-defence obligatory. There are verses on jihad for self-defence, but there are also verses that allow unconditional jihad against unbelievers.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁵ Firestone (1999), p. vi; Donner (1991).

¹⁷⁶ Lawrence (1991), p. 142; Bonner (2006), p. 153; Euben (2002).

¹⁷⁷ Firestone (1999), p. vi, 76–79, 101, 113; Esposito (2002), p. 64; Cook (2005), p. 1.

¹⁷⁸ Bonney (2004), pp. 9–11, 399, 401.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*; Firestone (1999), p. 4.

¹⁸⁰ Bonner (2006), pp. 15, 16, 115.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 22; Donner (1991), p. 47; Martin (1991); An-Na'im (1988), pp. 307, 324–331; Firestone (1996).

Any attempt to understand the *Qur'ānic* position on jihad would necessitate the linking of all these verses by way of intellectual interpretation and methodological reasoning. Since human interpretations are inherently diverse, the hope for producing a single coherent view on jihad seems futile.¹⁸²

Indeed, Muslim scholars acknowledge that in order to ensure Islam's relevance across time and space, the *Qur'ān* was deliberately revealed with verses that are *ghayr-muḥkamāt* (none definitive) allowing for various interpretations and understandings. This allows Muslim scholars to apply the teachings of the religion in accordance to the changing contexts. They also allow Muslim scholars to deduce different rulings on one issue.¹⁸³

The second contributing factor to the diverse strands of jihad ideas is the context, which refers to the political, social or economical environment within which an interpretation of jihad is made.¹⁸⁴ Indeed, the verses of the *Qur'ān* were revealed, on many occasions, in response to specific events or contexts. During the Prophet's lifetime, pre-existing practices that were seen as good were endorsed and eventually incorporated into the *sharī'ah*.

Examples of contexts that had contributed to the understanding of jihad include:

- Pre-Islamic traditions such as the prohibition of war during specific months.
- Traditions which existed before a mass conversion to Islam such as in the case of Mongols, Turks and Berbers.
- Traditions of other communities and civilisation which Muslims interacted with such as the Romans and Persians.
- Contemporary norms such as the international conventions of war and peace.
- Major events such as the crusaders and Mongol invasion, colonisation of Muslim lands by Western countries and the power struggles among Muslim rulers.

¹⁸² Firestone (1999), pp. 47–50.

¹⁸³ Al-Qaraḍāwī (1977), pp. 231, 232.

¹⁸⁴ Bonney (2004), p. 14; Lawrence (1991); Sachedina (1990).

- *Fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) on jihad of the time.¹⁸⁵

The jihad ideas held by the leaders of the Egyptian *Al-Jamā'ah Al-Islāmīyah* is a good example of the evolution of a jihad idea at a particular time by the same persons. Jihad to them was first conceived as political and social reform in the country. After experiencing and witnessing brutal suppression and torture, the idea evolved into overthrowing the authority via violent means. However, the proponents subsequently denounced voluntarily the narrow militant strand and reverted to their original idea when they realised that their violent struggle had failed to achieve the intended outcome and has had detrimental effects on them, the organisation, the religion and the society at large.¹⁸⁶

A study has shown that the current Palestinian groups hold a different concept of jihad from Al-Qaeda. The former are nationalists waging armed jihad while the latter is a global jihadist entity waging jihad across borders and with greater permissiveness. Jihad in Islam can never be properly understood without incorporating diverse views and understanding the contexts behind them. The study of jihad must be dynamic and flexible in approach.¹⁸⁷

The third contributing factor to the diversity in jihad ideas is the actors involved in the formulation of jihad understanding. Michael Bonner lists the categories of actors that had influenced or will always influence jihad ideas:

- Tribal warriors during the early period of Islam. They contributed to the early classical strand of jihad by incorporating pre-Islamic traditions. Their influence however diminished when Muslim rulers increasingly relied on regular armies.
- Rulers. Muslim rulers have always had a vested interest in jihad. Historically, they waged jihad against non-Muslims as a show of commitment to the religion and to claim legitimacy and

¹⁸⁵ Donner (1991), pp. 32, 33, 53–57, 91.

¹⁸⁶ Peters (2005), pp. 180–183.

¹⁸⁷ Cook (2005), pp. 132, 133, 149.

endorsement from the population. They used jihad to eliminate rivals and opposition, and in the process, they influenced jihad ideas and rules related to it through royal decrees, *fatwā* or treatises from the *mufī* or '*ulamā*' that supported them.

- Scholars. There were scholars who were purely academics and those who participated in jihad campaigns, but both attempted to guide the understanding of jihad. The latter however also attempted to mobilise Muslims to join jihad campaigns as they did. There were also independent scholars and scholars of a particular establishment. The diversity of scholars who operated in different contexts and had different roles would naturally influence how jihad ideas were formulated. Their relationships with rulers would also determine which ideas became dominant.
- Fighters. They were either regular or volunteers who were fulfilling their religious obligations, pursuing material gains or both. Jihad was often perpetuated due to these interests through the use or misuse of scriptural texts and theological views.¹⁸⁸

Esposito concludes that throughout history, jihad ideas were often the product of diverse individuals and authorities applying scriptural texts to myriad contexts.¹⁸⁹ In a similar vein, Bonney asserts that history is witness to continual selections of texts and doctrines pertaining to jihad by different actors to suit their different interests.¹⁹⁰

The centrality of jihad to Islam and the psyche of Muslims in general mean that various parties would continue to use jihad to pursue interests, whether religiously sanctioned or otherwise.¹⁹¹

Bonney notes that throughout Islamic history, jihad had been used not only against infidels but also against fellow Muslims. It had been used not only to defend against aggression but also for the

¹⁸⁸ Bonner (2006), pp. 115, 153–155; Donner (1991), pp. 47, 51, 52.

¹⁸⁹ Esposito (2002), pp. 64, 65.

¹⁹⁰ Bonney (2004), p. 399.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 13, 400.

territorial expansion. It had been used by rulers against rival rulers or elites for power, by rulers to quell rebellions by ordinary people and by scholars against internal or external enemies. Participants of jihad were not only militants or fundamentalists but also *ṣūfī* practitioners who were known for their preference for the “greater jihad.”¹⁹²

The combination of the above three elements has not only resulted in diverse strands of jihad ideas but also different genres of jihad treatises. Peters observes at least three genres: mobilisational, instructional, and a combination of both.

2.6.3 *Different genres*

Treatises in the mobilisational genre muster Muslims for armed jihad in response to a specific, well-defined political situation. This genre, according to Peters, is as old as the history of jihad. An example of this type is Ibn Taymīyah’s work on jihad which sought to mobilise Muslims against the Mongols. The instructional genre emerged with the objective of providing religious guidance and rulings on jihad for Muslims. Generally, it consisted of academic works. Reformist works that seek to reconcile jihad with international law, compare jihad with the just-war theory or to refute the idea that Islam was spread by the sword fall under this genre. The combination genre refers to works that were published to jolt Muslims from their slumber but not necessarily in response to any specific political occurrence. Jihad, as elaborated in this genre, is usually framed as a battle against the threat of an external enemy.¹⁹³

2.6.4 *Greater jihad first*

The idea that jihad encompasses greater (spiritual) and lesser (armed) jihad and that the former supersedes the latter in importance have

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, pp. 55–58, 71–82, 127–132, 178, 179, 182, 185, 187; Lindsay (2003), pp. 6, 7; Donner (1991), p. 52.

¹⁹³ Peters (2005), pp. 103, 106, 108, 110.

existed since the early period of Islam. In fact, the *Qur'ān* clearly points out that the greater jihad is the first concept of jihad. Muslims during the Meccan period were obligated to focus on their spiritual development and were prohibited from retaliating against persecution and harassment. It was later through classical works that armed fighting became almost synonymous with jihad. Despite this fact, classical scholars still acknowledge that the greater jihad supersedes the lesser jihad in importance.¹⁹⁴

2.6.5 Rethinking past, current and future

Despite calls for Muslims to speak out against and rein in the militants, the discourse of greater versus lesser jihad is in reality a constant feature of Muslim debate across history. Contemporary scholars, reviewing jihad-related works, find that the dominant strand now is the reformist one.¹⁹⁵

However, it will be very difficult for the idea of a totally peaceful jihad to take root among Muslims in the immediate future. David Cook has found that the Islamic tradition does not preclude the mixture of greater and lesser jihad. Even the *ṣūfiys* hold to both concepts in their understanding of jihad.¹⁹⁶ The importance of aggressive jihad according to Cook is always latent and can be brought to forth at any time.¹⁹⁷ In relation to this, Ann Elizabeth Mayer, writing in *War and Peace in the Islamic Tradition and International Law*, asserts that the reformists' attempt to revise and update jihad understanding to contemporary context has not been recognised. She suggests that there will be no single recognisable consensus on the justification for war and the limit of violence among Muslims. Thus, it will be difficult to derive a definitive Islamic doctrine on jihad.¹⁹⁸ On the same note also, it

¹⁹⁴ Cook (2005), p. 4; Bonney (2004), p. 404; Sachedina (1990), pp. 37–40; Euben (2002), pp. 12, 13.

¹⁹⁵ Cook (2005), pp. 164, 165; Khadduri (1962), p. 295; Martin (1991).

¹⁹⁶ Cook (2005), pp. 31–33, 47, 165, 166; Willis (1967), p. 414.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 30, 31.

¹⁹⁸ Mayer (1991), pp. 197, 198.

will be unlikely for Muslims to define jihad similar to the Christian pacifism framework, even though they value peaceful and spiritual jihad above violent ones.

Based on the work of scholars, two important trends may be seen in the future. Cook suggests that the classical and militant viewpoints will have no future as the jihad to avenge perceived wrongs inflicted upon Muslims over the past two centuries “has been a dismal failure, with the possible exception of the expulsion of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan.”¹⁹⁹ He views that the era of using jihad as an effective tool for conversion has passed and that its effectiveness in transforming Muslim societies has been doubtful.²⁰⁰ He writes:

“It is difficult to see the situations in the world at the present time where jihad is likely to gain the Muslim community anything. The world is simply too interconnected ... for jihad to separate Muslim from non-Muslims. From the growth of Muslim minorities in non-Muslim countries to the growth of non-Muslim minorities in Muslim countries, as well as the ongoing process of globalization, the evidence suggests that this process will continue to expand in the coming years. Jihad cannot stop it, at least not in its present form, even with the aid of martyrdom operations.”²⁰¹

Mayer, however, senses a convergence of ideas among Muslims despite the diversity of ideas. Contemporary Muslim scholars have been keen to update the classical viewpoint. Muslim scholars have abandoned the binary classification of *Dār Al-Islām* and *Dār Al-Harb* and have accepted the modern nation-state system in international politics. They have also attempted to align jihad with international law and view it in the light of the just-war theory.²⁰²

¹⁹⁹ Cook (2005), p. 164.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 165.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 164, 165.

²⁰² Mayer (1991), p. 198.

Efforts made by reformist scholars must be supported. In this regard, Bonney suggests that while the emphasis for greater jihad must continue, the understanding of jihad as a whole must be linked with the dialogue of civilisations on an equal footing, recognising the pluralistic nature of the contemporary world.²⁰³

2.6.6 Conclusion and moving the research forward

This chapter has highlighted the diverse views of jihad ideas among Muslims and factors that had and will continue to contribute to it. It has concluded that the diversity will continue and consequently no singular understanding of jihad will ever emerge.

The reformist viewpoint is the dominant strand held by mainstream Muslims, and scholars are making serious and continuous efforts to revisit the classical viewpoint to adapt it to the modern context. Against this backdrop, what are we to make of `Azzām's contributions to jihadist ideas? The following chapters seek to address this.

²⁰³ Bonney (2004), pp. 404, 407, 418.

Chapter 3

`Abd Allāh `Azzām's Jihad Ideas

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter highlighted four major jihad strands found among Muslims today. `Abd Allāh `Azzām has been identified as an influential figure for the militant strand. This chapter will attempt to examine `Azzām's jihad ideas in greater detail, and will differentiate the militant from the non-militant ideas. `Azzām's militant ideas are influenced by contemporary events and mark a break from the classical strand while the non-militant ideas are similar to those of the traditional and classical strands. This examination will then become the basis of subsequent analysis.

This chapter will examine `Azzām's jihad ideas based on his books, articles and transcripts of lectures. The examination will be divided into the following sections:

- `Azzām's Worldview,
- Definition of Jihad,
- Status of Jihad in Islam,
- Other Ideas Relevant to Jihad,
- Types of Jihad,
- Stages of Revelation,
- Objectives of Jihad,
- Who Can Fight for Jihad?
- Ethics and Rules of Jihad,
- Martyrs,
- Jihad and *Irhāb* (Terrorism), and
- The Idea of *Al-Qā'idah*.

The chapter will begin by briefly illustrating `Azzām's religious *weltanschauung* (worldview) — the set of religious ideas and beliefs that framed the way he interpreted and interacted with the world, and developed his theological opinion. Reconstructing `Azzām's broad religious worldview will provide a better appreciation of his jihad ideas.

Where `Azzām's jihad ideas run similar to the classical view, illustrated in the previous chapters, only brief illustration will be given followed by references to the relevant section of the previous chapter to avoid repetition and to economise space.

3.2 `Azzām's Worldview

As highlighted previously, `Azzām admitted he was greatly influenced by Ibn Taymīyah and Sayyid Quṭb.¹ He was also affiliated with the Muslim Brothers, founded by Ḥasan Al-Bannā.² His contact with the Muslim Brothers began when in his early teenage years, according to some of his biographies.³

A review of materials associated with `Azzām has revealed that his ideology bears striking similarity to those of Ibn Taymīyah, Quṭb and Al-Bannā's Muslim Brothers.⁴ His ideas also conform to the broad worldview held by jihadist groups, as illustrated in Chapter 1.⁵

`Azzām's worldview is summarised as follows:

1. Islam is supreme over other religions. It is the only true religion recognised by God.⁶

¹ `Azzām (1986); `Azzām (1991), pp. 12, 13; `Azzām (1992), pp. 10–12; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *ʿAmlaq Al-Fikr Al-Islāmīy* (Giant of Islamic thought), pp. 1–15; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *A Message of Youth*, p. 4.

² `Azzām (1992), p. 69; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fi Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah* (*Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter of the Qurʾān]*), p. 36.

³ `Azzām (1990), pp. 30, 31.

⁴ See Sections 2.5.3 on “Ibn Taymīyah,” 2.5.6 on “Ḥasan Al-Bannā,” and 2.5.8 on “Sayyid Quṭb” in Chapter 2.

⁵ See Section 1.2.1 in Chapter 1 on “The Threat of Jihadist Terrorism.”

⁶ `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Al-ʿAqīdah Wa Atharuhā Fī Bināʾ Al-Jayl* (Islamic creed and its effect on development), p. 6; `Azzām (1980), pp. 1–8; `Azzām (1987); `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fi Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād (Fiqh and Ijtihād in jihad)*, p. 52.

2. *Allāh* is the absolute sovereign; with the absolute power to legislate over *ḥalāl* (permissible) and *ḥarām* (prohibited).⁷ Man has been entrusted only as His caliph (vicegerent) to uphold His commands i.e., the *sharī‘ah*.⁸
3. Islam is the only comprehensive way of life for all human beings; it recognises no separation between religion and politics.⁹
4. All virtues such as justice, freedom and happiness can only be attained through the teachings of Islam.¹⁰
5. Muslims are obligated to uphold and practice Islam (*sharī‘ah*) in its totality. The failure to fulfill this is sinful, while its rejection is an act of *kufr* (disbelief).¹¹
6. The crux of Islam is *tawḥīd* (monotheism) and living fully by the *sharī‘ah* is a practical manifestation of *tawḥīd*. They cannot be separated from each other and Muslims must accomplish both to gain salvation in the afterlife.¹²
7. The best way to understand *tawḥīd* and practice the *sharī‘ah* is to adopt the *salafīy* way.¹³
8. The establishment of an Islamic caliphate or Islamic state is fundamental to upholding Islam fully. After the collapse of

⁷This is similar to the concept of *ḥākimiyyah* held by Ibn Taymīyah, Al-Mawdūdīy, Qutb, Al-Bannā and many other Islamist groups. See Sections 2.5.3 on “Ibn Taymīyah,” 2.5.6 on “Ḥasan Al-Bannā,” and 2.5.8 on “Sayyid Qutb” in Chapter 2. *Ibid.*, Chapter 1, pp. 15–23; ‘Azzām (1988), pp. 4–6; ‘Azzām (1992), pp. 62–71.

⁸This is similar to the concept of *‘ubūdīyah* held by Ibn Taymīyah, Al-Mawdūdīy, Qutb, Al-Bannā and many other Islamist groups. See Sections 2.5.3 on “Ibn Taymīyah,” 2.5.6 on “Ḥasan Al-Bannā” and 2.5.8 on “Sayyid Qutb” in Chapter 2. *Ibid.*, pp. 15–23; ‘Azzām (1990), pp. 88, 89; ‘Azzām (1991), pp. 145–170; ‘Azzām, (1991), p. 46; ‘Azzām (1990), pp. 99–134.

⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 11, 15; ‘Azzām (date not cited). *Khaṭ Al-Taḥawwul Al-Tārīkhīy* (Point of Historic Transformation), pp. 20, 21; ‘Azzām (1980)

¹⁰‘Azzām (1985), pp. 4, 5; ‘Azzām (1992), pp. 1–29.

¹¹Another similar concept of *‘ubūdīyah* held by Ibn Taymīyah, Al-Mawdūdīy, Qutb, Al-Bannā and many other Islamist groups. See Sections 2.5.3 on “Ibn Taymīyah,” 2.5.6 on “Ḥasan Al-Bannā,” and 2.5.8 on “Sayyid Qutb” in Chapter 2. *Ibid.*, pp. 15–23; ‘Azzām (1992), pp. 62–71.

¹²‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Al-As’ilah Wa Al-Ajwibah Al-Jihādīyah* (Questions and Answers on Jihad), pp. 8, 9.

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 17; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Al-‘Aqīdah Wa Atharuhā Fī Binā’ Al-Jayl* (Islamic Creed and Its Effect on Development), pp. 1, 14; ‘Azzām (date not cited). *Kalimāt Min Khaṭ Al-Nār* (Words from the Battlefield), p. 90.

- the Ottoman caliphate, it became obligatory for all Muslims to re-establish the caliphate in any part of the world.
9. Muslims are obliged to ensure that Islam eventually rules the world through the institution of the caliphate and that all infidels submit to Islamic rule.¹⁴
 10. Life is a constant battle between the truth (Islam) and falsehood/*jāhiliyyah* (other beliefs). There is no common ground.¹⁵ There will always be some proponent of falsehood/*jāhiliyyah* to stand in the way of Islam.¹⁶
 11. Armed jihad for the supremacy of Islam is not only inevitable but also a constant feature of this life.¹⁷
 12. Muslims are enjoined to be wary, strict, stern and firm towards all infidels.¹⁸
 13. Muslims must uphold the principle of *al-walā'* (total loyalty and allegiance to God and doing what pleases Him i.e., loyalty to fellow Muslims) and *al-barā'* (total disassociation from

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 8; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Muqaddimah Fī Al-Hijrah Wa Al-I'dād* (Introduction to Migration and Preparation), pp. 26, 27, 82–85; `Azzām (1990), pp. 8, 9; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Al-Manārah Al-Mafqūdah* (The lost minaret), pp. 1–17; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Al-Shuyūyah: Al-Saraṭān Al-Aḥmar* (Communism: The Red Cancer), p. 6. See `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Hadm Al-Khilāfah Wa Bināuhā* (The Destruction and Rebuilding of Caliphate). Peshawar: Maktab Al-Khidmāt.

¹⁵ `Azzām held a similar concept of *jāhiliyyah* as Ibn Taymīyah, Al-Mawdūdī and Quṭb as well as a similar stand. See Sections 2.5.3 on "Ibn Taymīyah," 2.5.6 on "Ḥasan Al-Bannā," and 2.5.8 on "Sayyid Quṭb," in Chapter 2.

¹⁶ `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Hadm Al-Khilāfah Wa Bināuhā* (The Destruction and Rebuilding of Caliphate), pp. 85–93; `Azzām (1986), pp. 4, 5; `Azzām (1990), p. 21; `Azzām (1985), pp. 4–7; `Azzām (1986), pp. 4, 5; `Azzām (1985), pp. 4, 5; `Azzām (1987), pp. 4–7; `Azzām (1991), pp. 19–30, 107–110; `Azzām (1992), pp. 7–11; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Khaṭ Al-Taḥawwul Al-Tārikhiyy* (Point of Historic Transformation), pp. 1–31; `Azzām (1989); `Azzām, AA (1992), pp. 167–169; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Itjihād* (Fiqh and Itjihād in Jihad), p. 74; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Tujār Al-Ḥurūb* (War Traders), pp. 1–27; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Bashāir Al-Naṣr* (Promises of Victory), pp. 2, 3; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Muqaddimah Fī Al-Hijrah Wa Al-I'dād* (Introduction to Migration and Preparation), pp. 74, 75; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Silsilah Fī Al-Tarbīyah*, Vol. 12, pp. 14, 90, 91–95.

¹⁷ `Azzām (1991), pp. 1–15; `Azzām (1992), pp. 7, 8; `Azzām (1987), pp. 4, 5; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Khaṭ Al-Taḥawwul Al-Tārikhiyy* (Point of Historic Transformation), p. 1; `Azzām, (1987), pp. 4–7; `Azzām (1990), pp. 47, 48; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Ibar Wa Baṣāir Lī Al-Jihād Fī Al-'Asr Al-Ḥāḍir* (Lessons for Jihad in Contemporary Era), p. 7.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

anythings that displeases God). The latter includes things that are related to *kufr* (disbelief) and *kuffār* (infidels). As such, Muslims should avoid living with them or following their lifestyles. They are also forbidden from appointing any infidels as their rulers.¹⁹

14. It is essential to form a core group of Muslims, *Al-Qā'idah Al-Sulbah*, that is committed to continuous education and training in religious knowledge and practices, including participation in armed jihad.²⁰

In addition to the above, Ibn Taymīyah's influence in ʿAzzām's thinking can also be seen in three areas: his commitment to the *salafīy* way of understanding *tawhīd* and practicing the *sharīʿah*, his conception of *tawhīd*, which is identical to Ibn Taymīyah's exposition of *tawhīd rubūbiyah*, *ulūhiyah* and *al-asmā' wa al-ṣifāt*,²¹ and his hostility towards sufism.²²

ʿAzzām's participation in the jihad in Afghanistan was not just a defensive jihad against foreign invasion into a Muslim territory, it was also a jihad for his worldview.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 35–58; ʿAzzām (1988), pp. 4–6; ʿAzzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah* (Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter of the Qurʾān]), pp. 11, 23; ʿAzzām, (1992), pp. 18–28.

²⁰ ʿAzzām (1988), pp. 4–6; ʿAzzām (1990), pp. 8, 9; ʿAzzām, AA (1991), p. 48; ʿAzzām (1993), p. 41; ʿAzzām, AA (date not cited). *Al-Asʿilah Wa Al-Ajwibah Al-Jihādiyyah* (Questions and Answers on Jihad), p. 25; ʿAzzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah* (Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter of the Qurʾān]), p. 10; ʿAzzām (1980), p. 13; ʿAzzām (1992), p. 148.

²¹ *Tawhīd rubūbiyah* (monotheism in the divinity of Allāh) is to believe that Allāh is the only God, the creator, the planner, the sustainer etc. of the universe. *Tawhīd ulūhiyah* (monotheism in the worship of Allāh) is to believe that none has the right to be worshipped, submitted to and obeyed but Allāh. *Tawhīd al-asmā' wa al-ṣifāt* (monotheism in the qualities of Allāh) is to believe in all names and attributes that Allāh has named and attributed to himself in the Qurʾān or through the Prophet. For reference, see footnote 22.

²² ʿAzzām, AA (date not cited). *Al-Asʿilah Wa Al-Ajwibah Al-Jihādiyyah* (Questions and Answers on Jihad), p. 17; ʿAzzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah* (Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter of the Qurʾān]), p. 87; ʿAzzām (1992), pp. 177, 178, 325, 326. See ʿAzzām, AA (date not cited). *Al-ʿAqīdah Wa Atharuhā Fī Bināʾ Al-Jayl* (Islamic Creed and Its Effect on Development).

3.3 Definition of Jihad

According to `Azzām, jihad, in the *Qur'ān* and *ḥadīth*, refer to fighting the infidels — a position upheld by all four major *mazhabs* (schools of jurisprudence), namely the *Hanafīy*, *Mālikīy*, *Shāfi'īy* and *Hanbalīy* schools.²³ He drew a parallel to the term *ṣalāh* (prayer) which in Islam is restricted to a specific form of prayer only — as referred to in the *Qur'ān* and *ḥadīth*. Otherwise, Muslims could offer any form of prayer. This would undermine the obligation of the five daily prayers as one of the five pillars of Islam.²⁴

Hence, `Azzām felt that broadening the meaning of jihad, based on its etymological meaning “to struggle,” would undermine the Qur'ānic injunction to fight infidels. `Azzām believed this to be an obligation that is central to Islam and which must stand till the end of the world.²⁵

He interpreted the meaning of jihad and the word *fī sabīl Allāh* (in the path of Allah) as used in the *Qur'ān* and the *ḥadīths*, to mean fighting against the infidels — a view that is shared by classical Muslim scholars.²⁶

3.4 Status of Jihad in Islam

3.4.1 *The pinnacle of Islam*

Quoting a *ḥadīth* that says “the pinnacle of Islam is jihad,” `Azzām saw jihad as the pinnacle of Islamic devotion.²⁷ He considered it the

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 15; `Azzām (1987), pp. 2, 3; `Azzām (1992), p. 33; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *`Ibar Wa Baṣāir Lī Al-Jihād Fī Al-`Asr Al-Ḥādir* (*Lessons for Jihad in Contemporary Era*), p. 1; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Join the Caravan*, Conclusion; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād* (*Fiqh and Ijtihād in Jihad*), pp. 23, 24, 28, 53, 75; `Azzām (1992), pp. 88, 120–122, 217, 315.

²⁴ `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah* (*Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter of the Qur'ān]*), pp. 78, 91, 109, 112; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Ittiḥāf Al-`Ibād Bi Faḍāil Al-Jihād* (*Virtues of Jihad*), p. 2; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *`Ibar Wa Baṣāir Lī Al-Jihād Fī Al-`Asr Al-Ḥādir* (*Lessons for Jihad in Contemporary Era*), p. 1; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Muqaddimah Fī Al-Hijrah Wa Al-I'dād* (*Introduction to Migration and Preparation*), p. 29; `Azzām (1987), pp. 4–7; `Azzām (1990), p. 11.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 110; `Azzām (1992), pp. 121, 122, 218.

²⁶ *Ibid.*; `Azzām (1987), pp. 2, 3.

²⁷ `Azzām (1985).

best deed after the belief in Allah, a point asserted also by Ibn Taymīyah.²⁸ ‘Azzām even regarded jihad as being more important than obligatory prayer, fasting in *Ramaḍān*, *haj* (pilgrimage) and all other *farḍ* ‘*ayn* obligations.²⁹ This is because jihad is concerned with the interest of Muslims at large and protecting Islam from external threats, whereas the other *farḍ* ‘*ayn* obligations only concern the individual.³⁰ ‘Azzām even cited Ibn Taymīyah’s *fatwā* which said that Muslims are obligated to contribute their wealth or pay their obligatory *zakāh* (tithe) towards jihad even if it means forgoing *zakāh* towards the destitutes.³¹

Accordingly, the status of a *mujāhid* (jihad fighter) has been exalted to such an extent that even a sinful *mujāhid* is believed to be superior to a pious Muslim who is not a *mujāhid*.³²

3.4.2 Jihad guarantees glory for Islam

‘Azzām’s reading of history convinced him that the high commitment placed on jihad by the early Muslims (*salaf*) had brought glory to Islam.

‘Azzām observed that the fate of the early Muslims changed tremendously only after God made jihad obligatory. He pointed out that within a few years after the Prophet’s migration and the

²⁸ ‘Azzām (1990), p. 13; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *The Defence of Muslim’s Land*, Chapter 1.

²⁹ *Ibid.*; ‘Azzām (1992), pp. 51, 175, 176; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād (Fiqh and Ijtihād in Jihad)*, pp. 2, 10, 25; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Dhikrayāt Filistīn (Memories of Palestine)*, pp. 12, 13; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Jihād Sha‘b Muslim (Jihad of a Muslim Nation)*, pp. 25, 26; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *‘Ibar Wa Baṣāir Lī Al-Jihād Fī Al-‘Asr Al-Ḥāḍir (Lessons for Jihad in Contemporary Era)*, pp. 1, 9; ‘Azzām (1986), p. 4; ‘Azzām (1987), p. 8; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *T’lān Al-Jihād*, p. 1; ‘Azzām (1992), p. 38.

³⁰ ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *‘Ibar Wa Baṣāir Lī Al-Jihād Fī Al-‘Asr Al-Ḥāḍir (Lessons for Jihad in Contemporary Era)*, p. 80.

³¹ ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah (Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter of the Qur’ān])*, p. 111; ‘Azzām, (1988); ‘Azzām (1989).

³² ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād (Fiqh and Ijtihād in Jihad)*, p. 64; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *‘Ibar Wa Baṣāir Lī Al-Jihād Fī Al-‘Asr Al-Ḥāḍir (Lessons for Jihad in Contemporary Era)*, p. 2.

commandment to wage jihad, the number of Arabs converting to Islam grew exponentially from a few hundred to about 100,000.³³

He also highlighted that it was jihad that had brought down the two superpowers of the time — the Roman and Persian empires — under the leadership of the caliphs. This not only increased the territory of *Dār Al-Islām* but also brought wealth to Muslims and increased the Muslim population — an effect that in the later years turned Islam into a political and civilisational hegemony, which commanded respect and struck fear in the hearts of infidels.³⁴

According to `Azzām, the glory of Islam was achieved because the early Muslims held jihad as a way of life. Like any great civilisation, the glorious history of Islam was written in blood, and therefore its glory may only be reclaimed through the same way.³⁵

`Azzām was convinced that Islam and Muslims will not attain glory, respect, territory and more believers without jihad.³⁶ He believed that the humiliating state of the Muslims now was due to their abandonment of their jihad duty — a view that was similarly held by Al-Faraj.³⁷

³³ `Azzām (1992), p. 7; `Azzām (1990), p. 185; `Azzām (1990).

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 39; `Azzām (1980), pp. 4–7; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah* (Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter of the Qur'ān]), p. 53; `Azzām (1992), pp. 196, 197.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 7; `Azzām (1990), pp. 22, 140, 167; `Azzām (1992), pp. 274, 275; `Azzām; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Join the Caravan*, Part 1; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād* (Fiqh and Ijtihād in jihad), pp. 11, 26–28; `Azzām (1986); `Azzām (1986); `Azzām (1991), p. 45; `Azzām (1991); `Azzām (1987); `Azzām (1987).

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 41, 50–52, 136, 149, 150, 156; `Azzām (1991), p. 81; `Azzām (1992), pp. 37, 52, 53, 220; `Azzām (1992), pp. 3, 7; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād* (Fiqh and Ijtihād in Jihad), pp. 30, 44–47, 72; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Bashāir Al-Naṣr* (Promises of Victory), p. 15; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Ibar Wa Baṣāir Lī Al-Jihād Fī Al-'Asr Al-Ḥāḍir* (Lessons for Jihad in Contemporary Era), p. 9; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Dhikrayāt Filistīn* (Memories of Palestine), p. 3; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah* (Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter of the Qur'ān]), p. 33; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *The Defence of Muslim's Land*, Chapter 1; `Azzām (1989); `Azzām (1990); `Azzām (1990).

³⁷ `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Join the Caravan*, Part 1 and 2; `Azzām (1987), p. 5; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād* (Fiqh and Ijtihād in Jihad), p. 29; `Azzām (1988); `Azzām (1993); `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *The Tawhīd of Action*, p. 1; `Azzām (1992), p. 273.

3.4.3 Jihad guarantees the survival of Islam

As described in the previous section, ʿAzzām believed in “the cosmic battle” between Muslims, on the side of truth, and non-Muslims on the side of falsehood/*jāhiliyyah*.³⁸ Jihad is necessary for Islam to attain its mission as well as for its survival and security.³⁹ Without jihad, Islam and Muslims are exposed to the serious threat of *jāhiliyyah* forces and will be overwhelmed politically, economically, militarily and culturally — which is a reality for Muslims today.⁴⁰ Most Muslims share this sense of being overwhelmed, but they disagree with the radicals that armed jihad is the solution.

ʿAzzām’s belief in jihad as the means of establishing God’s law and countering the evil intentions of *jāhiliyyah* forces⁴¹ was reinforced by the following verses of the *Qurʾān*:

Permission [to fight] is given to those against whom war is being wrongfully waged and, verily, God has indeed the power to succour them. Those who have been driven from their homelands against all right for no other reason than their saying, “Our Sustainer is God!” For, if God had not enabled people to defend themselves against one another, all monasteries and churches and

³⁸ ʿAzzām (1992), p. 43; ʿAzzām (date not cited). *The Defence of Muslim’s Land*, Chapter 1; ʿAzzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād (Fiqh and Ijtihād in Jihad)*, pp. 3, 27; ʿAzzām (1992), pp. 7–11.

³⁹ ʿAzzām (1990); ʿAzzām (1992), pp. 3, 7; ʿAzzām, AA (date not cited). *ʿIbar Wa Baṣāʾir Lī Al-Jihād Fī Al-ʿAsr Al-Ḥāḍir (Lessons for Jihad in Contemporary Era)*, p. 6.

⁴⁰ ʿAzzām (date not cited). *Join the Caravan*, Part 1; ʿAzzām (1990), p. 169; ʿAzzām (1992), p. 37; ʿAzzām (1990); ʿAzzām, AA (date not cited). *Al-Shuyūʿiyyah: Al-Saraṭān Al-Aḥmar (Communism: The Red Cancer)*, p. 51; ʿAzzām, AA (date not cited). *The Tawhīd of Action*, p. 2; ʿAzzām (1992), pp. 206, 207.

⁴¹ ʿAzzām, AA (date not cited). *Dhikrayāt Filisṭīn (Memories of Palestine)*, p. 19; ʿAzzām, AA (date not cited). *The Defence of Muslim’s Land*, Chapter 1; ʿAzzām (1990), p. 169; ʿAzzām (1992), pp. 7–11; ʿAzzām, AA (date not cited). *Al-Asʾilāh Wa Al-Ajwibah Al-Jihādīyah (Questions and Answers on Jihad)*, p. 39; ʿAzzām, AA (date not cited). *ʿIbar Wa Baṣāʾir Lī Al-Jihād Fī Al-ʿAsr Al-Ḥāḍir (Lessons for Jihad in Contemporary Era)*, pp. 4, 8; ʿAzzām (1988); ʿAzzām (1988); ʿAzzām (1989); ʿAzzām, AA (date not cited). *Kalimāt Min Khaṭ Al-Nār (Words from the Battlefront)*, p. 88.

synagogues and mosques — in [all of] which Gods name is abundantly extolled — would surely have been destroyed [ere now]....⁴²

3.4.4 *Jihad guarantees survival of humanity*

Because `Azzām considered Islam as the only religion for humanity, and that jihad is the means of establishing Islam, he believed that humanity and its survival can only be achieved and guaranteed through jihad.⁴³ Otherwise, *jāhiliyyah* would prevail and humanity will continue to suffer the ills of modern Western society.⁴⁴

3.4.5 *Jihad produces true Muslims*

`Azzām believed that Islam's glory and survival would be delivered in the hands of a core group he called *Al-Qā'idah Al-Ṣulbah*, comprised of men who had undergone the hardship, difficulty and sacrifices of jihad. He felt that many Islamic teachings such as patience, *tawakkul* (reliance to Allah) and belief in *qadr* (predestination) can never be understood and internalised fully until a person is put under a real test, the ultimate form of which is in the battlefield of jihad.

A corollary to this is the view that true Islamic society can only be achieved when the society has succeeded the test of jihad.⁴⁵

⁴² The *Qur'ān*, 22:39–30.

⁴³ `Azzām (date not cited). *Join the Caravan*, Part 1; `Azzām (1992), p. 275.

⁴⁴ `Azzām (1992), pp. 29–33.

⁴⁵ `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Dhikrayāt Filistīn (Memories of Palestine)*, pp. 17, 18; `Azzām (date not cited). *The Tawhid of Action*, pp. 3–8; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Join the Caravan*, Part 1; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *‘Ibar Wa Baṣāir Lī Al-Jihād Fī Al-‘Asr Al-Hāḍir (Lessons for Jihad in Contemporary Era)*, pp. 2, 7; `Azzām (1992), p. 7; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah (Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter of the Qur'ān])*, p. 103; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād (Fiqh and Ijtihād in Jihad)*, pp. 13, 30, 76; `Azzām (1990), pp. 147, 155, 165, 177; `Azzām (1992), pp. 40, 93, 293; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Al-As'ilah Wa Al-Ajwibah Al-Jihādiyyah (Questions and Answers on Jihad)*, p. 39; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *‘Ibar Wa Baṣāir Lī Al-Jihād Fī Al-‘Asr Al-Hāḍir (Lessons for Jihad in Contemporary Era)*, pp. 4, 8; `Azzām (1992); `Azzām (1985); `Azzām (1990); `Azzām (1991).

3.4.6 *Jihad is the gauge*

The centrality of jihad in Islam means, in ‘Azzām’s opinion, that the level of one’s commitment to and participation in jihad is a barometer of one’s belief in Allah, as well as one’s sincerity and commitment towards Islam.⁴⁶

Thus, laggardness and indifference towards jihad are considered signs of hypocrisy and a weakness in faith. Therefore, those who have no aspiration to perform jihad are to be abhorred.⁴⁷

In ‘Azzām’s view, the best opportunity to achieve all the merits of jihad was through participation in the Afghan jihad. He admitted that although there were jihad campaigns in other parts of the world, none offered greater potential for success.

3.5 Other Ideas Relevant to Jihad

3.5.1 *The importance of intention*

In accordance with the classical view, ‘Azzām held that fighting infidels would only be accepted as jihad, if it was done for Allah and for the purpose of establishing His religion.⁴⁸

3.5.2 *The division of lands*

In ‘Azzām’s view, lands can be divided into four categories: *Dār Al-Islām*, *Dār Al-Ḥarb*, *Dār Al-‘Ahd* and Others.

His definition of *Dār Al-Islām* and *Dār Al-Ḥarb* is identical to that in the classical strand.⁴⁹ ‘Azzām borrowed the concept of *Dār*

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 24; *Ibid.*; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād (Fiqh and Ijtihād in Jihad)*, pp. 12, 13, 36, 41; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Ittihāf Al-‘Ibād Bi Faḍāil Al-Jihād (Virtues of Jihad)*, p. 2; ‘Azzām (1985); ‘Azzām (1987); ‘Azzām (1992); ‘Azzām (1988).

⁴⁷ ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Ittihāf Al-‘Ibād Bi Faḍāil Al-Jihād (Virtues of Jihad)*, p. 2.

⁴⁸ ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *I‘lān Al-Jihād*, p. 11; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād (Fiqh and Ijtihād in Jihad)*, pp. 9, 45; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Ittihāf Al-‘Ibād Bi Faḍāil Al-Jihād (Virtues of Jihad)*, pp. 21, 22; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Ibar Wa Baṣāir Li Al-Jihād Fī Al-Asr Al-Ḥāḍir (Lessons for Jihad in Contemporary Era)*, pp. 5, 6; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Jarīmat Qatl Al-Nafs Al-Muslimah (Killing a Muslim is a Crime)*, pp. 8, 10.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 1–5.

Al-`Ahd* from *Al-Shāfi`īy, the founder of the *Shāfi`īy* school of jurisprudence. It refers to any territory outside of *Dār Al-Islām* that has a formal peace agreement with Muslims. This includes contemporary diplomatic agreements between states. Thus, all states that have diplomatic relations with *Dār Al-Islām* are considered *Dār `Al-Ahd*.⁵⁰ `Azzām emphasised the importance of respecting any agreement signed by Muslims, as he considered this a definite injunction recorded in many verses of the *Qur`ān*. `Azzām warned "If we [Muslims] do not fulfill [promises and agreements], who else would?"<sup>51</sup> Although `Azzām did not explicitly refer to the UN Charter, by which all member countries including Muslim states today have a peace agreement, it can be inferred that he could have considered UN member states to be outside of *Dār Al-Ḥarb*, and therefore not targets of jihad.

The last category, Others, refers to a land that was part of *Dār Al-Islām* where the *sharī`ah* had been replaced by secular laws, either by Muslims living there or by a non-Muslim regime occupying it. This category is derived from Ibn Taymīyah's *fatwā* on the status of 13th century *Mārdin* city, which had submitted to the Mongol ruler and was ruled by the Mongol traditional law, although it was populated by Muslims and defended by Muslim soldiers. Ibn Taymīyah considered *Mārdin* city as being neither *Dār Al-Islām* nor *Dār Al-Ḥarb*. `Azzām used this category for Afghanistan, which was ruled by the local communist party supported by the Soviet Union. This category includes other contemporary Muslim countries which are governed by laws modeled on Western countries.⁵²

3.5.3 *Four stages of Islamic struggle*

From the history of the Prophet, `Azzām had identified four stages in the evolution of Islamic struggle. The first stage was the

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 5, 6.

⁵¹ `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah (Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter of the Qur`ān])*, pp. 16, 17, 22; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Ittihāf Al-`Ibād Bi Faḍāil Al-Jihād (Virtues of Jihad)*, p. 24.

⁵² `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *I`lān Al-Jihād*, pp. 6, 7.

Prophet’s public pronouncement of his prophethood, and his invitation to people to embrace Islam and renounce paganism.

The second stage was the stage of persecution and the war of ideas with the *jāhiliyah* establishment that was opposed to Islam.

The third was the stage of war when Muslims were permitted to take up arms in the name of jihad against *jāhiliyah*. This stage was a protracted one, with a good number unable to persevere. Those who stayed on would later form the core of the *ummah*; becoming the leaders who led the struggle to the victory in the fourth and final stage. This was the stage in which the Prophet made a victorious entrance into Mecca and subsequently saw the fall of the Roman and Persian empires in the hands of the succeeding caliphs.

ʿAzzām postulated that efforts to revive the Muslim *ummah* to its former glory would have to go through the same stages.⁵³ In his worldview, jihad against the infidels is an inevitable consequence of any true struggle for Islam and that jihad in Afghanistan was the critical third stage that would catalyse the return of the glory of Islam.

3.5.4 Four steps of jihad

ʿAzzam defined the four steps necessary for any Muslim interested in performing jihad as *hijrah* (migration), *iḍḍād* (preparation), *ribāṭ* (standing-by) and finally participation in jihad.⁵⁴

Hijrah refers to migration from any lands where Muslims are unable to practice Islam fully either due to the rampant proliferation of vices and immorality, or the fear of persecution, to *Dār Al-Islām*. This is held as obligatory unless these Muslims believe that they are able to fulfill the greater interests of Islam by remaining there.⁵⁵

⁵³ ʿAzzām, AA (date not cited). *Shahr Bayn Al-ʿAmāliqah* (A Month with Giants), p. 43; ʿAzzām (1988); ʿAzzām (1992), pp. 119, 120.

⁵⁴ For a dedicated treatise on the topic, see ʿAzzām, AA (date not cited). *Ittihāf Al-ʿIbād Bi Faḍāil Al-Jihād* (Virtues of Jihad); ʿAzzām, AA (date not cited). *Muqaddimah Fī Al-Hijrah Wa Al-Ḍād* (Introduction to Migration and Preparation); ʿAzzām (1994).

⁵⁵ ʿAzzām, AA (date not cited). *Ḍād Al-Jihād*, p. 8; ʿAzzām, AA (date not cited). *Muqaddimah Fī Al-Hijrah Wa Al-Ḍād* (Introduction to Migration and Preparation), pp. 16–18, 25–27; ʿAzzām (1987).

Hijrah is also obligatory on Muslims whose expertise is needed in *Dār Al-Islām*. In addition, *hijrah* to the land of jihad is considered a *fard `ayn* when jihad in that land is also *fard `ayn*.⁵⁶ This link between *hijrah* and jihad made `Azzām believe that *hijrah* was intricately connected to jihad, and was in fact the initial step towards it. His belief stemmed from many verses in the *Qur`ān*. Furthermore, this was consistent with the fact that the Prophet migrated to Medina first before God commanded him to wage jihad.⁵⁷

Since jihad is a standing obligation until the end of the world, `Azzām reasoned that the command for *hijrah* takes on a similar rule, and those who die in the course of migration are considered martyrs.⁵⁸ This is because *hijrah* requires sacrifices, and the willingness to perform *hijrah* is a sign of great commitment to Islam and strong faith.⁵⁹

`Azzām endorsed migration to *Dār Al-Islām* even if Muslims do not fear for their religion or security as he considered that living with infidels is not acceptable in Islam.⁶⁰

The second step, *i`dād*, refers to the preparations Muslims must undertake for jihad after *hijrah*. This preparation consists of physical and military training as well as intellectual and spiritual development. The intellectual component covers the right worldview (*fikrah*), theology (*`aqidah*) and jurisprudence (*fiqh*) to ensure all actions of the individual are in accordance to the precepts of Islam. Spiritual training refers to beautifying oneself with patience, *tawakkul*, humility and

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Ittihāf Al-`Ibād Bi Faḍāil Al-Jihād* (*Virtues of Jihad*), pp. 5, 6; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Al-As`ilah Wa Al-Ajwibah Al-Jihādiyyah* (*Questions and Answers on Jihad*), p. 26; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Jihād Sha`b Muslim* (*Jihad of a Muslim Nation*), p. 10.

⁵⁷ `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Ittihāf Al-`Ibād Bi Faḍāil Al-Jihād* (*Virtues of Jihad*), p. 5; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Muqaddimah Fī Al-Hijrah Wa Al-I`dād* (*Introduction to Migration and Preparation*), pp. 12, 13, 16; `Azzām (1991); `Azzām (1992), pp. 105, 106.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Ībar Wa Baṣāir Lī Al-Jihād Fī Al-Asr Al-Hāḍir* (*Lessons for Jihad in Contemporary Era*), p. 6.

⁵⁹ `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Muqaddimah Fī Al-Hijrah Wa Al-I`dād* (*Introduction to Migration and Preparation*), p. 19.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 14; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah* (*Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter of the Qur`ān]*), p. 11; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Ittihāf Al-`Ibād Bi Faḍāil Al-Jihād* (*Virtues of Jihad*), p. 5.

compassion so as to ensure that the individual’s relationship with others (man and other creations) closely mirrors the example of the Prophet.⁶¹ Without the intellectual and spiritual components, ‘Azzām feared that the people who train for jihad could easily go astray and form a band of bandits instead.⁶²

The importance of *i`dād*, in ‘Azzām’s view, is recorded in the verses where Allāh reprimanded those who had asked to be excused from participation in jihad due to their lack of preparation. This implies that true commitment to jihad must be manifested through one’s preparation at all times. *I`dād* is not only a practical step for the fulfillment of one’s jihad obligation but also the sign of a Muslim’s sincerity, faith and commitment to the religion.⁶³

After proper training, Muslims are enjoined to take up the third step — *ribāṭ*. This refers to life in the frontier posts, to carry out military operations against the enemy or to safeguard the border from enemy attacks. Although *ribāṭ* requires less exertion of resources, ‘Azzām pointed out that those who die in *ribāṭ* would also receive the status of martyrdom. Muslims are thus enjoined to establish frontier posts for security reasons and to facilitate *ribāṭ* practices.⁶⁴

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 21–24, 40, 83; *Ibid.*, pp. 35, 84, 85; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Al-As’ilah Wa Al-Ajwibah Al-Jihādiyyah* (Questions and Answers on Jihad), p. 26; ‘Azzām (1992), pp. 7, 9, 10, 24–26, 51; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād* (Fiqh and Ijtihād in Jihad), p. 37; ‘Azzām (1991); ‘Azzām (1990); ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Kalimāt Min Khaṭ Al-Nār* (Words from the Battlefield), p. 88; ‘Azzām (1992), pp. 145–152.

⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 21, 25; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Ittiḥāf Al-‘Ibād Bi Faḍāil Al-Jihād* (Virtues of Jihad), p. 8; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād* (Fiqh and Ijtihād in Jihad), p. 71; ‘Azzām (1992), pp. 297–300; ‘Azzām (1991), pp. 58–61; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah* (Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter of the Qur’ān]), p. 173; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Dhikrayāt Filisṭīn* (Memories of Palestine), pp. 31, 32; ‘Azzām (1985); ‘Azzām (1987).

⁶³ ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah* (Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter of the Qur’ān]), pp. 84, 85.

⁶⁴ ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Ittiḥāf Al-‘Ibād Bi Faḍāil Al-Jihād* (Virtues of Jihad), pp. 9, 10; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *I`lān Al-Jihād*, p. 9; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Muqaddimah Fī Al-Hijrah Wa Al-I`dād* (Introduction to Migration and Preparation), pp. 34–37, 50, 51; ‘Azzām (1992), p. 9; ‘Azzām (1990), pp. 18, 19; ‘Azzām (1992), pp. 106, 107, p. 56; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Ibar Wa Baṣāir Lī Al-Jihād Fī Al-‘Asr Al-Ḥāḍir* (Lessons for Jihad in Contemporary Era), pp. 2–5; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād* (Fiqh and Ijtihād in Jihad), pp. 17, 29.

In essence, `Azzām was calling for Muslims all over the world to join the jihad in Afghanistan where they could carry out all the four steps — migration, then joining the training camps before being deployed to the various fronts and lastly participating in jihad operations against the enemy.

3.6 Types of Jihad

`Azzām classified jihad into two types:

- *Jihād Al-Daf`* (defensive jihad): This is when Muslims are under attack. It is *fard` ayn* upon the affected Muslims to engage in jihad. If they are not able to repel the enemy, the obligation first extends to other Muslims living within about a 90-kilometer radius and then, if more fighters are needed this radius is extended until sufficiency is achieved or until it covers all Muslims.
- *Jihād Al-Ṭalab* (offensive jihad): This refers to jihad campaigns against all *Dār Al-Ḥarb* or non-Muslims not under the rule of *Dār Al-Islām*. This must be done at least once a year by a Muslim ruler.⁶⁵

Jihād Al-Ṭalab, in `Azzām's view was largely theoretical as his priority is in the defensive jihad (*jihād al-daf`*) of Afghanistan. Furthermore, since `Azzām's definition of occupied Muslim lands that need to be reclaimed encompassed all lands formerly under the rule of an Islamic caliphate, defensive jihad would be the type of jihad for many decades to come.

3.7 Ruling of Jihad

`Azzām's understanding of the ruling of jihad is to a large extent similar to the dominant classical viewpoint.

⁶⁵ `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *The Defence of Muslim's Land*, Chapter 1; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Dhikrayāt Filistīn (Memories of Palestine)*, pp. 18–20; `Azzām (1987); `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *I`lān Al-Jihād*, p. 1; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād (Fiqh and Ijtihād in Jihad)*, p. 3; `Azzām (1990), p. 60; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Jihād Sha`b Muslim (Jihad of a Muslim Nation)*, p. 5.

He agreed that jihad is originally *farḍ kifāyah*. In this situation, a Muslim ruler is obligated to wage a jihad campaign at least once a year.⁶⁶

But, ‘Azzām strongly viewed that jihad today is *farḍ ‘ayn*.⁶⁷ He believed that this is so not just since the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, but since the fall of Andalusia to the hands of Christians in 1492. He believed jihad will remain *farḍ ‘ayn* until all lands that used to belong to *Dār Al-Islām*, such as Central Asia, Mindanao, Kashmir and Chad, are brought back under the Islamic rule.⁶⁸

Although ‘Azzām’s original *fatwā* on jihad as *farḍ ‘ayn* was in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the ruling was not contingent or restricted to the events in Afghanistan, as he had clearly stated in many of his published materials. In fact, this is one of ‘Azzām’s most consistent standpoints on jihad. ‘Azzām offered three main arguments.

Firstly, he held that there is already a consensus among Muslim scholars that jihad is *farḍ ‘ayn* when an inch of *Dār Al-Islām* is occupied by infidels until it is reclaimed back. This is applicable to Afghanistan and indeed to many other lands.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *The Defence of Muslim’s Land*, Chapter 4. Arabic version: *Al-Difā’ ‘An Araḍī Al-Muslimīn*; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Join the Caravan*, Part 3; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād (Fiqh and Ijtihād in Jihad)*, pp. 3, 13, 49, 51, 57; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah (Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter of the Qur’ān])*, p. 77; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *I’lān Al-Jihād*, p. 2; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *The Signs of Ar-Rahman in the Jihad of Afghanistan*, p. 59.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Al-As’ilah Wa Al-Ajwibah Al-Jihādiyyah (Questions and Answers on Jihad)*, pp. 7, 20.

⁶⁸ ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Join the Caravan*, Part 3; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *The Signs of Ar-Rahman in the Jihad of Afghanistan*, pp. 59, 60; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *The Defence of Muslim’s Land*, Chapter 2; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Dhikrayāt Filisṭīn (Memories of Palestine)*, pp. 9, 10; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Al-As’ilah Wa Al-Ajwibah Al-Jihādiyyah (Questions and Answers on Jihad)*, pp. 2, 3, 9; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād (Fiqh and Ijtihād in Jihad)*, pp. 2, 3, 9, 12–19, 23, 24, 51, 57, 82; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Bashāir Al-Naṣr (Promises of Victory)*, pp. 5, 13; ‘Azzām (1990), pp. 58, 73–75; ‘Azzām (1992), pp. 247, 273, 287, 315; ‘Azzām (date not cited). *Fī Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah (Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter of the Qur’ān])*, pp. 77, 140, 169; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *I’lān Al-Jihād*, p. 8; ‘Azzām (1985); ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Ḥamās: Al-Judhur Al-Tārikhiyah Wa Al-Mithāq (Hamas: Its Historical Roots and Charter)*, p. 17.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *The Defence of Muslim’s Land*, Chapter 1.

Secondly, he argued that *daf' al-ṣā'il* was an obligation upon all Muslims. *Daf' al-ṣā'il* refers to the act of resisting any transgression on personal life, honour and property. If someone seeks to threaten the life of another person, molest/rape a woman or rob a property, a Muslim is obligated to defend them and if the Muslim dies, in the process, he or she is considered a martyr. 'Azzām reasoned that the obligation to defend life, honour and property could be extrapolated to defending a whole nation like Afghanistan. In fact, he sees this latter act to be even more important.⁷⁰

Thirdly, even if jihad is considered *farḍ kifāyah* in the context of Afghanistan, jihad is only relieved from the shoulders of all Muslims when it can be fulfilled sufficiently by other Muslims. But 'Azzām argued that this was not yet the case, pointing to the situation in Afghanistan as well as the fact that there are many Muslim lands that are still under infidel occupation. Thus, jihad is *farḍ 'ayn* on all Muslims until it can be satisfactorily carried out by a group of Muslims.⁷¹

'Azzām's view that individual participation of *farḍ 'ayn* jihad does not necessitate seeking permission from one's parents, the authorities or creditors, is identical to the classical viewpoint.⁷² His stance is that permission is only required when jihad is *farḍ kifāyah*.⁷³

⁷⁰ 'Azzām, AA (date not cited). *The Defence of Muslim's Land*, Chapter 1; 'Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Jihād Sha'b Muslim (Jihad of a Muslim Nation)*, p. 5; 'Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād (Fiqh and Ijtihād in Jihad)*, pp. 66, 67, 91; 'Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah (Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter of the Qur'ān])*, pp. 25, 26; 'Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Ittihāf Al-'Ibād Bi Faḍā'il Al-Jihād (Virtues of Jihad)*, p. 3; 'Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Hamās: Al-Judhur Al-Tārikhiyah Wa Al-Mithāq (Hamās: Its Historical Roots and Charter)*, p. 17; 'Azzām (1988); 'Azzām (1985); 'Azzām (1990); 'Azzām (1992), p. 286.

⁷¹ 'Azzām, AA (date not cited). *The Defence of Muslim's Land*, Chapter 4; 'Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Dhikrayāt Filistīn (Memories of Palestine)*, pp. 18–20; 'Azzām, AA (date not cited). *I'lān Al-Jihād*, p. 1; 'Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād (Fiqh and Ijtihād in jihad)*, pp. 3, 18, 19, 21–23, 50; 'Azzām (1990), p. 60; 'Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Jihād Sha'b Muslim (Jihad of a Muslim Nation)*, p. 5.

⁷² See Section 2.2.7 on "Fighters" in Chapter 2; 'Azzām (1992), pp. 87, 88, 129, 249, 273.

⁷³ 'Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād (Fiqh and Ijtihād in Jihad)*, pp. 2, 7, 14–16, 22, 23; 'Azzām, AA (date not cited). *The Defence of Muslim's Land*, Chapters 3 and 4.

In addition, ‘Azzām also ruled that:

- The interest of jihād has priority above any personal interests because it is for the greater good of the religion or the nation. Hence citing another religious duty as an excuse for not participating in jihād is unacceptable.⁷⁴
- Muslims should donate towards jihād rather than accumulate wealth for personal gain. It is considered permissible for the authority to seize the wealth of the rich and use it for jihād.⁷⁵
- It is permissible to use all *zakāh* funds for jihād *fī sabīl Allāh*, even if it means leaving nothing for the other seven groups of lawful recipients (namely, the needy [*miskīn*], the poor [*faqīr*], *zakāh* collector [*‘āmil*], new convert or potential Muslim [*muallaf*], slave [*raqabah*], wayfarer [*ibn sabīl*] and debtor [*ghārim*]).⁷⁶
- It is allowed to spend all wealth for jihād purposes even if it means not giving anything to destitutes.⁷⁷
- Financial contribution to jihād does not relieve a Muslim from physical participation.⁷⁸
- The verse, “Nor should the Believers all go forth together: if a contingent from every expedition remained behind, they could devote themselves to studies in religion, and admonish the people when they return to them....,”⁷⁹ which implies that participation in jihād is not obligatory upon every Muslim, applies only when jihād is *farḍ kifāyah*.⁸⁰

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 8, 15, 80; ‘Azzām (1992), p. 38; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah* (Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter of the Qur’ān]), p. 79.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 4, 65, 66; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *The Defence of Muslim’s Land*, Chapter 3; ‘Azzām (1990), pp. 60, 81.

⁷⁶ ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah* (Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter of the Qur’ān]), pp. 110, 111.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

⁷⁸ ‘Azzām (date not cited). *The Defence of Muslim’s Land*, Chapter 3; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Join the Caravan*, Part 3; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād* (Fiqh and Ijtihād in Jihād), p. 3.

⁷⁹ The Qur’ān, 9:122.

⁸⁰ ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *The Defence of Muslim’s Land*, Chapter 3; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Join the Caravan*, Part 3 and Conclusion; ‘Azzām (1990), p. 157; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah* (Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter

- The obligation stands despite the numerical advantage of the enemy. The verse that permits Muslims to retreat or suspend jihad due to the enemy's numerical advantage⁸¹ is only applicable when jihad is *fard kifāyah*. When jihad is *fard `ayn*, Muslims must uphold jihad even if he is alone.⁸²

`Azzām held that it is obligatory to incite Muslims for jihad, be it *fard `ayn* or *kifāyah*, because the means towards an obligation is itself obligatory.⁸³ Those who discourage Muslims from jihad have committed a grave sin similar to those who prevent them from performing obligatory prayers.⁸⁴ `Azzām considered Muslims today as sinners for allowing many Muslim lands to remain occupied. The non-participating *`ulamā'* bear a greater sin for they are supposed to be role models for Muslims.

Although jihad is an obligation for all Muslims, `Azzām ruled that it must be performed collectively because the purpose of jihad cannot be achieved by fighting individually.<sup>85</sup> This means that Muslims must fight under a rightful authority, and this traditionally refers to a ruler of *Dār Al-Islām*. In the absence of such an authority, `Azzām suggested that Muslims should organise themselves by forming a *jamā'ah* (group) and appointing a leader, or join an existing jihad group. He asserted that the threat posed by the enemy on Muslim lands and the religion dictates that jihad must be carried out despite the absence or the dereliction of authority. It is the duty of the *`ulamā'*, according

of the *Qur'ān*], pp. 167, 184; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Jihād Sha `b Muslim (Jihad of a Muslim Nation)*, p. 41; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād (Fiqh and Ijtihād in Jihad)*, p. 2; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Muqaddimah Fī Al-Hijrah Wa Al-I'dād (Introduction to Migration and Preparation)*, p. 64.

⁸¹ The *Qur'ān*, 8:65, 66.

⁸² `Azzām (1990), p. 10; `Azzām (1992), p. 316; `Azzām (1985).

⁸³ `Azzām (1989).

⁸⁴ `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād (Fiqh and Ijtihād in Jihad)*, p. 42; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah (Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter of the Qur'ān])*, p. 125; `Azzām (date not cited). *Join the Caravan*, Part 3; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Bashāir Al-Naṣr (Promises of Victory)*, pp. 5, 13.

⁸⁵ `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Join the Caravan*, Part 3; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *I'lān Al-Jihād*, p. 2.

to ‘Azzām, to incite and lead Muslims in performing this obligation.⁸⁶ In any case, ‘Azzām believed that jihad is an obligation that Muslims should strive to perform regardless of whether it was ruled as *farḍ ‘ayn* or *kifāyah*.⁸⁷

In ‘Azzām’s worldview, jihad will continue to be *farḍ ‘ayn* until an Islamic state exists and all lands formerly belong to the Islamic caliphate are returned to Islamic rule.

3.8 Stages of Revelation

‘Azzām held the same classical view on the four stages of Qur’ānic revelation on jihad.⁸⁸ However, he favoured the view that the final stage, i.e., the revelation of jihad verses in Chapter 9 of the *Qur’ān*, abrogated all earlier jihad verses.⁸⁹

This leaves the infidels with only these options:

- embrace Islam; or
- remain a non-Muslim but submit to Islamic rule and pay *jizyah*; or
- become targets of Muslims aggression.⁹⁰

The final revelation on jihad, according to ‘Azzām, prescribes the basis of Muslim-infidel relations as war, not peace.⁹¹

3.9 Objectives of Jihad

Jihad is to be undertaken for the following objectives:

- To revive Muslims from their current slumber to their previous glory.
- To establish Islam above all other religions and ideologies.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Jihād Sha‘b Muslim (Jihad of a Muslim Nation)*, p. 5; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Al-Shuyū‘yah: Al-Saraṭān Al-Aḥmar (Communism: The Red Cancer)*, p. 53; ‘Azzām (1992), p. 175, 273.

⁸⁷ ‘Azzām (1992), pp. 86, 87.

⁸⁸ See Section 2.2.5 on “Stages of Jihad” in Chapter 2.

⁸⁹ ‘Azzām (1990), pp. 33–36; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād (Fiqh and Ijtihād in Jihad)*, pp. 3, 43, 44, 70–75, 84, 85.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

⁹¹ ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah (Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter of the Qur’ān])*, pp. 1, 5, 184.

- To establish *Dār Al-Islām* as the political and geographical base for Islam.
- To counter-balance and deter *jāhilīyah* forces.
- To help the oppressed and eliminate tyranny.
- To attain a high position in heaven and salvation from hell.⁹²

It can be deduced that `Azzām saw this as a jihad of self-defense aimed at bringing all of *Dār Al-Ḥarb* or all infidels under the rule of Islam. However, he asserted that proper *da`wah* (propagation) must precede any offensive jihad campaigns against *Dār Al-Ḥarb* or infidels. More elaboration of `Azzām's view on this aspect will be touched in the coming section. The immediate objective, however, was the defeat of communist forces and the establishment of Islamic state in Afghanistan.

3.10 Who Can Fight for Jihad?

`Azzām believed that all Muslims who have met the criteria as listed in the discussion on the classical strand⁹³ are to perform the duty of jihad, either voluntarily or by conscription.⁹⁴

In addition to those who are exempt from jihad according to classical scholars, `Azzām held that, in view of the context, the exemption could be extended to persons who are denied by governments from travelling. This may be in the form of the refusal to issue travel documents⁹⁵ or the denial of entry visas into jihad lands.⁹⁶

However, even those who are exempted from jihad should still participate if they are able to. In any case, they are obligated to

⁹² `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād (Fiqh and Ijtihād in Jihad)*, pp. 9, 30, 44, 45, 52, 62, 73, 74, 78, 90; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Muqaddimah Fī Al-Hijrah Wa Al-I'dād (Introduction to Migration and Preparation)*, pp. 26, 82; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *`Ibar Wa Baṣāir Lī Al-Jihād Fī Al-`Asr Al-Ḥāḍir (Lessons for Jihad in Contemporary Era)*, pp. 3, 5; `Azzām (1992), pp. 132–135, 294.

⁹³ See Section 2.2.7 on "Fighters" in Chapter 2.

⁹⁴ `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Join the Caravan*, Part 3.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 5, 13; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Muqaddimah Fī Al-Hijrah Wa Al-I'dād (Introduction to Migration and Preparation)*, p. 78; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah (Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter of the Qur'ān])*, p. 141.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

contribute financially and constantly supplicate for the success of jihad.⁹⁷

According to ‘Azzām, fulfillment of other religious duties and obligations in a society is not a valid reason for not participating in jihad. The same rule applies to those who have debt. ‘Azzām argued that many companions of the Prophet were indebted when they participated in jihad. Muslims who are tied down with employment should resign from their work and students should abandon their study.⁹⁸

‘Azzām believed two types of people should be prohibited from participating in jihad; *murjif* (those who like to disseminate negative information to demoralise the fighters) and *mukhdhil* (those who seek to discourage people from participating in jihad).⁹⁹

3.11 Ethics and Rules of Jihad

In addition to the right intention, i.e., for the sake of God, ‘Azzām believed that fighting can only be accepted as jihad if it conforms to the established ethics and rules of war in Islam.

Otherwise, there is the risk that the fighting will not be considered as a commendable and honorable act that is aimed at pleasing God.¹⁰⁰

3.11.1 *Da’wah, warning and declaration*

‘Azzām was inclined to the view upheld by the majority of classical scholars that jihad cannot be waged against infidels before ensuring that the message of Islam has been conveyed to them.¹⁰¹

⁹⁷ ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Join the Caravan*, Part 3; ‘Azzām (1985).

⁹⁸ ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fi Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād (Fiqh and Ijtihād in Jihad)*, p. 59; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fi Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah (Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter of the Qur’ān])*, pp. 140, 169, 183; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Join the Caravan*, Part 2; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Jihād Sha’b Muslim (Jihad of a Muslim Nation)*, p. 9; ‘Azzām (1992).

⁹⁹ ‘Azzām (date not cited). *Jihād Sha’b Muslim (Jihad of a Muslim Nation)*, p. 5; ‘Azzām (1987), p. 39; ‘Azzām (date not cited). *Fi Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah (Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter of the Qur’ān])*, pp. 6, 83, 86, 162.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 1, 8, 11.

¹⁰¹ See Section 2.2.9 on “Rules Before Battle” in Chapter 2; ‘Azzām (1987). *Fi Al-Jihād: Ādāb Wa Ahkām* (In jihad, there are ethics and rules), pp. 5–8.

After that, the infidels should be given an ultimatum and sufficient time to make their decision.

The above process is particularly relevant for countries, individuals or communities of infidels that have not had any prior peace agreements with Muslims.¹⁰²

3.11.2 *Legitimate targets*

The legitimate targets of jihad according to `Azzām are:

- Infidel fighters,
- *Qutṭā' al-Ṭuruq/Muḥāribūn* (Bandits/Miscreants), and
- *Bughāh* (Rebels).¹⁰³

`Azzām held a view similar to all Muslim scholars that only infidel fighters can be targeted or fought in the jihad battlefield.¹⁰⁴ However, jihad must conform to the rules of engagement.

While classical scholars disagree on whether fighting *qutṭā' al-ṭuruq* and *bughāh* were considered jihad, they acknowledged that it is legitimate in Islam. `Azzām's stand on this was, however, not clear. It is probable that he regarded it as jihad because firstly, both were covered in one of his main treatises on jihad titled *Fī Al-Jihād: Adāb Wa Ahkām* (*Jihad: Ethics and Rules*) and, secondly, he reiterated that those who were killed in fighting against these two groups are considered martyrs by a majority of classical scholars.¹⁰⁵ However, `Azzām emphasised that *da`wah* and warning must precede jihad against both *qutṭā' al-ṭuruq* and *bughāh*.

Qutṭā' al-ṭuruq was a term used by `Azzām to describe the people who attacked and stole from the *mujāhidīn*'s supply convoy or fought the *mujāhidīn* because they refused to pay protection levies to them.

¹⁰² `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *I'ān Al-Jihād*, p. 1.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 12; `Azzām (1987), pp. 5, 26, 27.

¹⁰⁴ See Section 2.2.10 on "Rules During Battle" in Chapter 2; `Azzām (1987), p. 5.

¹⁰⁵ `Azzām (1987), pp. 26, 27; `Azzām (1985).

3.11.3 Non-legitimate targets

Similar to the classical viewpoint, ‘Azzām ruled that it was not permissible to target non-fighters such as women, children, unarmed ordinary folk, old men and monks. He, however, upheld the majority view that all non-fighters would lose this immunity if they contributed to the war either through money, ideas or spreading propaganda aimed at raising the morale of their soldiers and/or demoralising the Muslim army.¹⁰⁶

Thus, ‘Azzām ruled that it is permissible to kill Jews in America or American Jews if they were found to be contributing to Israel. He cautioned that one must be guided by consideration of benefits (*maṣālih*) versus the harms (*ḍarar*) which may be caused, as well as the *fatwā* of *Ahl Al-Thughūr*, scholars who have participated in armed jihad. To ‘Azzām, *Ahl Al-Thughūr* are the people qualified to provide appropriate and accurate advice in this matter.¹⁰⁷

On monks and clergymen, ‘Azzām said those who live and mix with the society can be targeted but those who live in monasteries seclusively cannot. The former is assumed to have contributed to war, just like members of any religious institution within the society. A similar rule is also applied to the nobles and elites.¹⁰⁸

However, this immunity did not apply to Afghan communists, regardless of gender. He reasoned that their ideology was inherently hostile and detrimental to Islam and that they were apostates punishable by death. He also highlighted that women today played an active role in promoting ideologies and that their beliefs could affect their immunity status.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁶ See Section 2.2.10 on “Rules During Battle” in Chapter 2; *Ibid.*, pp. 5, 9–15; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *I’lān Al-Jihād*, p. 12.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 111, 156; ‘Azzām (1994); ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Al-As’ilah Wa Al-Ajwabah Al-Jihādīyah* (Questions and Answers on Jihad), p. 29; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Itjihād* (Fiqh and Itjihād in Jihad), pp. 11, 12, 49, 50; ‘Azzām (1992), p. 12; ‘Azzām (1992), p. 249.

¹⁰⁸ ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *I’lān Al-Jihād*, pp. 13, 14.

¹⁰⁹ ‘Azzām (1987), pp. 45–53; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Jarīmat Qatl Al-Nafs Al-Muslimah* (Killing a Muslim Is a Crime), pp. 2–6, 10, 11; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Al-Shuyūyah: Al-Saraṭān Al-Aḥmar* (Communism: The Red Cancer), pp. 23–26.

Targeting *dhimmīys* and those who have made peace agreements with Muslims is strictly forbidden. The same applies to those who have surrendered.¹¹⁰

The rule on targeting property is also similar to the classical viewpoint,¹¹¹ which advocates minimal destruction to end hostility by incapacitating the enemy's fighting ability but not a total destruction of infrastructure. The power to decide lies with the rightful authority, i.e., the ruler and/or military commander. One example of impermissible destruction of property is an act that would bring about famine.¹¹²

`Azzām held a firm view on the impermissibility of killing Muslims indiscriminately.¹¹³ He wrote *Jarīmat Qatl Al-Nafs Al-Muslimah* (The Crime of Killing Muslim Life) as a response to conflicts among jihad groups in Afghanistan that had, on many occasions, taken the lives of Muslims. It is believed that each Muslim life is as sacred as the holy land of Mecca. `Azzām ruled that killing fellow Muslims is a grave sin that may qualify a person a permanent place in hell. Those who collaborated with or sheltered someone who had killed a Muslim risked receiving the same punishment as that of the killer.¹¹⁴

However, `Azzām reiterated that these rulings did not apply to Muslims who were fighting on the side of the Afghan communist regime or working for any intelligence agency belonging to the infidels, as they were considered apostates and must be fought and killed.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹¹¹ See Section 2.2.10 on "Rules During Battle" in Chapter 2.

¹¹² `Azzām (1987), pp. 5, 16–22; `Azzām (date not cited). *I'lān Al-Jihād*, p. 14.

¹¹³ `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Ittihāf Al-'Ibād Bi Faḍāil Al-Jihād* (*Virtues of Jihad*), pp. 9, 12, 14, 117.

¹¹⁴ `Azzām (date not cited). *Jarīmat Qatl Al-Nafs Al-Muslimah* (*Killing a Muslim is a Crime*), pp. 2–6, 10, 11; `Azzām (date not cited). *Ittihāf Al-'Ibād Bi Faḍāil Al-Jihād* (*Virtues of Jihad*), p. 12; `Azzām (1992), pp. 26, 27.

¹¹⁵ `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah* (*Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter of the Qur'ān]*), p. 122.

3.11.4 Peace agreement and cease fire

‘Azzām ruled that any peace agreements which contradicted the *sharī‘ah* is null and void. This is especially if the agreement caused the suspension of jihad indefinitely. When jihad is deemed as *fard ‘ayn*, he made the ruling that no peace agreements should be ratified until all occupied lands are reclaimed. This is to avoid any neglect of jihad duties due to the peace agreements and the de facto surrender of Muslim lands to infidels. Hence, ‘Azzām asserted that ratifying peace agreements with the Afghan communist regime was not an option and that the regime had to surrender the government to the leaders.¹¹⁶

However, if an agreement was signed, ‘Azzām warned that Muslims should commit to all the terms of agreement. The *ḥadīth* that says “war is deception,” according to him, only applies to those who has no peace agreements with Muslims and that the use of peace agreements as a part of a ruse for deception is an act of betrayal forbidden in Islam.¹¹⁷

Nonetheless, ‘Azzām reminded Muslims to be wary of infidels whom he considered inherently deceitful.¹¹⁸

3.11.5 Tactics and means

Although the use of modern weaponry such as rifles, artillery and rockets were potentially problematic from the dominant classical viewpoint because they can cause collateral damage, ‘Azzām ruled their permissibility on the basis of the inevitability of their use and as long as they are not used against non-legitimate targets.¹¹⁹ He forbade the use of fire for killing and burning unless there is real necessity.¹²⁰

¹¹⁶ ‘Azzām (1986).

¹¹⁷ ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah* (*Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter* [The Ninth Chapter of the Qur’ān]), p. 17.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 13; ‘Azzām (1987), pp. 24, 25.

¹²⁰ ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *l’Īlān Al-Jihād*, p. 12.

`Azzām held the view that suicide is forbidden in battle,¹²¹ but he endorsed the use of daring tactics that could risk the lives of Muslim fighters similar to the contemporary use of commando raids. While he acknowledged that classical scholars were divided on the issue, he preferred the view that permitted it. Citing those views, he asserted that suicide is carried out due to despair, while these tactics were conducted for the noble cause of exalting the word of God, to protect fellow fighters, to prevent greater harm (such as occupation) and to fight and strike fear in the enemy. Furthermore, the practice has had many precedents among the early Muslims and had been endorsed by the companions of the Prophet. It is considered permissible so long as it can achieve either of two purposes: bringing benefit to Muslims by raising their morale and motivating them to fight, or to destroy the enemy.¹²²

On the same basis also, he endorsed human-driven bombs; be it in the form of explosive-laden vehicles or vests. `Azzām did not recognise the difference between the classical practice of daring acts during battle and the human bomb. Although in reality, the former is not necessarily suicidal and is not killed by his weapon.¹²³

Another tactic endorsed by `Azzām during jihad was the use of assassination which was not restricted to military targets. It could also be used on:

- political leaders of a hostile country (he specifically mentioned Russian and communist leaders),
- every Jew who extended support and sympathy to Israel,
- boastful anti-Muslim leaders of secular and atheist parties, and
- anyone who stood by Israel.¹²⁴

¹²¹ `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Jarīmat Qatl Al-Nafs Al-Muslimah (Killing a Muslim is a Crime)*, p. 7.

¹²² `Azzām (1992), pp. 218, 219, 316; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād (Fiqh and Ijtihād in Jihad)*, pp. 30, 31, 39; `Azzām (1987), p. 21; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Ittihāf Al-`Ibād Bi Faḍāil Al-Jihād (Virtues of Jihad)*, p. 15; `Azzām (1992), p. 33; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Ibar Wa Baṣāir Lī Al-Jihād Fī Al-`Asr Al-Ḥāḍir (Lessons for Jihad in Contemporary Era)*, pp. 56–63.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 129, 130; `Azzām (1992); `Azzām (1985).

¹²⁴ `Azzām (1988); `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah (Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter of the Qur'ān])*, p. 15.

He based this view on the verse that says, “...then fight and slay the Pagans wherever ye find them, and seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem (of war)....”¹²⁵ He also highlighted that the Prophet was reported to have commanded some of his companions to assassinate certain infidel leaders for their hostility towards him and the religion. Hence, ‘Azzām considered that it was important to revive this neglected tradition of the Prophet in order to deter the enemy during the Afghan jihad period.¹²⁶ However, he was against the idea of assassinating leaders of Muslim countries in order to establish an Islamic state. Instead, he prescribed *da‘wah* and preparation first.¹²⁷

‘Azzām stressed that the decision for an assassination mission must be referred to and approved by the ‘*ulamā*’ and leaders who held the mandate of the people. They, then, have to determine whether the potential benefits are indeed greater than the harm. In the case of leaders of Muslim countries, he ruled that the ‘*ulamā*’ must first make a case of apostasy *vis-à-vis* the targeted leader.¹²⁸

3.11.6 *Fighting in the sacred months and land*

The four sacred months known among Arabs during the period of the Prophet were *Dhū Al-Qa‘dah* (11th month), *Dhū Al-Hijjah* (12th month), *Muḥarram* (1st month) and *Rajb* (6th month). Fighting and shedding blood during these months were regarded as abominable acts. Classical scholars however differed on whether the sanctity of these months should still be recognised after the Prophet’s era.

‘Azzām held the view that the practice of abstaining from fighting during these months had been abrogated after the conquest of Mecca because the Prophet attacked the people of Taif

¹²⁵ The *Qur’ān*, 9:5.

¹²⁶ ‘Azzām (1988); ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah* (*Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter* [The Ninth Chapter of the *Qur’ān*]), p. 15.

¹²⁷ ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād* (*Fiqh and Ijtihād in Jihad*), pp. 35–37.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

in the month of *Dhū Al-Qa`dah* and a few months after it. Thus, Muslims are allowed to wage jihad anytime. This is more so, according to him, when jihad is *fard`ayn* because the *Qur`ān* says:

They ask thee concerning fighting in the Prohibited Month. Say: "Fighting therein is a grave (offence); but graver is it in the sight of Allah to prevent access to the path of Allah, to deny Him, to prevent access to the Sacred Mosque, and drive out its members." Tumult and oppression are worse than slaughter.... (The *Qur`ān*, 2:217)

The Arabs also abhorred fighting and shedding blood in the sacred land of Mecca. This rule remains effective, according to `Azzām, except if it is transgressed upon first by the enemy.¹²⁹ Thus, jihad operations in Afghanistan continued throughout the Islamic year.

3.11.7 *Personal ethics & attributes*

Apart from the right intention and conformance to the law of jihad, `Azzām also emphasised the importance of personal ethics for Muslim fighters. This will be elaborated in the section on `Azzām's idea of *Al-Qā'idah* — the Muslim vanguard group.

3.11.8 *Desertion, retreat and withdrawal*

`Azzām's view on desertion, retreat and withdrawal is consistent with the classical strand.¹³⁰ Thus, those who left jihad in Afghanistan for unacceptable reasons such as disillusionment or impatience risked committing the grave sin of abandoning jihad.

¹²⁹ `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah* (*Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter of the Qur`ān]*), pp. 75, 76.

¹³⁰ See Section 2.2.10 on "Rules During Battle" in Chapter 2; `Azzām (1988).

3.11.9 Prisoners of war and the vanquished

While ‘Azzām acknowledged the difference of opinions among the classical scholars on the permissibility of killing enemy POWs, he was inclined to permit it, subject to the discretion of the authority.¹³¹ He cited two conditions that permit the killing — when a POW refuses to march along with the Muslim army or when he is injured and is incapable of marching, which would make him a serious liability.¹³²

Communist Afghans however were considered either *zindīq* (libertine/atheist) or apostates and were subject to the death penalty. Even if they were to repent following their capture, it was still permissible to kill them as punishment and deterrence to others. This, according to ‘Azzām, was the rule held by the majority of classical Muslim scholars.¹³³

‘Azzām agreed with the majority view that a captured infidel spy should be killed. For an infidel spy who was under any peace or non-hostility agreement such as *dhimmah*, truce or *al-amān* agreement, ‘Azzām preferred the death penalty as deterrence to others. The punishment for captured Muslims who spy for the enemy, according to ‘Azzām, is based on the discretion of the authority. The death penalty is, however, permissible.¹³⁴

On *qutṭā’ al-ṭuruq*, ‘Azzām viewed that the punishment had been fixed by the *Qur’ān*.¹³⁵ It was either:

- execution,
- crucifixion,
- banishment (imprisonment), or
- cutting off one hand and the opposite leg.

¹³¹ ‘Azzām (1987), pp. 44, 50, 51; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah* (Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter of the Qur’ān]), pp. 13, 14.

¹³² *Ibid.*, pp. 54, 55.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 46–49; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Al-Shuyūyah: Al-Saraṭān Al-Aḥmar* (Communism: The Red Cancer), p. 23.

¹³⁴ ‘Azzām (1987), pp. 54–57.

¹³⁵ The *Qur’ān*, 5:33, 34.

The choice of punishment is either based on the discretion of the Muslim authority or the severity of the offence.

It is not permissible, according to `Azzām, to practice torture on POWs and the vanquished people.¹³⁶

3.11.10 Others

`Azzām upheld the practice of *bay`ah* (pledge of allegiance) in jihad because it is a recognised tradition of the Prophet. The purpose, according to `Azzām, is to strengthen one's resolve and commitment to jihad. In that regard, he ruled on the permissibility of renewing it from time to time or for specific purposes such as before engaging in major operations. He based this on the practice of the Prophet who took a special *bay`ah* from his companions known to be the *Bay`at Al-Riḍwān*.<sup>137</sup> The *bay`ah* was made to avenge a companion, who had been killed while negotiating for the safe passage of Muslims to Mecca for pilgrimage.

Unlike many Islamic groups, `Azzām did not view anything wrong with Muslims giving multiple *bay`ah* to different people or groups as the *bay`ah* that is practiced in this instance was not a *bay`ah* to a caliph.

`Azzām, however, cautioned that no *bay`ah* should demand total and unconditional obedience on all matters as such obedience is only reserved for God. Obedience to any human being must be conditional. At least, it should not contradict the *sharī`ah*. It has been established by all scholars that there is no obedience to anybody, who is in disobedience to God. Secondly, no *bay`ah* should prevent anybody from performing anything that is enjoined by the *sharī`ah*.¹³⁸

`Azzām considered that the state of war between *Dār Al-Islām* and *Dār Al-Ḥarb* does not necessarily prohibit trade between the

¹³⁶ `Azzām (1987), p. 53; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah (Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter of the Qur'ān])*, p. 13.

¹³⁷ `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Ittihāf Al-`Ibād Bi Faḍāil Al-Jihād* (Virtues of Jihad), p. 10.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

two domains or between subjects of both domains. However, he was against the trading of harmful substances even if they were to infidels. During one of his travels to the inner part of Afghanistan with Hekmatyar, he came across an opium plantation and subsequently questioned the owner. The owner explained that the opium was to be sold to infidels, implying that it was not for personal use and would not harm Muslims. Nonetheless, ‘Azzām asserted that Islam forbids all acts that were harmful whether to the one self or to others, and prohibited drug trade.¹³⁹

3.12 Martyrs

‘Azzām regarded the highest form of martyrdom is that in jihad battle. He ruled any Muslim man, woman or children who died in battle sincerely for the sake of God regardless of whether they died immediately in battle or later due to injury, and whether at the hands of the enemy or due to friendly fire, including those who died fighting *quṭṭā’ al-ṭuruq* and *bughāh*, as martyrs. For ‘Azzām, martyrs are the creators and shapers of the *ummah*. The greatness of the martyr’s position in God’s eyes and their reward should inspire Muslims to strive for it or at least aspire to die a martyr’s death. The yearning to achieve martyrdom in the battlefield helps fighters overcome the difficulties of jihad.¹⁴⁰

3.13 Jihad and *Irḥāb* (Terrorism)

‘Azzām made no apologies that Islam makes *irḥāb* (contemporary Arab word used for terrorism) an obligation upon Muslims based on the *Qur’ān* and the *ḥadīth*.¹⁴¹

¹³⁹ ‘Azzām (1989).

¹⁴⁰ ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād (Fiqh and Ijtihād in Jihad)*, pp. 65, 67; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *‘Ibar Wa Baṣāir Lī Al-Jihād Fī Al-‘Asr Al-Ḥāḍir (Lessons for Jihad in Contemporary Era)*, p. 4.

¹⁴¹ ‘Azzām (1990), pp. 49, 50, 58; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Dhikrayāt Filisṭīn (Memories of Palestine)*, pp. 17–19.

God has said in the *Qur'ān*:

Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into (the hearts of) the enemies....¹⁴²

It is reported in a *ḥadīth* narrated by Al-Bukhārī and Muslim that God has promised victory for the Prophet by instilling fear in the enemy's heart, even when a Muslim army is at a distance of a month's march.

`Azzām even claimed that the Prophet was the first Muslim who struck fear and terror in the hearts of the infidels. The sign of true Islam, according to `Azzām, is that it is feared by the enemy. On the contrary, the sign of corrupted Islam is that it is liked by the enemy. `Azzām quoted the *ḥadīth*:

The People will soon summon one another to attack you just like people seated around a platter of food invite one another to consume that food. "Someone asked," "Will that be because of our small numbers at that time?" He replied, "No, you will be numerous at that time: but you will be froth and scum like that carried down by a torrent (of water), and *Allah* will take the fear of you from the hearts of your enemy and cast *al-wahn* into your hearts. "Someone asked," "O Messenger of *Allāh*, what is *al-wahn*?" He replied, "Love of the world and dislike of death." (Narrated by Abū Dāwud and Aḥmad)¹⁴³

Irhāb, in `Azzām's view, is an extension of jihad. Commenting on the verse, he wrote, "If there is no fighting (jihad), there will be no terror on the infidels. They, then, will never respect us. Without fighting, the enemy will not fear us, the religion will not be victorious and we will have no existence in this life."¹⁴⁴

¹⁴² The *Qur'ān*, 8:60.

¹⁴³ `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Muqaddimah Fī Al-Hijrah Wa Al-I'dād* (Introduction to Migration and Preparation), p. 43.

¹⁴⁴ `Azzām (1990), p. 50.

All the above are meanings extracted from ‘Azzām’s own words. Whether this would put ‘Azzām’s notion and practices of terrorism similar to what is held by the current Al-Qaeda and jihadist groups of the same ilk will be discussed in the concluding section of this chapter.

For now, it is sufficient to note that the word *irhab* has two different meanings in Arabic use. The *Qur’ānic* perspective of the word essentially refers to the concept of deterrence as understood in strategic studies. This can be implied from the *Qur’ānic* verse that commands Muslims to strike fear in the enemy by getting “ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war,” not through indiscriminate or premeditated attacks on civilians. The second usage refers to what is currently known as terrorism, which implies a premeditated indiscriminate attack.

3.14 The Idea of *Al-Qā’idah*

As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, ‘Azzām, in his writings, highlighted the mutual interplay between the ideas of *Al-Qā’idah* and jihad. ‘Azzām’s usage of *Al-Qā’idah* also implies a relationship with Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda, the most prominent jihadist group and proponent of contemporary jihadism.

‘Azzām expounded his idea of *Al-Qā’idah* in his article *Al-Qa’idah Al-Sulbah* which appeared in the April 1998 issue of *Al-Jihād* magazine. Some researchers have suggested that it was written as the founding document of Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda. Due to the close nexus between ‘Azzām’s ideas of *Al-Qā’idah* and jihad and their implied association with Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda, it is crucial to look at his *Al-Qā’idah* concept in order to understand his jihad ideas.

3.14.1 *The concept*

By *Al-Qā’idah*, ‘Azzām was referring to a group of Muslims, functioning as the foundation upon which the *ummah* and its structure should be founded and developed. Its strength will establish God’s

rule in this world, divert mankind from worldly preoccupations to the comprehensiveness of Islam and to resist and subdue the hostile *jāhiliyah*.¹⁴⁵

It also referred to the first generation of Muslims, i.e., the companions who after being educated and moulded by the Prophet himself, brought glory to Islam after the Prophet's death through territorial expansion and civilisational contributions. This generation was what `Azzām envisioned *Al-Qā'idah* to be. To re-invent this historical generation, the Prophet's approach should be emulated.¹⁴⁶ *Al-Qā'idah* was to function as the Islamic Movement that will ignite the potential of the *ummah*.¹⁴⁷

In *Al-Qā'idah Al-Ṣulbah*, `Azzām explained the rationale for this group. He wrote "As long as the ideology — even if it originates from the Lord of the Worlds — does not find this self-sacrificing vanguard that spends everything in his possession for the sake of making its ideology prevail, this ideology will be still-born, perishing before it sees light and life."¹⁴⁸ `Azzām blamed the absence of *Al-Qā'idah* among Muslims on the widespread mischief and destruction caused by *jāhiliyah*.

3.14.2 *The qualities*

`Azzām listed the following essential qualities of *Al-Qā'idah*:

- Withstand tribulation.

`Azzām believed that glory and victory belongs only to those who have passed God's tribulations. He wrote: "Trial polishes the spirit, cleanses the soul and purifies the heart from meanness and pettiness.... The more tribulation there is, the closer victory gets..."¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁵ `Azzām (1988); `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah (Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter of the Qur'ān])*, p. 10; `Azzām (1991); `Azzām (1993); `Azzām (1992), p. 148.

¹⁴⁶ `Azzām (1990); `Azzām (1980), p. 13.

¹⁴⁷ `Azzām (1988).

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, Paz (2001), pp. 16–21.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

Elsewhere, ‘Azzām likened *Al-Qā‘idah* to building blocks, which had to be burnt before they can be used as building foundations.

- Asceticism/abstinence.

‘Azzām extolled the virtue of shedding worldly attachments and desires. He wrote:

Abstinence is the very foundation of Jihad. Affluence is the biggest weakness that befalls nations, spoils their kids and undermines their humanity.... We can clearly see that Allah’s Prophet adopted abstinence on purpose, and the same holds true of his companions, despite the fact that the world was at their feet.¹⁵⁰

- Deep conviction in the faith,¹⁵¹ perserverence¹⁵² and devotion to God.

This includes additional prayers at night. He wrote: “These additional prayers are provision for Jihad; they are its spirit and its life.”¹⁵³

- *Al-Walā’* (loyalty to Allah) and *Al-Barā’* (disassociation from *kufr*).

Staying true to these two principles will ensure that *Al-Qā‘idah* will not be swayed, unlike the Kemalists who had sold Palestine to Britain and abolished the Ottoman caliphate in exchange for power. ‘Azzām wrote: “There are so many Kemalists in our nation who sold it for a piece of bread or a word of recognition or a glass or a prostitute. The lack of the sense of loyalty and devotion in the minds of many led them and those following them into the depths of hell.”¹⁵⁴

- Fully aware of the international conspiracy against Islam.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁵² *Ibid.*

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

In other articles, `Azzām mentioned the following attributes of *Al-Qā'idah*:

1. Truthful to Islamic principle,
2. Defends Islam,
3. Ready to sacrifice even one's life,
4. Confronts *jāhiliyah*,
5. Free from worldly desires,
6. Understands the confrontation between Islam and *jāhiliyah*,
7. Loves martyrdom, and
8. Possesses *`izzah* (honour).¹⁵⁵

There is no contradiction between the attributes listed in the main article (*Al-Qā'idah Al-Ṣulbah*) and the others. The list can be subsumed under those that were mentioned in the former. In fact, there is no fundamental difference between the attributes specifically mentioned for *Al-Qā'idah* and the general attributes of Muslim fighters in jihad mentioned previously.

3.14.3 *The means*

`Azzām believed that the means to regenerate *Al-Qā'idah* is through a long process of *tarbiyah* (education) of the individuals, fundamentally, in matters of creed (*`aqidah*) similar to the Prophet's 13 years in Mecca where he was preparing the early companions for greater responsibilities, which included managing an Islamic polity in Medina after the migration and waging jihad against the infidels. Without this long process of *tarbiyah*, "there is no chance for the believing society to come about, and if it came about without it (without that understanding) it would be like a house on sand blown away by the first storm or even a gust of wind," `Azzām wrote.¹⁵⁶

In `Azzām's view, there were several reasons why this long period of *tarbiyah* is crucial before embarking on jihad. It was to

¹⁵⁵ `Azzām (1991).

¹⁵⁶ `Azzām (1988).

provide a code of conduct for those wanting to go on jihad, fuel them with the mental stamina and spiritual strength to persevere throughout the long process of jihad while successfully guarding themselves against the temptations which they may encounter along the way.¹⁵⁷

Integral to the *tarbiyah* process is God’s tribulation. ‘Azzām wrote: “No mission can be divested of the element of testing.”¹⁵⁸ The most important school for *tarbiyah* is jihad and its battlefield. He wrote: “The long Jihad will bring people’s qualities to the fore and highlight their potentials.”¹⁵⁹

It is in this regard that ‘Azzām saw the jihad in Afghanistan as a fertile training ground for the regeneration of *Al-Qā’idah*. He attributed the success of jihad in Afghanistan to the existence of Islamic movements under the leadership of individuals such as Hekmatyar, Rabbānī, Sayyāf and Yūnus Khālīsh who were already educated and trained by Islamic movements before the jihad and gained further strengths by their involvement in jihad.

3.14.4 *Eight guiding principles*

‘Azzām listed eight principles for the *tarbiyah* of *Al-Qā’idah*:

1. It must jump into the fire of the toughest tests and into the waves of fierce trials.
2. The training leadership shares with them the testing march, the sweat and the blood. The leadership must be like the motherly warmth of a hen whose chicks grow under its wings, throughout the long period of hatching and training.
3. This vanguard has to abstain from cheap worldly pleasures and must bear its distinct stamp of abstinence and frugality.
4. In like manner it must be endowed with firm belief and trust in the ideology, instilled with a lot of hope for its victory.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

5. There must be a strong determination and insistence to continue the march no matter how long it takes.
6. Travel provision is among the most important items on this march. The provision consists of meditation, patience and prayer.
7. Loyalty and devotion.
8. They must grasp anti-Islam machinations all over the world.¹⁶⁰

In `Azzām's view, not every Muslim can be *Al-Qā'idah* but every Muslim is obligated to support *Al-Qā'idah* with their money and lives.

3.15 Commenting on `Azzām

`Azzām's jihad ideas are essentially classical with a militant bent. Some of the features which characterized `Azzām's jihad ideas as classical militant are:

- Jihad means fighting the infidels,
- Jihad is a perpetual war between Muslims and infidels,
- The basis of relationship between Muslims and infidels is war, not peace,
- The objective of jihad is not just self-defence but to establish Islam above all religions and ideologies,
- Reclaiming land that was part of *Dār Al-Islām* from the infidels is an act of self-defence against transgression,
- Glorification of everything and everyone related to jihad (armed fighting for Islam), and
- Incitement of Muslims to practice jihad.

Indeed, a substantial part of `Azzām's jihad ideas are continuous with classical tradition, but with a *salafī* take on theological issues. The ideas are characterised by great deference to the opinions held by classical scholars, strict adherence to the classical scholars'

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

methodology of *ijtihad* or deduction from the *Qur'ān* and the *ḥadīths*, based primarily on three important sciences popularly known as *Uṣūl Al-Fiqh* (Science of Islamic Jurisprudence), *Uṣūl Al-Tafsīr* (Science of Interpreting the *Qur'an*) and *Uṣūl Al-Ḥadīth* (Science of *Ḥadīth*). The approach is essentially literalist and textualist in nature.

However, the fundamental problem with `Azzām is that such an approach gives precedence to the opinions of classical scholars, which are contingent on the contexts in which they were formulated. It restricts the understanding of classical viewpoints to literal and textual analysis, and denies perspectives generated from other disciplines such as the social sciences and humanities which are equally relevant to the study of ideas and laws.

In `Azzām's classification of lands into *Dār Al-Islām* and *Dār Al-Ḥarb*, he essentially applied what had been formulated by classical scholars and sidestepped the differences in the context then and now. This is despite the fact that such classification was an *ijtihād* (rational deduction) of the scholars and not an injunction from the *Qur'ān* and *ḥadīth*. Thus, Muslim scholars are not obligated to adhere to it.

Another problem in `Azzām's approach is his neglect of contemporary international conventions on war in his formulation of jihad ideas, thus, potentially ignoring the established legal maxim in Islamic jurisprudence, *Al-`Adah Muḥakkamah* — custom/convention as a binding law. Based on `Azzām's own view on the importance of Muslims to abide with all contractual agreements, it could be argued that the ratification of the Geneva Conventions by Muslim countries binds Muslims who are citizens of those Muslim states. Muslims in non-Muslim countries are also bound, based on the above points, to follow the law. Thus, the practice and understanding of jihad cannot be oblivious to these rules or they will risk breaching them.

There are two aspects of `Azzām's jihad ideas which depart from the classical viewpoint. His ruling on the contemporary practice of "martyrdom operations" has no precedent in classical works. Classical works refer to daring acts in the battlefield where the risk of death was high and even if a person was killed, it would not be

by his own weapons. The other aspect is the permissibility of armed rebellion against a ruler — a position that a majority of classical scholars would have serious reservations about. On this issue, `Azzām ruled that jihad against the ruling Afghan regime carried the same ruling as jihad against the invading Soviet army. He suggested that jihad in Afghanistan did not begin when the Soviet army invaded the country but had begun earlier against the local communist regime. In this respect, `Azzām, like other jihadist groups, resorted to *takfīr* — branding the rulers of the local Afghan regimes as apostates for their communist ideology and persecuting Afghans on the basis of their religion. `Azzām, however, disapproved of using this same tactic against the ruling regimes in the Arab countries, because the conditions were not as favourable as in Afghanistan.

Nonetheless, it should be pointed out that `Azzām's jihad ideas also carried features of restraint that distinguished it from the jihadism practiced by the Egyptian groups that had preceded him and the current Al-Qaeda network. The latter has become more permissive and trans-national in nature. This restraint could also be seen from his recognition of modern diplomatic relations as valid peaceful agreements and visas as equal to the classical *al-amān* concept in Islam. Muslims, thus, are not allowed to launch any attacks on infidel countries as long as this relationship stands, or to attack any infidel who enters Muslim countries with a valid visa.¹⁶¹

While `Azzām had made a ruling that rulers of Muslim countries who were found guilty of apostasy and those who supported Israel may be attacked, he also laid down several conditions to restrict the practice. He asserted that consultations must be made with a council of '*ulamā'*', who will then issue a *fatwā*, before the attack. Such attacks should not cause greater harm to Islam and Muslims. Thus, the matter cannot be decided by any individual or group independent of a credible religious authority.

`Azzām's notion of jihad to establish an Islamic state was mass-based and not uncoordinated jihad waged by disparate groups

¹⁶¹ `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah (Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter of the Qur'ān])*, pp. 14–18, 50.

against the authority. Thus, he did not consider acts of assassinating apostate leaders practiced by some jihadist groups as the right way to bring down the *jāhiliyah* system.

During the Afghan jihad, ‘Azzām had not sent foreign Muslim fighters to launch attacks against the Soviet Union’s interests outside the Afghan battlefield as practiced by the resistance or terrorist groups of his time. Except for limited operations against the Soviet army based in border regions, the hinterland of the Soviet Union and its civilians were largely spared from any attacks.¹⁶² This is starkly different from the practice of Chechen jihadists against the Russians. There has been no evidence that ‘Azzām had urged Muslims to attack the enemy wherever they are found as practiced by Al-Qaeda today. Instead, he had called on Muslims to travel to Afghanistan in order to wage jihad against infidels there. ‘Azzām’s involvement in jihad in Palestine and Afghanistan had been primarily a defensive act against external aggressions.

It can then be said that the aforementioned idea of *irhāb* (terror) found in ‘Azzām’s works referred to the concept of deterrence and not terrorism as it is conventionally used today. This can be further supported by ‘Azzām’s assertion:

“In Islam, ends do not justify means; Islam disputes Machiavelli’s idea (ends justify means) or Lenin’s idea (for the sake of benefit, do whatever you wish). For instance, Islam honours agreements and treaties; it therefore does not allow the liberation of a city by breaching an agreement or forsaking a treaty. Likewise, Islam does not allow the killing of children and the kidnapping of women for the sake of inducing pressure on the enemy.”¹⁶³

Having said that however, ‘Azzām’s strict adherence to the classical view that non-fighters can be targeted if they contributed to hostilities against Islam via ideas, wealth and other means, could be used to justify terrorism in today’s context.

¹⁶² ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Al-As’ilah Wa Al-Ajwibah Al-Jihādīyah (Questions and Answers on Jihad)*, pp. 6, 11, 43, 44; ‘Azzām (1987).

¹⁶³ ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *I lān Al-Jihād*, p. 9.

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Chapter 4

Framing Jihad for Mobilisation

4.1 Introduction

After the in-depth study of the source of `Azzām's jihad ideas, this chapter will explain the workings of `Azzām's ideas using the framing perspective of the social mobilisation theory (SMT). The assumption is that the critical issue in `Azzām's brand of jihad as well as that of other jihadists is not the ideas *per se* but how the ideas function as an ideology in order to achieve specific political objectives.

Most proponents of the framing perspective hold that framing was often used to persuade people to act or subscribe to the ideas that underlie an act. Frames are also constructed by social entrepreneurs when they tap on their cultural and cognitive stocks, which includes among others, worldview and ideas. Thus, it is important to understand the worldview and ideas of a person or movement before understanding and analysing the frame.

This chapter will answer the following research questions:

- (1) How did `Azzām frame his jihad ideas?
- (2) How did the context in which he lived influence his ideas?
- (3) How did he use that context to frame his ideas in order to achieve his objectives?

Because the concept of framing is essential in understanding this chapter, it will be useful to recapitulate the concept, the model

that underpins it, the rationale for its choice and its intended use in this research work, as elaborated in the first chapter.

“Frame” here refers to an interpretive lens that simplifies and condenses the complexity of the world. It helps individuals to interpret, perceive and label events in their lives and indeed the world. Like a camera lens that includes or excludes elements of a scene, a frame punctuates and encodes, includes and excludes, objects, situations, events and experiences so that meanings may be derived.

The framing model used in this work is Snow *et al.*’s collective action frames. In this model, a frame is not only a lens by which to interpret and provide meanings to events but it is a means of mobilising target audiences to change situations that have been defined as unjust.

A collective action frame constitutes three key elements or sub-frames:

- Diagnostic frame that defines the problem or unjust situation requiring change and attributes its causal agent, i.e., who is to be blamed.
- Prognostic frame that defines the solution to the said problem and attributes its causal agent, i.e., who is responsible to change the situation.
- Mobilising frame that rationalises the “call to arms” and motivates people to action.

All contemporary scholars of SMT and framing stress that ideas and frames are not merely cognitive products that are fixed and static. Ideas and frames are concurrently shaping and are shaped by the context.

In this regard, scholars have recommended the dynamic approach in analysing ideational elements which requires investigating how each cognitive element (i.e., worldview, jihad ideas and frame), influence and are being influenced by each other; and how these cognitive elements influence and are being influenced by the context (i.e., political structure and opportunity, resources, targeted audiences and opposition forces).

The result of this would be the presence of multiple frames that are incoherent or contradictory due to responses to, or influences from various interacting elements such as different audiences, changes of opportunity, internal constraints, ideational revisions and counterforces. The same dynamics also would have caused frames to evolve over time. Ideas and frames in this regard are dynamic, emergent and contested.

On a similar note, Mark Juergensmeyer writes, “But it [religion] does not ordinarily lead to violence. That happens only with the coalescence of a peculiar set of circumstances — political, social, and ideological — when religion becomes fused with violent expressions of social aspirations, personal pride, and movements for political change.”¹

This chapter will attempt to capture this dynamism by using framing to analyse `Azzām’s jihad ideas with the hope that it will generate better understanding and, when necessary, better responses to his ideas.

It is important to highlight that Snow *et al.*’s model of framing is used primarily here as a tool to analyse `Azzām’s ideas dynamically, and not to validate the model through its application on `Azzām’s jihad ideas. Thus, the chapter will give greater focus to `Azzām’s jihad ideas rather than the application of the model itself.

This chapter begins with an analysis of `Azzām’s worldview and the contextual factors that contributed to its Islamist character. It identifies, from `Azzām’s ideas elaborated in the preceding chapter, two collective action frames — distinct but inter-related — whose functions are to effect mobilisation. These frames are jihad to defend Afghanistan, and jihad for Islamism.

The chapter then proceeds with a detailed analysis of the two frames using Snow *et al.*’s. framing model. The analysis seeks to strip the components of the frames according to the model, i.e., the frame resonance/alignment and the frame resonance strategy. This is to understand the potency of `Azzām’s ideas in effecting mobilisation during the Soviet–Afghan war period.

¹Juergensmeyer (2003), p. 10.

The chapter also highlights inconsistencies found in ‘Azzām’s ideas and points out their utility value for counter-jihadism work.

Finally, this chapter illustrates some challenges faced by ‘Azzām in the form of counter-frames that also underscored some of the contextual factors that shaped his ideas.

4.2 ‘Azzām’s Worldview and Jihad Ideas

Based on the preceding chapters, it is clear that ‘Azzām held an Islamist worldview which can be traced to his long affiliation to the Jordanian chapter of the Muslim Brothers.² He was reportedly talent-spotted by the Muslim Brothers at a young age due to his intelligence and piety. The head of the Jordanian Muslim Brothers paid him frequent visits to keep track of his development.³

‘Azzām was not a low-ranking follower or mere sympathiser of the Muslim Brothers. He provided military training to delegations from Syria sent by Marwān Ḥafīd, one of the leaders of the Syrian Muslim Brothers, during his involvement with the resistance movement.⁴ He also had access to the family of the late Sayyid Quṭb, namely, Muḥammad Quṭb, Ḥamīdah Quṭb, Āminah Quṭb and her husband Kamāl Al-Sanānīrīy — the person who was responsible for convincing ‘Azzām to join the jihad in Afghanistan. Unless ‘Azzām was a recognised senior member of the Brothers, such close relations and collaborations would not have been possible due to the strict internal security measures practiced by the Brothers against external threat.⁵

² ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah (Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter of the Qur’ān])*, p. 3; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād (Fiqh and Ijtihād in Jihad)*, p. 77.

³ ‘Azzām (1990).

⁴ ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Hamās: Al-Judhur Al-Tārikhiyah Wa Al-Mithāq* (Hamās: Its Historical Roots and Charter), p. 14; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah (Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter of the Qur’ān])*, p. 10; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Muqaddimah Fī Al-Hijrah Wa Al-Iḍād (Introduction to Migration and Preparation)*, pp. 82, 83; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Dhikrayāt Filisṭīn (Memories of Palestine)*, p. 9.

⁵ ‘Azzām, AA (no date cited). *Yā ‘Ulamā’ Al-Ummah! Man Yasuddu Makān Al-Shahīd* (O scholars of the nation! Who will replace the martyr [Kamāl Al-Sanānīrīy]), pp. 85, 86. *Kalimāt Min Khaṭ Al-Nār*.

This indicates that `Azzām must have gone through the Muslim Brothers' extensive *tarbiyah* program to qualify for such a position in the group and thus explaining `Azzām's Islamist tendency. During the *tarbiyah* program, he must have been exposed to Quṭb's ideas which were then required reading. `Azzām himself had, by his own admission, been attracted to Quṭb's ideas whom he described as of the most influential persons in shaping his Islamic worldview.⁶

In this regard, `Azzām shared two broad ideological characteristics with jihadist groups: Islamist worldview and militant jihad ideas.

In studying `Azzām's worldview and jihad ideas, it can be concluded that jihad in `Azzām's view was not the end but a means for Islamism,⁷ albeit an important one compared non-violent means.⁸ `Azzām held that the ultimate glory and victory of Islam over other religions and ideologies can only be achieved through armed jihad.⁹

However, a study of Islamism reveals that not all Islamists subscribe to the militant jihad viewpoint of `Azzām and not all members of the Muslim Brothers hold such a view. At least three senior Muslim scholars known to be affiliated with the Muslim Brothers have shown distinct differences with `Azzām on the issue of jihad. These are Sa`īd Ramaḍān Al-Būṭīy, a senior Syrian scholar, Yūsuf Al-Qaraḍāwīy a well-known scholar in the Muslim world, and Fayṣal Mawlawī, a leader of the Lebanese chapter of the Muslim Brothers.

Al-Būṭīy's view of jihad, discussed in the second chapter of this volume, is reformist.¹⁰ Al-Qaraḍāwīy's view, as reflected in his recent book on jihad, does not fundamentally differ from Al-Būṭīy's.¹¹ Mawlawī, in one of his treatises available on his personal

⁶ `Azzām (1986); `Azzām (1991), pp. 12, 13; `Azzām (1992), pp. 10–12; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *A Message of Youth*, p. 4.

⁷ See Section 3.4.3 on "Jihad Guarantees the Survival of Islam" in Chapter 3.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Section 3.4.1 on "The Pinnacle of Islam."

⁹ *Ibid.*, Section 3.2 on "`Azzām's Worldview."

¹⁰ See Section 2.4 on "Reformist Strand of Jihad" in Chapter 2.

¹¹ Al-Qaraḍāwīy (2003); Maleeh (2009). See also Al-Qaraḍāwīy (2009).

website, clearly seeks to construct a theological basis for peaceful relationships and cooperation between Muslims and non-Muslims on the basis of universal values and common benefits.¹²

This thus raises the question. Despite sharing the same worldview and being raised on the same tradition of the Muslim Brothers, why was `Azzām's jihad viewpoint inclined to the militant strand?

The answer is both ideational and contextual. From an ideational perspective, `Azzām held that the final revelation on jihad calls upon Muslims to wage jihad against non-Muslims unconditionally, and had abrogated previous verses that sanctioned jihad for the purpose of self-defence.<sup>13</sup> Juxtaposing this with `Azzām's other view that all non-Muslims are inherently hostile towards Muslims and will never cease to oppose them until they abandoned the religion,¹⁴ leads to the conclusion that jihad against non-Muslims is inevitable and a necessity for the survival and supremacy of Islam.¹⁵

This distinguishes `Azzām from the other three scholars who reject the abrogation argument and the generalisation that all non-Muslims are inherently hostile.

Two points can be made on the ideational influence on `Azzām's militant jihad viewpoint. Firstly, as mentioned earlier, it had set jihad as the means and not the end. Secondly, it functioned as `Azzām's frame in mobilising people for jihad.

From a contextual perspective, three events contributed significantly to `Azzām's inclination towards the militant strand of jihad. The first was, in his own words, the humiliating experience of witnessing the defeat of the Arab military forces and the capture of his family's land by the Israeli forces during the 1967 war.¹⁶ While

¹²Mawlawī, F (date not cited). *Al-Mafāhīm Al-Asāṣiyah Li Al-Da`wah Al-Islamiyah Fī Bilād Al-Gharb* (Basic understanding for Islamic propagation in Western countries), Chapter 3.

¹³See Section 3.8 on "Stages of Revelation" and Section 3.15 on "Commenting on `Azzām" in Chapter 3.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, Section 3.2 on "`Azzām's Worldview."

¹⁵*Ibid.*, Section 3.4.2 on "Jihad Guarantees Glory for Islam" and Subsection 3.4.3 "Jihad Guarantees the Survival of Islam."

¹⁶See Section 1.3.2 on `Abd Allāh `Azzām: His life and role during the Soviet-Afghan war in Chapter 1.

the event justified his engagement in armed jihad, albeit for the reason of self-defence, it affirmed his view of the hostile nature of non-Muslims.¹⁷ To him, the aggression originated not only from Israel but also from non-Muslim countries that supported the country politically and militarily.¹⁸

Secondly was his participation in armed resistance against the Israeli occupation. He and like-minded Muslims organised the resistance forces in the occupied territories from Jordan under the auspices of the main resistance organisation, the PLO. They had their own base known as the *Shuyūkh* (Elders/Scholars) Base. This continued for almost two years before the Jordanian government banned all such activities following the 1970 Palestinian rebellion against the monarch.¹⁹

`Azzām admitted that this period was among the most meaningful of his life, apart from his involvement in the Afghan jihad. To him all his life was in vain except for his involvement in jihad in Palestine and Afghanistan.²⁰

His experience of witnessing miracles during battles, achieving battle successes and gaining respect due to his exploits fuelled the fire in him, strengthened his resolve on jihad and convinced him that jihad was the right way. For `Azzām, jihad was not only legitimate but also a way to erase the humiliation, retrieve the confidence and pride in Muslims and reinstate Islam's glorious past. After the ban on all armed resistance activities in Jordan, he kept looking forward to recreating the experience in other places until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.²¹ Juergensmeyer described this

¹⁷ See Section 3.2 on "`Azzām's Worldview" in Chapter 3.

¹⁸ `Azzām, AA (no date cited). *Dhikrayāt Filisṭīn* (*Memories of Palestine*), pp. 33, 34; `Azzām, AA (no date cited). *Ḥamās: Al-Judhur Al-Tārikhīyah Wa Al-Mithāq* (*Hamās: Its Historical Roots and Charter*), pp. 5–11.

¹⁹ `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Al-As'ilah Wa Al-Ajwibah Al-Jihādīyah* (*Questions and Answers on Jihad*), pp. 2, 20, 31; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād* (*Fiqh and Ijtihād in jihad*), p. 77; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Ḥamās: Al-Judhur Al-Tārikhīyah Wa Al-Mithāq* (*Hamās: Its Historical Roots and Charter*), pp. 9, 14, 15; `Azzām (1991), pp. 74–78; `Azzām (1992), pp. 288, 289.

²⁰ `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād* (*Fiqh and Ijtihād in jihad*), p. 14.

²¹ `Azzām (1992), p. 35.

as a sense of empowerment in place of a sense of humiliation, desperation and marginalisation.²²

Thirdly was 'Azzām's involvement in jihad against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in mobilising, recruiting and managing the foreign fighters. This historic event, from his militant jihad perspective, validated his view of the hostile nature of non-Muslims towards Islam and reaffirmed his jihad experience against Israel on a greater scale. In addition, his emphasis on jihad above other means suited his role best as the mobiliser, recruiter and organiser of jihad. No one in his position would have turned to the reformist viewpoint of jihad because it lacks the militancy needed for effective mobilisation.

It is important to note that all of 'Azzām's elaborations on his militant jihad ideas were recorded either in print or in audio cassette during this period. Thus, one should not discount the influence of the jihad in Afghanistan and the role that it played on the development of his jihad ideas. 'Azzām did not publish materials on jihad prior to his involvement in Afghanistan. His death before the conflict came to an end after the fall of the local Afghan regime in 1992 which means that there were no other records except those produced in the period of the Soviet–Afghan war.

After examining the ideational and contextual factors that influenced 'Azzām's militant jihad, the next question to be answered is which of the two factors had greater influence.

It is argued here that contextual factors played the greater role in shaping 'Azzām's militant jihad and the following three points are offered to support this assertion.

Firstly, a look into 'Azzām's history indicates that there was no involvement in armed jihad activities from 1971, when a ban was placed on all resistance activities in Jordan, until his participation in the Afghan jihad in the early 1980s. It is instructive to note that despite his militant jihad viewpoint, he did not organise his own jihad group in Jordan or join any existing jihad group while he was

²² Juergensmeyer (2003), pp. 191–198.

studying for his PhD in Egypt. This is significant considering that there were numerous armed activities organised by Palestinian and jihadist groups at the time.

Secondly, `Azzām lamented that one of the reasons he could not wage armed jihad against Israeli occupation was due to the suppression by the Arab authorities through strict border controls. Armed resistance was not possible without direct confrontation with these authorities, and thus would only cause greater detriment.²³

The third point is `Azzām's affiliation to the Muslim Brothers which was significant in moderating `Azzām's practice of jihad, despite its ideational importance and emphasis. This was because by the early 1970s the Muslim Brothers had eschewed the use of violence in favour of peaceful democratic process and was working towards reconstituting its own idea of jihad. The Muslim Brothers is also known for its pragmatic approach to its struggle compared to many other Islamic movements.²⁴ As a senior member of the Muslim Brothers, `Azzām had to abide by the group's general policy and restrain his practice of jihad.

Fourthly, `Azzām wrote a paper titled *Al-Islām Wa Mustaqbal Al-Bashariyah* (Islam and the Future of Humanity) in 1980, a year before his participation in Afghan jihad. In this paper, `Azzām argued that humanity was in a very sorry state due to the spiritual void and psychological crisis that secularism had caused in distancing human beings from spiritual guidance, i.e., the religion. He asserted that Islam is the only force that could offer a remedy. What is interesting is that, unlike his Islamist stance during his participation in the Afghan jihad, the mention of jihad in the paper is negligible and the element of militant jihad (i.e., framing jihad as the ultimate means and call for participation in armed jihad) is absent.²⁵ In fact, the word "jihad" and its derivatives are used only

²³ `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *The Defence of Muslim's Land*, Chapter 2; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Dhikrayāt Filisṭīn (Memories of Palestine)*, pp. 4–12, 43–45; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Zīlāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah (Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter of Qur'ān])*, pp. 154, 155.

²⁴ Abed-Kotob (1995).

²⁵ `Azzām (1980), pp. 1–15.

six times in the 11,000-word paper and are only mentioned in the context of refuting those who viewed jihad as purely defensive.²⁶

In addition, the document also contained `Azzām's early concept of *Al-Qā'idah Al-Ṣulbah* (the core group) and four points of action to save humanity. Unlike his article in 1988 which was dedicated to the concept, `Azzām did not place strong emphasis on armed jihad. There was no mention of the importance of armed jihad in building the character of *Al-Qā'idah*. The four points of action also did not include jihad and jihad was not mentioned in the explanation of any of the points.²⁷

It could then be argued that the above four points indicate clearly that `Azzām's ideas and practices of jihad were very much shaped by external contextual factors, not only in affirming his militant tendency, but also in restraining jihad practices and limiting their proliferation.

In the subsequent section, it will be argued that the contextual factors provided him with the opportunity to practice militant jihad and catapult his ideas onto the global stage, thus releasing him from the above mentioned policy of the Muslim Brothers.

4.3 From Worldview to Collective Action Frames

This section seeks to reconstruct `Azzām's collective action frame as defined earlier for the purpose of mobilising Muslims.

Two main frames can be identified from `Azzām's jihad ideas. The first frame which emerged in his early writings was jihad for defending Afghanistan against the Soviet invasion and helping the oppressed fellow Afghan Muslims.

The second was jihad for Islamism. This frame was less prevalent in `Azzām's early material when he initially joined the Afghan jihad but was used subsequently in parallel with the first. However, it differed from the first in its diagnosis, prognosis, broad scope and inclusiveness. This makes it suitable as a master frame.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 23–27.

4.3.1 *First frame: Jihad for defending Afghanistan*

`Azzām's diagnosis in this frame was that the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan with the help of the local communist Afghans was a transgression of a Muslim territory, life, property and honour. He ruled that this transgression was *ḥarām* (forbidden) and must be corrected. Islam has made it obligatory that Muslims stop any transgression and it is obligatory to protect Muslim territory from non-Islamic forces and reclaim any occupied Muslim territory from the establishment and perpetuation of *kufr* (disbelief). Strategically also, the occupation of Afghanistan by the atheistic communist Soviet power posed a serious threat to neighbouring Muslim countries such as Pakistan and the Gulf States. The cause of this problem was the Soviet occupation forces and its local communist agents.²⁸

There were no other solution to this problem other than waging defensive jihad and although the primary duty of this fell on the Afghans, all Muslims were obligated to share the responsibility with the Afghans. Thus, it was obligatory for all able-bodied Muslims to travel to Afghanistan and participate in jihad.²⁹

To encourage participation, `Azzām used a combination of motivations that were positive and negative; religious and strategic; and personal and altruistic. Positive motivations encompassed the promise of a noble status accorded to martyrs, redemption of all sins, salvation in heaven while the negative motivation included reminders of the great sin of non-compliance of an important *fard `ayn*, namely defensive jihad. Both were also religious and personal in nature. The strategic motivation was the threat posed by the presence of Soviet military bases in Afghanistan to all Gulf States within range of Soviet missiles, bombers and fighter planes. Altruistic motivation was the fight for the political and religious freedom of the Afghans and the removal of their suffering.

²⁸ `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *The Defence of Muslim's Land*, Chapter 4; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Join the Caravan*, Parts 2 and 3; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *The Signs of Ar-Rahman in the Jihad of Afghanistan*, p. 7.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, Chapters 1, 2 and 3; *Ibid.*, Part 3 and Conclusion.

The key element of this frame was the defence and liberation of Afghanistan from a foreign aggressor and its local collaborator.

4.3.2 *Second frame: Jihad for Islamism*

For `Azzām, Islamism was not just a worldview for guiding his jihad ideas but also a frame for mobilising Muslims from all over the world for jihad. This can be seen in the way Islamism was linked to the call for jihad in Afghanistan in the first frame.

In this second frame, `Azzām diagnosed that the main problem was the humiliating status of Islam and Muslims which he attributed to internal and external factors. The former referred to Muslims who had abandoned the religion and adopted secular ideologies as their worldview and practiced Islam only ritualistically. External factors refer to non-Muslims who unceasingly conspired against Islam and Muslims in order to perpetuate *kufr* (disbelief). The larger consequence of this is the widespread human suffering due to the degradation of civilisation and humanity.³⁰

`Azzām's prognosis was the establishment of an Islamic state in any part of the world as a base for the full implementation of the *sharī`ah* and Islam as the way of life so as to generate a dedicated core group (*Al-Qā'idah Al-Ṣulbah*) that would function as the catalyst for the rebirth of a true Islamic community, as exemplified by the first Muslim generation (*salaf*), thus reinstating Islam's supremacy over other religions and ideologies. The responsibility of transforming this prognosis into reality fell on the shoulders of all Muslims, and the means was through waging jihad.³¹

`Azzām argued that Afghanistan provided the best opportunity and the most fertile ground for realising these ideals as Muslims could practice and experience real jihad that had been denied in other Muslim countries. Unlike in other countries, jihad in Afghanistan received wide support from the people and was led by those who shared the Islamist worldview. He argued that the

³⁰See Section 3.2 on "`Azzām's Worldview" in Chapter 3.

³¹*Ibid.*, Section 3.14 on "The Idea of *Al-Qā'idah*."

Palestinian struggle was, in contrast, led by un-Islamic groups. Thus, jihad in Afghanistan provided not only a suitable base for an Islamic state but the people (Afghans and non-Afghans) to be groomed as the core group. In addition to this were the great rewards promised in Islam for jihad participants and the freedom for the Afghans to practice their belief.³²

The key element of this second frame is the establishment of an Islamic state or caliphate being the central idea in Islamism.

4.3.3 *Analysing both frames*

`Azzām's writings may be divided into four categories or subjects: (1) jihad in Afghanistan and jihad rulings, (2) Islamic laws such as those pertaining to *ḥalāl* meat, marriages and contracts, (3) Islamic worldview, and (4) issues of the day.

There were books written for each category. The first frame that of defending Afghanistan, can be found in the first category while the second frame, that of jihad for Islamism, can be found in the third and fourth categories. This research does not cover the second category as it has little relevance to the present topic.

The review of materials in the first, third and fourth category showed that both frames formed a distinct narrative. They do not form a sub-narrative for the other. Although each is related to the other, the relation is not inclusive. In other words, each frame can exist independently.

It is on this basis that this research seeks to reconstruct two different collective action frames from his writings, instead of reconciling both into one.

Early print materials relevant in verifying `Azzām's first frame are two of his early jihad treatises and his articles published in his *Al-Jihād* magazine. The two jihad treatises are *Ayāt Al-Rahmān Fī Jihād Al-Afghān* (The Signs of Al-Rahmān [Allah the Merciful] in the Jihad in Afghanistan) and *Al-Difā` 'An Araḍī Al-Muslimīn* (Defence of Muslim Lands) in 1983 and 1984 respectively.

³² *Ibid.*

Although the two treatises were published in 1983 and 1984, it is important to note that the ideas must have been conceived much earlier. This is particularly significant as *Al-Difā'* is the shorter version of the original draft.³³

Ayāt Al-Rahmān documented miracles encountered by Muslim fighters in their struggles against the enemy. The call and ruling related to jihad is only touched upon towards the end³⁴ and the key element of the second frame is absent. *Al-Difā'*, his most famous jihad treatise, was written primarily as an elaborate *fatwā* that jihad in Afghanistan was *fard 'ayn* upon Muslims, with the clear objective of mobilising Muslims to support and join the struggle.³⁵ The key element of the second frame (i.e., jihad for Islamism) was only mentioned in two short paragraphs in the whole document.³⁶

Similar arguments were also discerned from his articles written during the first year (1984) of *Al-Jihād* magazine. The key element of the second frame is sparsely touched upon. Most of the articles were about the need to defend Afghanistan through jihad.

The reason for the formation of the first frame was because 'Azzām, as a non-native of Afghanistan was still familiarising himself with the general level of religiosity, religious orientation and norms in Afghanistan. This was important in order for him to gain trust and acceptance.

In this regard, the frame suited the situation because it dealt directly with the problem at hand (i.e., the Soviet invasion) and it appealed to the basic sense of injustice in all human beings. Compared to the second, the first frame was the surest option because it resonated with Afghans in general. This helped to elevate his position among the locals.

Although the first frame was theologically grounded, its narrow focus and nationalist bent, i.e., jihad for the liberation of

³³ 'Azzām, AA (date not cited). *The Defence of Muslim's Land*, Introduction.

³⁴ 'Azzām, AA (date not cited). *The Signs of Ar-Rahman in the Jihad of Afghanistan*, pp. 60–75.

³⁵ 'Azzām, AA (date no cited). *The Defence of Muslim's Land*, Chapters 1, 2 and 3.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, Chapters 2 and 4.

Afghanistan, did not sit well with `Azzām's Islamist worldview. For Islamists, jihad has to serve a broader agenda than the liberation of Afghanistan from foreign invasion. The Islamist worldview dictates the establishment of the supreme political power of Islam, where Muslims and non-Muslims submit to its rule.

As an Islamist who was often judged by the consistency of his actions with the worldview that he believed in, `Azzām had to be true to himself and to his fellow Islamists. This is the hallmark of an Islamist which `Azzām himself demanded from jihad participants in Afghanistan.

After he had familiarised himself with the situation and succeeded in building good relationships with leaders of various Afghan groups, `Azzām was convinced that his worldview was also shared by the leaders whom he called the sons of the Islamic movement (a term usually referring to Islamist groups).³⁷ According to him, they were products of the Islamic movement's *tarbiyah* (education) and they had expressed commitment to the establishment of an Islamic state in Afghanistan and subsequently extending jihad to other occupied Muslims lands such as Palestine.³⁸

This encouraged `Azzām to construct the second frame and to use it concurrently with the first.

In 1986, `Azzām wrote in *`Ibar Wa Baṣā'ir Lī Al-Jihād Fī Al-`Aṣr Al-Hāḍir* (Lessons and Learning Points for Jihad in Contemporary Time) that jihad was to serve the mission of spreading Islam to all. To him, land has no value unless it is ruled in accordance to God's dictates and *sharī`ah*. Jihad is an injunction and also a necessity in view of the obstructions laid down by *jāhiliyah*.³⁹

³⁷ `Azzām (1988).

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 6; `Azzām (1992), pp. 42, 55, 59; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *The Defence of Muslim's Land*, Chapter 2; `Azzām, AA (date no cited). *Dhikrayāt Filistīn* (Memories of Palestine), pp. 31–33; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Ṣilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah* (Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter of Qur'ān]), p. 154; `Azzām (1992).

³⁹ `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *`Ibar Wa Baṣā'ir Lī Al-Jihād Fī Al-`Aṣr Al-Hāḍir* (Lessons for Jihad in Contemporary Era), pp. 6–8.

The second frame also served an important mobilisation objective to recruit jihad participants from two significant segments of Muslims. They were:

- Members of non-jihadist Islamist groups. The frame appealed to this segment as jihad in Afghanistan was a legitimate defensive act recognised by the *sharī`ah* and it provided the opportunity to serve the Islamist cause through the dissemination of the Islamist worldview among the local and foreign jihad participants, and the enhancement of the education and training of Islamist cadres.
- Members of jihadist groups, such as the Egyptian *Al-Jamā`ah Al-Islāmīyah*, that were already waging unsuccessful campaigns against their local Muslim rulers. For this segment, jihad in Afghanistan suited their jihadist tendency and provided them with the training base for their members and safe havens for their leaders. Participation in Afghan jihad would not only help their vision of establishing an Islamic state in Afghanistan but would subsequently enhance the jihad that they have been waging unsuccessfully against their own governments.

Although these two frames were different in content, they were used to fulfil each other's objective. The basic appeal of the sense of injustice in the first frame resonated with the general Muslim population regardless of their level of religiosity or religious orientation (i.e., *ṣufīy*, traditionalist, *salafīy*, activist etc.). It was rooted primarily on the legitimacy of the act of self defence and the nobility of the Afghans in defending their homeland. Their participation in Afghan jihad would not only increase the number of fighters in the field but also expose them to the Islamist worldview propagated by `Azzām and supported by local Afghan leaders. The exposure and socialisation process throughout their stay in Afghanistan converted these Muslims into supporters of the Islamist worldview.

The second frame which appealed to the two specific segments brought in volunteer leaders, preachers and trainers who helped in circulating the Islamist worldview among all jihad participants

including ordinary Afghans, strengthened Islamist control of the struggle and improved the effectiveness of jihad.

In conclusion, the two frames contributed to the realisation of each frame's prognosis of the problem, i.e., the liberation of Afghanistan (for the first frame) and the subsequent establishment of an Islamic state in Afghanistan and the spread of Islamist world-view among Muslims (for the second frame).

Understanding the dynamic interaction between ideational and contextual elements, as mentioned, has been useful in understanding the emergence of these two different frames and their concurrent use by `Azzām.

4.4 Frame Resonance/Alignment

For a collective action frame to fulfil its function, it must resonate with the target audience. Under Snow *et al.*'s model, this is achieved by aligning the frame with the individual's interests, values and beliefs.⁴⁰ There are six factors that affect frame resonance under this model: (1) Frame consistency; (2) Empirical credibility; (3) Credibility of the frame's promoters; (4) Experiential commensurability; (5) Centrality; and (6) Narrative fidelity.⁴¹

The focus of this section is to analyse the presence of these factors in `Azzām's jihad ideas that would provide insights to its appeal and the dynamic behind their construction.

4.4.1 *The first frame*

There is a high degree of consistency in the narrative of the first frame. The consistency here refers to its logical complementariness in its different aspects i.e., tactics, diagnosis, prognosis, core values and beliefs. Firstly, the call for jihad to defend Afghanistan is consistent with the universal idea that people have the right to resist foreign occupation. This is clearly stated in the UN Charter.

⁴⁰ Snow *et al.* (1986).

⁴¹ Johnston and Noakes (2005), pp. 11, 12; Snow and Benford (2000).

Secondly, there was little contention among the majority of Muslim scholars on the legitimacy of jihad in Afghanistan. The theological position on this has already been deliberated at length in the second chapter from the classical, traditional, reformist and militant strands. In this regard, the call for jihad is consistent with the frame's diagnosis and struck a chord with the core values of Muslims that Islam enjoins them to uphold justice, help the oppressed and obligates defensive jihad.

Thirdly, in term of tactics, i.e., armed jihad, it has been commented in the third chapter that the overall tactical conduct of jihad by 'Azzām had been restraint with no report of indiscriminate targeting of civilians or acts of terrorism. This is consistent with the ethics of jihad.

Although the issue of occupation was contested by certain segments of the international community especially those who were allies of the Soviet Union, it resonated with the majority of leaders of Muslim countries and indeed Muslims at large.

To support the credibility of the frame, 'Azzām invoked historical and contemporary evidence of the ill-treatment of Muslims living under the ruling communist regime of the Soviet Union in the form of genocide, denial of religious freedom and annexation of Muslim lands in Central Asia.⁴² Moreover, 'Azzām made reference to the attempts of the communist regime to impose communism on the local people and challenged their religious values.⁴³ In addition, 'Azzām also highlighted the suffering, displacement and killing of millions of Afghans.⁴⁴

This resonance was boosted by the wide media coverage naturally drawn due to its news relevance, and encouraged by the United States and its Western allies as part of the Cold War politics against the communist Soviet Union.

Knowing the high deference given to classical sources and in line with his training as a scholar, 'Azzām used classical

⁴² 'Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Al-Shuyūḥ: Al-Saraṭān Al-Aḥmar* (Communism: The Red Cancer), pp. 23–26.

⁴³ 'Azzām (1986).

⁴⁴ 'Azzām (1985); 'Azzām, AA (date no cited). *Dhikrayāt Filisṭīn* (Memories of Palestine), p. 22.

resources to support his argument. This also added to the credibility of his frame and its arguments and consistency. He further sought endorsements for his call for jihad in Afghanistan from many prominent scholars of the time which included the late `Abd Al-`Azīz ibn Bāz, the Grand Muftī of Saudi Arabia. This can be seen from the book *Al-Difā`*, his main publication on jihad in Afghanistan.⁴⁵

`Azzām did not promote himself as a scholar and none of his books or writings carried his PhD title from Al-Azhar University. However, his ability to craft the jihad treatise from classical sources and the testimonies he received from reputable scholars of the time were sufficient to affirm his scholarly status and make him a credible promoter, thus adding to the overall credibility of the frame. More importantly, `Azzām called for jihad participation from the land of jihad. His migration to Pakistan with his family and resignation from a secure job to dedicate himself to jihad was seen as exemplary. `Azzām was not like those scholars who only issued *fatwā* that supported jihad in Afghanistan from the safety of their respective countries.

Many other Muslims experienced occupation but not all of them would invoke jihad for mobilisation. This can be seen, for example, in the case of the PLO's struggle against Israel and the Moro National Liberation Front's clash against the Philippine government. `Azzām could have used a different frame such as national independence or the right of self-determination in his call to defend Afghanistan. His use of jihad as the frame was significant. It was primarily ideological, but it had an important effect on resonance.

As a religious scholar, `Azzām was most familiar with jihad as a concept. It was unlikely for him to invoke other secular frames for, as a hardcore Islamist, it is an abomination to base one's action on something other than Islam. For him, if jihad was the solution, it must be declared as such without apology. To apologise was a sign

⁴⁵ `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *The Defence of Muslim's Land*, Introduction and Letters of Acknowledgement; `Azzām (1992), pp. 85–88.

of defeatism⁴⁶ as jihad and its meaning have been determined by the *Qur'ān*.⁴⁷

While the use of jihad in the frame was ideological, it had tremendous resonance with Muslims because of the strong link between jihad and Islam.

It has been mentioned in the first chapter that the jihad in Afghanistan occurred against the background of an Islamic resurgence all over the world.⁴⁸ `Azzām himself acknowledged this when he made a comparison of Cairo in the early 1970s and the late 1970s. There was a stark increase in the congregation of mosques, more Muslim women wore the *hijāb* (head cover) and more youths participated in Islamic activities on campuses.⁴⁹ With the increased importance of Islam among Muslims in general, jihad resonated very strongly with them.

This resonance was further enhanced with the use of Islamic discourse in explicating the situation and putting forth the argument to support the frame where, in the process, Islamic values, beliefs and symbols were inevitably weaved together. Examples of values, beliefs and symbols emphasised by `Azzām to support the frame were:

- Values: establishing justice for all, making sacrifices in the path of God, enjoining good (encouraging jihad in Afghanistan) and correcting evil (fighting the occupation), helping fellow Muslims in distress, having pride (by overcoming the humiliating state of Muslims) and being truthful to the faith (striving to practice the *sharī`ah* fully and establishing it in the society).
- Beliefs: sin and hell for neglecting jihad, reward and heaven for those participating in jihad.
- Symbols: miracles that symbolised the blessedness of jihad, martyrs that symbolised the heroic commitment to Islamic values.

⁴⁶ `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Dhikrayāt Filisṭīn (Memories of Palestine)*, pp. 17–21.

⁴⁷ See Section 3.3 on “Definition of Jihad” in Chapter 3.

⁴⁸ See Kepel (2003).

⁴⁹ `Azzām (1980), pp. 10–12.

`Azzām gave miracles and martyrs extra importance in his materials. This can be seen from a book in which he recorded the occurrence of miracles⁵⁰ and allocated many pages in his monthly *Al-Jihād* magazine to eulogise martyrs. Miracles and martyrs have always been integral aspects of Islamic faith, being important symbols and concepts held by Muslims. Stories of miracles and martyrs symbolise blessedness of jihad. If the jihad was not true, it would not have been blessed with miracles and martyrs, whose deaths were often accompanied by miracles. Both the miracles and martyrs reported by `Azzām played up to the Muslims' closely held values, and the belief that God, the All-powerful created miracles as symbols of truth and righteousness.⁵¹

Thus, the use of jihad as a frame with all its consequences creates both the sense of centrality and narrative fidelity among Muslims. A frame resonates well with its targeted audience, according to Snow *et al.*, when the views attached to it are central to the core values and beliefs of the target audience. Narrative fidelity refers to the extent to which the frame fits into the dominant culture of the target audience, its narratives, myths and basic assumptions.⁵²

`Azzām did not only use ideas to promote the frame. He used extensive images in print and video. In fact, it could be said that he was a pioneer in the use of battle videos and exploited the media to promote his call for jihad. Recognising the importance of the media in advocating a cause, he lamented the lack of Muslim journalists to report on the jihad in Afghanistan or promote the cause.⁵³

`Azzām widely distributed to the Arab world images of the destructive effects of the occupation and the sufferings of the Afghans in his *Al-Jihād* magazine. Videos of jihad operations conducted against the enemy were also widely circulated.

Daily news reports in print and video by the mainstream media also indirectly reinforced `Azzām's frame to the Muslim audiences.

⁵⁰ See `Azzām (no date cited). *The Signs of Ar-Rahman in the Jihad of Afghanistan*.

⁵¹ Cook (2005; 2007).

⁵² Snow *et al.* (1986); Johnston and Noakes (2005).

⁵³ `Azzām (1985); Zaydān (1990).

`Azzām's use of images and the mainstream media reports were powerful tools in stoking emotions for support and participation. They reinforced the resonance through experiential commensurability, when the frame is congruent with the targeted audience's daily experience. Even though most of the foreign volunteers had not experienced foreign occupation, many of them came from tyrannical and suppressive countries. The images also reinforced the empirical credibility of the frame.

4.4.2 *The second frame*

The second frame is more contentious compared to the first because a significant number of Muslims disagree on the diagnosis and prognosis of the Muslim issues. As observed by scholars, most Muslims are not Islamists in their religious outlook and orientation. Nevertheless, the frame is till consistent on its own terms.

If Islam is a way of life that is supreme above all other religions and ideologies, and the only one accepted by God, it follows that all human beings must either embrace it or submit to its rule. If *jāhiliyyah* is the anathema to Islam, it will not only seek to undermine Islam but also destroy it, and life becomes a cosmic battle between Islam and *jāhiliyyah*. Jihad is a necessity in order to respond to *jāhiliyyah* hostility or to pre-empt it. If Islamic politics is a part of Islam as a way of life and jihad cannot be achieved without a polity, hence it becomes obligatory to establish an Islamic state or caliphate.

To give credibility to the frame, `Azzām used various sources. The first source was the Islamic intellectual tradition which referred to verses from the *Qur'ān* and *hadīth*. `Azzām referenced the works of Muslim scholars and thinkers, in particular, Ibn Taymīyah and Quṭb. He also cited the consensus held by Muslim scholars that rulers who refused to rule by the *sharī'ah* has fallen into *kufr*.⁵⁴

The second source is history. To support his view on the *jāhiliyyah* unceasing hostility against Islam, `Azzām selected events in the history of the Prophet such as the persecution of the Muslims

⁵⁴ `Azzām (1988); `Azzām (1991); `Azzām (1992), pp. 62–71.

by the Meccan Quraysh and their war against Muslims in Medina,⁵⁵ the Jewish antagonism to the Prophet's propagation and their betrayal of the peaceful co-existence in Medina,⁵⁶ and the hostility of the Christian Romans and the Magian Persians to the Prophet's peaceful propagation.⁵⁷ Other well-known historical events were the Crusades,⁵⁸ the colonisation of Muslim countries,⁵⁹ the fall of the last caliphate in Turkey,⁶⁰ and the establishment of Israel at the expense of the Palestinians.⁶¹

The third source was `Azzām's analysis and experiences of certain events in which he highlighted the failure of the rulers of Arab countries and their collaboration with foreign *jāhiliyah*, thus discrediting the ideologies they subscribed to.⁶² He pointed out that the corrupt practices of the rulers have caused backwardness and moral decadence in Muslim society. They also betrayed the Palestinian cause by abandoning the struggle and forming alliances with the enemy.⁶³ In this regard, `Azzām highlighted the Western influences on the everyday lives of Muslims on the streets and provided his analysis of the history of the Israel–Palestine conflict.⁶⁴

As with the first frame, `Azzām's credibility as a Muslim scholar contributed to the credibility of this frame.

Here again the Islamic resurgence that was at its pinnacle at the time is relevant. When `Azzām was actively promoting jihad in Afghanistan, the Islamist worldview had become one of the main trends in Muslim societies, contributing to the fidelity of `Azzām's

⁵⁵ `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah* (*Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter* [The Ninth Chapter of the Qur'ān]), pp. 2–4, 16, 17, 19, 20.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 25, 55.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 71; `Azzām, AA (date no cited). *Tujjār Al-Ḥurūb* (War Traders), pp. 7, 22, 24–27.

⁶⁰ `Azzām, AA (date no cited). *Ḥadm Al-Khilāfah Wa Bināuhā* (The Destruction and Rebuilding of Caliphate), pp. 10–37.

⁶¹ `Azzām, AA (date no cited). *Dhikrayāt Filisṭīn* (Memories of Palestine), pp. 33–45; `Azzām, AA (date no cited). *Ḥamās: Al-Judhur Al-Tārikhiyah Wa Al-Mithāq* (*Ḥamas: Its Historical Roots and Charter*), pp. 1–18.

⁶² `Azzām, AA (date no cited). *Al-Qawmīyah*, pp. 1–17.

⁶³ `Azzām, AA (date no cited). *Dhikrayāt Filisṭīn* (Memories of Palestine), pp. 4–12, 36–38.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

narrative and its centrality to the general understanding of Islam and, in particular, of the Islamists. What they saw and experienced of the backwardness of Muslim society, the corrupt practices of the rulers, the prevalent influence of the western lifestyle, moral decadence and the failure of the secular ideology all amounted to experiential commensurability with the audience.

4.5 Frame Resonance Strategy

Snow *et al.* identified four strategies used by frame promoters to achieve resonance with target audiences. As this has been elaborated upon in the first chapter, the strategies are summarised here:

1. Frame bridging. This occurs when two or more frames that have an affinity, but were previously unconnected, are linked, such as the linking of Islam with politics to produce frames of political Islam.
2. Frame amplification. This involves highlighting certain issues, events, beliefs or values as being more salient than others. It is usually manifested in catch phrases such as “Islam is the solution,” for value or belief amplification.
3. Frame extension. This occurs when the frame is presented to extend beyond the social movements’ interest to areas that are presented to be important to the target audience.
4. Frame transformation. This refers to “changing old understandings and meanings and/or generating new ones” to generate support and mobilise the target through: (a) transformation of domain-specific interpretive frames, and (b) transformation of global interpretive frames. This is akin to radically changing the target audience’s worldview or ideology.⁶⁵

4.5.1 *The first frame*

`Azzām used the bridging strategy in the first frame to express the legitimacy of the act of defence against foreign occupation. The

⁶⁵ Johnston and Noakes (2005), pp. 11, 12; Snow and Benford (2000); Snow *et al.* (1986).

legitimacy of the act is universal and can be secular, but the use of the word “jihad” is a bridge between the act and Islam. By using the word “jihad,” it gave a religious connotation and made the act an obligation on Muslims.⁶⁶

Looking into `Azzām’s jihad ideas, one could deduce that he viewed:

- Islam as the only lens for Muslims to view this world and, thus, there could not be another word for the act of defence against foreign aggression other than jihad.⁶⁷
- Muslims should be wary of placing their trust with non-Muslims. Non-Muslim support in a war should only be sought if Muslims are in control of the situation and could ensure that there would not be any betrayal from them.⁶⁸
- One of the causes of the Muslim problem is the Muslims who abandoned jihad, in particular, and Islam, in general. The solution, therefore, was to bring Muslims back to the Islamic way of life, encompassing jihad as the pinnacle of the religion.⁶⁹

Based on the above, it could be said that the bridging strategy here has been influenced by `Azzām’s ideational position as a scholar and an Islamist. Even the choice of the audience was guided by the ideas that he believed in, rather than strategic and pragmatic consideration. Thus, the use of the word “jihad” has been consistent with his worldview and the frame’s narrative, i.e., diagnosis, prognosis and intended audience as the agent of change.

`Azzām’s worldview and jihad ideas are limited to Muslims. The centrality of Islam to Muslim values, beliefs and cultures, especially the Afghans themselves, resonated with a significant segment. Thus, his bridging strategy was effective with the target audience.

⁶⁶See Section 3.7 on the “Ruling of Jihad” in Chapter 3.

⁶⁷See Section 3.3 on the “Definition of Jihad” in Chapter 3.

⁶⁸See the Section on the “Participation of Infidels in Jihad” in Chapter 3.

⁶⁹`Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād (Fiqh and Ijtihād in Jihad)*, pp. 44–46; `Azzām (1985); `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Join the Caravan*, Part 1.

It is important to note that the use of jihad in this frame did not originate from `Azzām. It had been used by the leaders of Afghan groups before `Azzām's participation in it and `Azzām's frame was an endorsement of theirs. However, his ideational position was critical in determining the use of jihad for this frame because if the Afghan leaders' claim of jihad had not been valid, he would not have joined the cause as he had abandoned the Palestinian armed struggle under the PLO.

`Azzām's amplification strategy for the frame, from the perspective of this model, was his view that jihad is *farḍ* `ayn for all Muslims. This allowed him to mobilise Muslims all over the world for jihad duty, and push aside conditions such as the consent of parents, creditors or the authorities and excuses such as studying and performing religious duty in the society except those which had been explicitly excused by the *sharī`ah*.⁷⁰

In fact, he amplified the *farḍ* `ayn ruling by asserting that it should not revert to *farḍ kifāyah* until Afghanistan and all other lands formerly under the Islamic caliphate were reclaimed. He projected a vision of a protracted *farḍ* `ayn jihad.⁷¹

`Azzām also highlighted the atheistic characteristics of communism and the Soviet Union's ill treatment of Muslims living within its borders which amplified the frame and effect resonance. He cited the death of millions of Muslims through the genocide policy, the closure and destruction of mosques and restrictions of Islamic practices.⁷² He depicted the local Afghan communist regime in the same manner. The local regime's anti-Islamic policies could be traced to King Zāhir Shāh, the last Afghan monarch who ruled the country from 1933 until 1973, whom `Azzām attributed to "Westernising" Afghan Muslims in his attempt to modernise the country. He cited a story that the king in one of his public addresses had stepped on a *burqa* (a traditional head dress that covered the whole body for

⁷⁰See Section 3.7 on the "Ruling of Jihad" and Section 3.10 "Who Can Fight for Jihad?" in Chapter 3.

⁷¹See Section 3.7 on the "Ruling of Jihad" in Chapter 3.

⁷²`Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Al-Shuyūyah: Al-Saraṭān Al-Aḥmar* (Communism: The Red Cancer), pp. 23–26.

Afghan women), signifying the end of a dark period and the beginning of an enlightened period. Muslim scholars and traditional Afghans who were strongly rooted in Islam were enraged. When Afghanistan became a republic, it soon fell under the influence of communism through communist cadres trained by the Soviet Union. Increasingly, the ruling regime became hostile towards Islam through a de-Islamisation policy, imposition of communist ideology and lifestyles, and the persecution of Muslims.⁷³ There were stories of *burqa* -clad Afghan women who drowned themselves in the river in order to protect their honour from the regime's officials.⁷⁴ This, thus, became the basis for `Azzām's sub-narrative to the frame that jihad in Afghanistan did not begin with the invasion of the Soviet army and would not be stopped by its withdrawal. Instead, it should continue until the rule of Islam was established. This was not only amplification on his part but also a response to the status of jihad after the withdrawal of the foreign army. By amplifying the evil nature of the enemy, `Azzām reinforced his justification for jihad and delegitimised the sanctity of the lives of the enemy and their propaganda.

`Azzām also sought to amplify the noble characteristics of leaders of the Afghan groups and the Afghan people in general. Although he conceded that they were not free from flaws and weaknesses, `Azzām highlighted their bravery in confronting a superpower enemy, which many Muslim societies, such as in Palestine, had failed. The Afghans had been largely shielded from the influence of *jāhiliyah* and maintained their traditional values such as honour and piety. Their women remained covered and committed to their traditional role as mothers and homemakers unlike women in other Muslim societies whom `Azzām described as being "naked" and had been seduced to leave their traditional roles for work outside their homes. The leaders of the Afghan groups were either qualified scholars like Sayyāf and Rabbānī, or individuals who

⁷³ `Azzām (1992), pp. 1–29.

⁷⁴ `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *The Defence of Muslim's Land*, Chapter 2 and 3; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Join the Caravan*, Part 2 and 3.

had been trained by the Islamic movements (i.e., “sons of the Islamic movement”) and were fully committed to Islam and jihad.⁷⁵

Embedded in the notion of *farḍ `ayn* was the dire situation in Afghanistan, amplified by the images and videos that contributed to the sense of urgency in order to achieve the transformation strategy.

`Azzām's use of images in print and video could be regarded as his frame extension. Images and videos always captivate human attention and are more effective in conveying emotional messages such as sufferings and bravery. By using photos and videos, `Azzām extended his frame to capture the interests of people. They also lent credibility to the frame. Thus, linking the photos and videos with the frame enhanced the resonance with the audience.⁷⁶

`Azzām's frame amplification that jihad was *farḍ `ayn* was also his frame transformation strategy. It sought to transform the Muslim's slumber and passivity to a sense of urgency. It transformed the prevalent understanding that jihad was *farḍ kifāyah*, i.e., “someone else does it and I will be excused,” or was the duty of professional soldiers. As mentioned before, by ruling jihad as *farḍ `ayn*, `Azzām made it legitimate to not conform to the rules applied in *farḍ kifāyah*. He argued that the *farḍ kifāyah* ruling was not valid anymore because it had been the consensus of Muslim scholars that when a Muslim territory was transgressed, jihad became *farḍ `ayn* to the people of the land and the ruling extended to other Muslims if the former are unable to effectively repulse the enemy. This was his analysis due to the asymmetric power balance between the Afghans and the Soviet army.⁷⁷

`Azzām's frame transformation strategy also sought to transform the audience from their state of passivism to activism.⁷⁸ The

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Dhikrayāt Filistīn (Memories of Palestine)*, pp. 31–33; `Azzām (1988).

⁷⁶ See Silke (2008).

⁷⁷ `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *The Defence of Muslim's Land*, Chapter 2 and 3; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Join the Caravan*, Part 2 and 3.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, Chapter 2 and Final Word; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Join the Caravan*, Part 2 and 3.

narrative of Afghan suffering was used to justify *fard* *`ayn* while the obligation that Muslims have to render assistance to their brethren was constantly emphasised.⁷⁹

In his diagnosis, `Azzām acknowledged that Muslims have largely lived in a long slumber, which has led to their backwardness and humiliation. This was partly related to their ignorance and neglect of jihad, and their lifestyles which were antithetical to his frame. Hence, it was necessary to transform their old understanding of jihad and lifestyles to generate their support and mobilise them.

From the perspective of the model, this transformation could be regarded as a domain-specific type that is “fairly self-contained but substantial changes in the way a particular domain of life [i.e., jihad] is framed, such that a domain previously taken for granted is reframed as problematic and in need of repair.”⁸⁰

`Azzām took on another transformation strategy when he began to witness schisms and the abandonment of jihad arising from differences in religious practices between local Afghans and the foreign volunteers. `Azzām called upon all foreigners to align their religious practices in accordance to the Afghan norms as long as they were still within the recognised schools of jurisprudence while they were in Afghanistan. This, according to `Azzām, was for the greater good of jihad and to avert disharmony and distrusts towards the foreigners<sup>81</sup> as the media were spreading the propaganda that the foreigners were there to spread Wahhabism.<sup>82</sup> `Azzām cited *fatwā* to support his view that tolerating differences in ritual practices is permissible for a nobler objective:

The Afghans are a faithful people who recognize manhood, chivalry and pride, and do not appreciate trickery or hypocrisy.

⁷⁹ `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Join the Caravan*, Part 1.

⁸⁰ Snow *et al.* (1986).

⁸¹ `Azzām (1985); `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād (Fiqh and Ijtihād in Jihad)*, p. 83; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Jihād Sha'b Muslim (Jihad of a Muslim Nation)*, pp. 7, 8; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Shahr Bayn Al-'Amāliqah (A month with Giants)*, pp. 38, 39; `Azzām (1992), pp. 142, 143; `Azzām (1989).

⁸² `Azzām (1992), pp. 44–49; `Azzām (1992), pp. 56–58, 66.

When they love a person, they will give their life and soul for him, and if they dislike him they will not show it at all. A person should desist from certain actions of the prayer when he first mingles with them, in order to give himself a valuable chance of reaching their hearts so that he will be able to instruct and educate them and thus improve their worldly and religious conditions. Imam Ahmad and Ibn Taymiyyah have given verdicts to this effect.⁸³

4.5.2 *The second frame*

There were three key bridging strategies found in the second frame: (1) bridging Islam with defensive armed struggle, (2) bridging Islam with the state, and (3) bridging the jihad in Afghanistan with the Islamic state.

The first bridging has been discussed earlier in the examination of the first frame, and will not be repeated here.

The idea of the Islamic state introduced in the second frame was a bridge between two domains that are not necessarily connected. Similar to the use of jihad for the defence of Afghanistan, this bridging has had the same effect in providing a religious slant to a political objective that could be framed in a secular fashion. The bridging has made possible the ruling that the establishment of the Islamic state, in particular in Afghanistan, was obligatory and thus justified the mobilisation of Muslims.

However, the third bridging was the most important of all because it linked the two frames together. Each bridge was complementary to the other. Those who were mobilised by the first frame would contribute to the second, and vice versa. In this way, more Muslims could be reached to serve both frames, even if they had not necessarily subscribed to Islamism or, the idea of the establishment of an Islamic state in Afghanistan.

There were many amplification strategies used to enhance resonance in this frame. `Azzām amplified the backwardness of

⁸³ `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Join the Caravan*, Conclusion.

Muslims and Muslim countries against the West, and the inherent hostility of non-Muslims towards Islam, and how their beliefs, values and culture contradicted with Islam and were propagated to counter Islamic teachings. He asserted that rejecting the establishment of an Islamic state was a serious negation of faith. In this regard, `Azzām's logic dictated that since Islam could not be fully established and made supreme without a polity, the polity is then fundamental to Islam too. In this strategy, `Azzām depicted *jāhiliyah* as an evil force which could only be countered by Islam.⁸⁴ At the same time, he claimed that jihad in Afghanistan had the best potential for the establishment of an Islamic state.⁸⁵ `Azzām's characterisation of all non-Muslims as *jāhiliyah* was used to dismiss any counter-frames that challenged this.

The extension strategy related to this frame was similar to the first frame — the use of images in print and videos amplified the blessed nature of jihad and the plight of the Afghan people caused by the occupying force and its local collaborators.

The transformation which `Azzām sought to create resonance with the targeted audience was different from the transformation sought in the first frame. In this frame, `Azzām wanted Muslims to perceive Islam as a way of life, which included politics, the concern for their individual religious piety and that of the society at large. The latter was anchored to the argument that Islam obligates Muslims to reform society through *da`wah* and jihad for the promotion of good and the elimination of evil. Both *da`wah* and jihad, according to `Azzām, were *fard`ayn* in view of the sorry state of Muslims and the world at large.⁸⁶ This transformation is fairly global in its interpretative frame, which according to the model, is a frame that seeks to radically change the worldview or ideology of the target audience.⁸⁷

⁸⁴See Section 3.2 on “`Azzām's Worldview” in Chapter 3.

⁸⁵`Azzām, AA (date not cited). *The Defence of Muslim's Land*, Chapter 2.

⁸⁶See Section 3.2 on “`Azzām's Worldview” in Chapter 3.

⁸⁷Snow *et al.* (1986).

4.6 Emerging Inconsistencies

The use of the two frames, diverse audiences and the complexity of the myriad of issues that `Azzām tried to address resulted in some inconsistencies and tensions in his ideas.

The major inconsistency was `Azzām's view on the need of proper education and training (*tarbiyah*) in Islamic worldview, jurisprudence, ritual and ethics before taking up arms for jihad. In his mind, without proper education and training those involved could potentially create problems such as the lack of perseverance in the face of jihad, abuse of weapons (such as for the purpose of banditry), and non-compliance to the authority, and the laws and ethics of jihad.⁸⁸ He discussed these issues in jihad documents on *Al-Qā'idah Al-Ṣulbah* written before and during Afghan jihad. The former outlined a brief curriculum and the latter highlighted some expected outcomes.⁸⁹

The above, however, does not fit with `Azzām's other view that all Muslims were to join jihad in Afghanistan unless they were exempted as stated in the *Qur'ān*.⁹⁰ If Muslims had to be educated and trained prior to participating in jihad, some have to be exempted from jihad for a certain of period of time to undergo these trainings, while others must be exempted to conduct the necessary training programs. If the logic of preparation was extended to other fields such as engineering, medicine and military that was equally important for the success of jihad campaigns, then more people could be exempted. In other words, not every Muslims were obligated to abandon their occupation in order to go to Afghanistan to bear arms. Some have to stay behind to fulfil other related tasks, in line with the original injunction of the *Qur'ān*.⁹¹

⁸⁸ See Section 3.14 on "The Idea of *Al-Qā'idah*" in Chapter 3. `Azzām (1988); `Azzām (1990); `Azzām (1991); `Azzām (1993); `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Al-As'ilah Wa Al-Ajwibah Al-Jihādīyah* (*Questions and Answers on Jihad*), p. 25; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah* (*Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter of Qur'ān]*), pp. 10, 21; `Azzām (1980), p. 13; `Azzām (1992).

⁸⁹ `Azzām (1980), p. 14; `Azzām (1988).

⁹⁰ See Section 3.7 on "Ruling of Jihad" in Chapter 3.

⁹¹ The *Qur'ān*, 9:122.

`Azzām, however, did not provide insights on how these two contradictory positions could be reconciled.

It could be argued that the main sources for this inconsistency are his ideas and his experience in the jihad field.

`Azzām's Islamist worldview developed during his years with the Muslim Brothers. The Muslim Brothers emphasised systematic and structured ideological training at all levels of membership.<sup>92</sup> This influence was reflected in `Azzām's pre-Afghan jihad documents on the concept of *Al-Qā'idah Al-Ṣulbah*.⁹³

On the jihad battlefield, `Azzām encountered Muslim youths in Afghanistan who were more militant than him. Some of them belonged to or were influenced by the Egyptian *Al-Jamā'ah Al-Islāmīyah* and *Al-Jihād* that were both more inclined to commit acts of terror in the name of jihad.⁹⁴ From the Muslim Brothers' perspective, this phenomenon resulted from the lack of proper religious training and guidance. `Azzām realised that if they were not curtailed, these youth could bring detriment to themselves and jihad in Afghanistan as they had done to the Islamic movements in Egypt.⁹⁵

`Azzām declared a general mobilisation of Muslims for the jihad in Afghanistan during the early period of his participation, and subsequently emphasised the importance of education and training prior to involvement in jihad, as he had done in his writings during the pre-Afghan period. This was clearly stressed in the 1988 article dedicated to the concept of *Al-Qā'idah Al-Ṣulbah* which was meant to guide future jihad work.⁹⁶

It has been argued that this reiteration was his attempt to mitigate the effects of his general mobilisation effort which had brought

⁹²Rosen (2008), pp. 115–126; Maḥmūd (1991), pp. 387–399, 553–568.

⁹³`Azzām (1980), pp. 13, 14.

⁹⁴Al-`Arabīyah (2005). Interview with Ḥudhayfah, son of `Abd Allāh `Azzām, July 26.

⁹⁵`Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Muqaddimah Fī Al-Hijrah Wa Al-Idārah* (Introduction to Migration and Preparation), pp. 21, 25; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Ittihāf Al-`Ibād Bi Faḍāil Al-Jihād* (Virtues of Jihad), p. 8; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād* (Fiqh and Ijtihād in Jihad), p. 71; `Azzām (1992), pp. 297–300; `Azzām (1991), pp. 58–61; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah* (Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter of the Qur'ān]), p. 173; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Dhikrayāt Filisṭīn* (Memories of Palestine), pp. 31, 32; `Azzām (1985); `Azzām (1987).

⁹⁶`Azzām (1988).

Islamically untrained individuals to the jihad field, some of whom were members of the more radical groups.

It can also be concluded that this inconsistency was the effect of using two different frames in order to maximise the resonance. The general mobilisation view was always embedded in the first frame, while the stress upon education and training was embedded in the second frame.

Another inconsistency that was found in ‘Azzām’s material was his praise for the likes of Khālīd Islāmbūfī, Marwān Ḥadīd and Kārim Al-Anāḍūfī while having strong views against waging jihad on Muslim rulers. Islāmbūfī was sentenced to death for his involvement in the assassination of Anwar Sadat, the President of Egypt. Ḥadīd was a fellow member of the Muslim Brothers in Syria who engaged in armed rebellion against Ḥāfiẓ Al-Asad’s rule and was later arrested before he died in prison. Al-Anāḍūfī was sentenced to death for his involvement in an attempted coup in Egypt in 1974.⁹⁷

The third inconsistency is ‘Azzām’s view that both the United States and the United Kingdom were *Dār Al-Ḥarb*. This was not consistent with his view that the modern practice of diplomatic relations constituted a formal peaceful agreement under the *sharī‘ah*, binding Muslim countries and their subjects.⁹⁸ He often emphasised that Islam obligates Muslims to uphold all agreements and denounce treachery.

The reasons for the last two inconsistencies cannot be explained by an analysis of ‘Azzām’s writing. However, it highlights the complexity of ‘Azzām’s ideas as a result of his role as a scholar and activist confronted with a complex situation.

Also, these inconsistencies provide some insights into the dynamic interaction between the two frames and the interaction between the framer and its context, and that they do not exist in a vacuum. Thus, an analysis of ‘Azzām’s ideas should be done with this in mind.

⁹⁷ ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah (Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter of Qur’ān])*, pp. 8–10.

⁹⁸ See Section 3.5.2 on “The Division of Lands” in Chapter 3.

4.7 Frames and Counter-Frames

Some of the dynamics that are always encountered in framing are counter-frames, criticism and refutation from within and without. A review of `Azzām's writings clearly reveal the counter-frames and criticism that he had to face, and his attempts to answer and refute them.

The merit of looking into `Azzām's frames and ideas together with their counter-frames and criticism is that they provide insights into how his frames and ideas were constructed. This allows better understanding of the content of his ideas and frame.

There were three sources of counter-frames which concerned `Azzām: (1) the enemy he was fighting against (i.e., the Soviet Union and its local collaborators), (2) other non-Muslim entities such as Western countries and the international media, and (3) fellow Muslims.

The following paragraphs will lay down the counter-frames from these sources, `Azzām's responses to them and how they relate to his overall jihad ideas. Some of the counter-frames were produced by more than one source.

4.7.1 *Enemy*

One counter-frame produced by the local Afghan regime is found in `Azzām's writings. It was in the context of the regime's invitation to leaders of jihad groups or field commanders for reconciliatory talks and peace agreements so as to discuss the possibility of a joint government in order to stop the bloodshed of fellow Muslims and Afghans. The invitation was also an attempt by the regime to frame the issue as a conflict between fellow Afghan Muslims rather than a jihad between Muslims and the apostate communist Afghans, and thus a domestic political problem rather than a jihad against foreign occupation.⁹⁹ This counter-frame was prevalent in the run up to the Soviet army's withdrawal and after it.

⁹⁹ `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād* (*Fiqh and Ijtihād in Jihad*), p. 21; `Azzām (1988), pp. 4-6; `Azzām (1988); `Azzām (1989).

`Azzām responded by rejecting the offer. He argued that such reconciliations were forbidden in Islam because peace agreements are forbidden as long jihad remains as *fard* *`ayn*.¹⁰⁰ Using his second frame, he reiterated that the objective of the Afghan jihad was not restricted to repulsing a foreign power from the land but also to establish an Islamic state, a vision that was also widely shared by leaders of Afghan jihad groups. The idea of a joint government was rejected because it would have compromised the principle of *al-walā' wa al-barā'* (allegiance to God and non-allegiance to *kufṛ*).¹⁰¹

Also, `Azzām asserted that all Afghan communists were apostates who deserved corporal punishment and should be opposed until total victory was achieved.¹⁰²

Among the three sources, `Azzām did not really deal with the enemy's counter-frame, perhaps perceiving it as being irrelevant in challenging his frames. The lack of credibility of the enemy's frame could be seen from the low support they received from the Afghans and other Muslims.

4.7.2 *Non-Muslims*

From `Azzām's materials, this category could be divided into two: international media and major powers of Western countries.

These two sources were reported to have framed Afghan jihad as a civil war between the Afghans rooted in domestic political issues rather than religion.¹⁰³ There were also attempts to frame fight against the ruling regime as exploits for personal gain¹⁰⁴ and that some were seeking to spread Wahhabism or fundamentalist Islam.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁰ See Section 3.11.4 on "Peace Agreement & Cease Fire" in Chapter 3.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, Section 3.2 on "`Azzām's Worldview"; `Azzām (1987).

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, Section 3.11.2 on "Legitimate Targets" and Section 3.11.3 on "Non-legitimate Targets."

¹⁰³ `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Silsilah Fī Al-Tarbīyah*, Vol. 12, pp. 45–47; `Azzām (1990).

¹⁰⁴ `Azzām (1989).

¹⁰⁵ `Azzām (1992), p. 6; `Azzām (1992), pp. 44–49; `Azzām (1992), pp. 56–58, 66; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Al-As'ilah Wa Al-Ajawibah Al-Jihādīyah (Questions and Answers on Jihad)*, pp. 3, 4; `Azzām (1989).

`Azzām dismissed these frames by using his amplification strategy on the evil nature of the enemy. He considered the frames as attempts by the *jāhiliyyah* to stop the revival of Islam, prevent Muslims from supporting jihad and curtail the spirit of jihad among Muslims. He asserted that the non-Muslims were well aware of the effects of jihad on Muslims and the danger they would encounter if Muslims were to return to the religion. This would mean the fall of their power and cultural domination similar to the historic fall of the Roman Empire and parts of Europe following Muslim conquest.¹⁰⁶

To support his assertion, `Azzām pointed to the fact that most international media were owned by the Jews and then constantly provided negative reports on Islam and Muslims.¹⁰⁷

In this regard, `Azzām framed non-Muslims as inherently anti-Islam to legitimise negative attitudes and hostilities towards them by Muslims. On the other hand, his frame that leaders of Afghan groups were committed to the cause of Islam, jihad and the establishment of a true Islamic state was also his response to the international media and major powers. He would often quote the leaders in his writings and reported their organisation charters to prove their commitment.¹⁰⁸

His response to the civil war frame from these sources was similar to his response to the local regimes' frame mentioned earlier.

4.7.3 Fellow Muslims

`Azzām's frames were also contested by fellow Muslims. In fact, it could be said that opposition from fellow Muslims were the most serious. `Azzām's refutation to this opposition made up a large portion of his responses to criticisms on his frames. The following paragraphs

¹⁰⁶ `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah* (*Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter of the Qur'ān]*), p. 53.

¹⁰⁷ `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Tujār Al-Ḥurūb* (*War Traders*), p. 7; `Azzām (1989); `Azzām (1989).

¹⁰⁸ `Azzām (1988); `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *The Defence of Muslim's Land*, Chapter 2; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *The Signs of Ar-Rahman in the Jihad of Afghanistan*, pp. 8, 9.

will illustrate some examples. In essence, the counter-frames challenged `Azzām's frames by questioning the legitimacy of jihad, its *farḍ* *`ayn* status, and its priority above other Islamic concerns.

The *salafīy* scholars and their followers claimed that Afghans practiced *shirk* (polytheism), heresy and abominable practices such as wearing talismans, praying to tombs and smoking. Some of them suggested that the war in Afghanistan was fundamentally a conflict between heretic Afghans and communist apostate Afghans, not between Muslims and non-Muslims, and hence not a jihad that deserved widespread Muslim support.¹⁰⁹

To respond to this argument, `Azzām reverted to his strategy of amplifying the noble characteristics of the Afghans in general and their jihad leaders in particular. He rejected the accusation that Afghans practiced *shirk* and was heretical. In reality, the alleged polytheistic practices such as praying to tombs and wearing talismans were contentious issues among Muslim scholars. Although it is better not to practice them, `Azzām believed that they should be tolerated for the greater good of jihad for the protection of Islam. He insisted that the process of correcting the alleged practices, character flaws and weaknesses should be done gradually. Even if Afghans and their leaders' religiosity were far from desirable, he highlighted the view held by classical scholars that the jihad obligation must be fulfilled even under corrupt leaders or commanders. He opined that the harm from the spread of communism was greater than the harm from the alleged flaws and weaknesses of the Afghans.¹¹⁰ He wrote, "As long as they are Muslims, it is obligatory to fight alongside with them. The banner in Afghanistan is Islamic and the goal is the establishment of the religion on earth."¹¹¹ He argued that those who refused to perform jihad under unrighteous army were actually following "the practice

¹⁰⁹ `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād (Fiqh and Ijtihād in Jihad)*, pp. 5–7; `Azzām (1990), pp. 94–98; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah (Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter of the Qur'ān])*, pp. 66, 149.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 5–7, 64, 100–107; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah (Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter of the Qur'ān])*, p. 21.

¹¹¹ `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *The Defence of Muslim's Land*, Chapter 2.

of the Hururiyah, one of the [deviationist] sects of the Khawarij and their likes; people who adopt the way of vain and [*sic.*] cautiousness emanating from lack of knowledge.”¹¹²

He also borrowed the reformist viewpoint by arguing that even if Afghans were not Muslims or were heretics, they were the oppressed and persecuted people that Islam, being a religion for all mankind, called upon Muslims to assist them in order to eliminate oppression and persecution.¹¹³

‘Azzām’s general mobilisation of jihad in Afghanistan was challenged by the view that it distracted Muslim attention and support from the Palestine issue which was more important because it concerned a Muslim’s holy site, the *Al-Aqṣā* mosque. Instead of mobilising Muslims to Afghanistan, efforts should be channelled to Palestine.¹¹⁴

‘Azzām’s response was to bridge jihad in Palestine with jihad in Afghanistan. He first asserted that Palestine remained an important issue for all Muslims. However, he viewed that Afghanistan provided better opportunity for successful jihad. There were fewer constraints to participating in jihad in Afghanistan compared to Palestine. Furthermore, the success of jihad in Afghanistan would be an important stepping stone for the liberation of Palestine because it would provide the necessary experience, manpower and spirit of jihad among Muslims. To assure them, he claimed that all Afghan leaders were committed to the liberation of Palestine upon victory in Afghanistan. He reported that all Afghans were praying that God gave them victory in their land so they can attain martyrdom in Palestine. Giving priority to the Afghan jihad was legitimate and would also eventually serve the Palestinian cause. Through such arguments, he

¹¹² *Ibid.*, Chapter 4; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād (Fiqh and Ijtihād in jihad)*, p. 32; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah (Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter of the Qur’ān])*, pp. 5–7; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *I’lān Al-Jihād*, p. 3; ‘Azzām (1992), pp. 286, 287; ‘Azzām (1985).

¹¹³ ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād (Fiqh and Ijtihād in Jihad)*, p. 90; ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Jihād Sha’b Muslim (Jihad of a Muslim Nation)*, pp. 7–9.

¹¹⁴ ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Al-As’lāh Wa Al-Ajwibah Al-Jihādiyyah (Questions and Answers on Jihad)*, p. 7.

bridged both struggles in one narrative in order to please supporters of the Palestinian cause and the Afghan cause he was championing.¹¹⁵

Some Muslims viewed that the jihad in Afghanistan required funding rather than manpower from outside Afghanistan. Thus, there was no need for Muslims in other parts of the world to join the fight and there was no need to mobilise all Muslims.¹¹⁶ 'Azzām, however, dismissed this view. He claimed that the presence of Muslims from other places, especially the Arabs, was needed to motivate the Afghans in their struggle. In addition, Afghans loved and respected the Arabs for being the same race as the Prophet. Arabs often played important roles in providing religious guidance to Afghans and becoming intermediaries when there were disputes.¹¹⁷

'Azzām also had to respond to allegations that the Afghans were seriously factionalised and that it was best for other Muslims to stay away from their conflicts.¹¹⁸ In response, 'Azzām called for the involvement of the Arab brethren who could bring harmony among Afghan groups. He argued that there was nothing in the *sharī'ah* that forbade jihad when groups disagreed with one another in the battlefield.¹¹⁹

Other Muslims questioned the legitimacy of the jihad. They considered the conflict as a civil war that was nationalist in nature, and the clash of two superpowers with the Afghans as pawns rather than jihad.¹²⁰ Hence, participation in the war would only serve the

¹¹⁵ 'Azzām (1991), pp. 78–80; 'Azzām, AA (date not cited). *The Defence of Muslim's Land*, Chapter 2; 'Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Dhikrayāt Filisṭīn (Memories of Palestine)*, pp. 31–34.

¹¹⁶ 'Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād (Fiqh and Ijtihād in Jihad)*, p. 49.

¹¹⁷ 'Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Muqaddimah Fī Al-Hijrah Wa Al-I'dād (Introduction to Migration and Preparation)*, p. 70; 'Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Jihād Sha'b Muslim (Jihad of a Muslim Nation)*, p. 11; 'Azzām (1992), p. 12; 'Azzām (1987).

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 79; 'Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād (Fiqh and Ijtihād in Jihad)*, p. 21.

¹¹⁹ 'Azzām, AA (date not cited). *The Defence of Muslim's Land*, Chapter 4.

¹²⁰ 'Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Muqaddimah Fī Al-Hijrah Wa Al-I'dād (Introduction to Migration and Preparation)*, p. 80; 'Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād (Fiqh and Ijtihād in Jihad)*, p. 21; 'Azzām (1989); 'Azzām (1990).

interests of the superpowers and drain Muslim resources. `Azzām insisted that this assertion is the non-Muslims' attempt to tarnish and downplay jihad in Afghanistan.¹²¹

While some reformists supported the Afghan jihad and `Azzām's mobilisation efforts, they were inclined towards a non-violent solution. Although his extensive work on jihad was also a response to the reformist stance of a defensive jihad, `Azzām viewed proponents of non-violent jihad for the Afghan problem with contempt, dismissing them as scholars of the establishment with a defeatist mentality. The same label was given to those who challenged his Islamist frame and tried to project the image of Islam that is moderate and non-fundamentalist.¹²²

He argued that labels such as fundamentalist, militant, radical and moderate were all created by the *jāhiliyah* to confuse Muslims and distract them from true Islam. `Azzām claimed the true Islam is feared and disliked by the *kuffār* (infidels) and that Muslims should be sceptical of moderates and progressives rather than the fundamentalists, terrorists, extremists or militants.¹²³

Finally, some Muslims held that the general mobilisation of all Muslims for jihad in Afghanistan on the basis of *fard `ayn* was not realistic and appropriate because it would create serious vacuum of manpower for religious duties in other societies.¹²⁴

In this regard, `Azzām wrote:

If only Muslims would apply their Allah's command and implement the laws of their Shariah concerning the General March for just one week in Palestine, Palestine would be completely purified

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 64–66.

¹²² `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Tujār Al-Hurūb* (War Traders), p. 10; `Azzām (1990), pp. 26, 27; `Azzām (1992), p. 6; `Azzām (1989).

¹²³ `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Bashāir Al-Naṣr* (Promises of Victory), pp. 2, 3; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Muqaddimah Fī Al-Hijrah Wa Al-Iḍād* (Introduction to Migration and Preparation), pp. 74, 75; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Jarīmat Qatl Al-Nafs Al-Muslimah* (Killing a Muslim Is a Crime), pp. 1, 2; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah* (Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter of the Qur'ān]), pp. 22, 27.

¹²⁴ `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *The Defence of Muslim's Land*, Chapter 4.; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād* (Fiqh and Ijtihād in Jihad), p. 46; `Azzām (1992), p. 12.

of Jews. Similarly, the situation in Afghanistan would not last long if only the Ummah would march forward. Moreover, there would not be an absence of Da'i [preacher], nor would their homes be destroyed by the going out of their women. Instead, in every instance, we wait and we weep. We watch the Islamic region as it falls under the domination of the Kuffar, until it is swallowed whole, then we finally (*sic*) eulogise with much sighing and streaming tears.¹²⁵

In another book, he rhetorically wrote:

Some others excuse themselves by claiming that their presence in their country is necessary for the purpose of education and upbringing. For such people, we present the words of al-Zuhri:

“Sa`id Ibn al-Musayyib went out to battle at the point where he had lost the use of one of his eyes. He was told, ‘You are an invalid,’ but he said, ‘Allah has summoned forth the light and the heavy. So if I cannot fight, I will swell the ranks and guard belongings.’”... Matters have reached a critical point, the noose is tightening, the situation is grave for the Muslims, so when will we go forth? And for how long will we sit back doing nothing?¹²⁶

`Azzām essentially believed that the harm resulting from not confronting the enemy was graver than the harm resulting from the vacuum created by those answering the call of jihad.

4.8 Conclusion

The amount of effort `Azzām put into the construction of his jihad thought, the detailed argument he researched and put forth, the amount of ideological materials he produced and the emphasis on ideological indoctrination and training, point to the importance of

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

¹²⁶ `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Join the Caravan*, Part 3.

ideas to effect participation in the Afghan jihad and its revival among Muslims.

But this chapter has also shown that `Azzām's ideas were not purely cognitive and theological. They were also shaped by non-ideational factors such as his targeted audiences and political opportunities.

With regard to ideational influences, `Azzām's ideas on jihad were fundamentally shaped by his Islamist worldview which he got from his affiliation with the Muslim Brothers. He viewed the Afghan armed struggle against the Soviet invasion as jihad for self-defence, not an ethno-nationalist liberation cause. This, then, allowed him:

- to extend the jihad duty to all Muslims regardless of their nationality or ethnicity,
- to restrict his target audiences to Muslims only because, in his view, the role of non-Muslims in jihad was very limited due to their lack of trustworthiness and inherent hostility towards Muslims, in addition to his belief that jihad was a perpetual war between Muslims and non-Muslims, and
- to colour his mobilisation message with Islamic beliefs, values and symbols that resonated with societies whose cultures were strongly influenced by Islam, in view of the resurgence of Islamic revivalism in most Muslim societies during the period.

In his Islamist worldview, Muslims had to wage jihad in Afghanistan to repulse the occupying forces as well as contribute to the establishment of an Islamic state that would implement the *sharī'ah* and extend it to all occupied Muslim lands (such as Palestine and Spain). This accounts for his use of two parallel frames — jihad in Afghanistan and jihad for Islamism.

With regard to non-ideational influences, his militant jihad views were significantly influenced by events that occurred during his lifetime. These were witnessing Israel's victory over the Arab forces in 1967, which led the capture of his birthplace and his participation in armed struggle against the Israeli occupying forces.

His ideas were also the product of political opportunities that resulted from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It provided opportunities for `Azzām to revive his jihad experience by participating in it, and taking up the role of a mobiliser and coordinator for foreign volunteers. This strengthened his jihad ideas. `Azzām was able to build networks and gain access and allies that allowed him to propagate his jihad ideas to a global audience. Without these opportunities, it is doubtful that `Azzām and his jihad ideas would have achieved such prominence and influence. This is also in view of a lull in jihad that spanned a decade in `Azzām's life, which would probably have continued had the Soviet invasion not happened.

The use of the first frame resulted from his initial unfamiliarity with the Afghans and its utility value to resonate with the larger Muslim audience.

`Azzām's use of two parallel frames had contributed not only to the mobilisation of Muslims for jihad in Afghanistan and the spread of jihad understanding among Muslims but also the proliferation of Islamism to those who answered his call and to the Muslims at large. His jihad for Islamism frame was also tolerated by those who would not have subscribed to or would have been against such views, such as the Muslim leaders and non-Muslim elites who gave him the opportunity to tour all over the world and spread the message of jihad for the defence of Afghanistan against the leader of the communist bloc.

However, the resonance of `Azzām's two frames was not the function of their intrinsic appeal only but because they were also hinged on a set of conditions external to them. These were: (1) their close fit with the audiences' life experiences, and (2) centrality and fidelity to their beliefs, values and cultural symbols.

This chapter has shown how `Azzām's frames were made credible, central and relevant by primarily hinging on Islamic values, beliefs and symbols that permeated Muslim societies. This was further reinforced by the global wave of Islamic resurgence and mounting frustration towards other worldviews that had failed many Muslim societies.

While studies of social movement recognised the role of incentive in effecting mobilisation, this, however, was not so in `Azzām's case.

`Azzām did not rely on material incentives to effect mobilisation. In fact, he considered seeking monetary rewards as an incentive for jihad forbidden. Although he saw the need for some form of remuneration to perform certain duties in jihad, he made it clear that the amount must not go beyond the basic needs of the person.¹²⁷

This again points to the importance of ideas in `Azzām's mobilisation in persuading the audience. He did it by transforming his audience from pacifist to activist, from self-centredness to altruism, and using his frames to resonate with the audiences' "cultural tool kit."¹²⁸

`Azzām's approach is known as "motivational framing" described by Benford and Snow, as an approach where leaders succeed in mobilising people through a call to arms or normative collective action. In this context, participation is framed as "a moral duty or obligation, whether driven by "moral shock" or by deeply held values and beliefs, irrespective of the costs and benefits likely to affect those involved."¹²⁹ This explains the participation of the foreign Muslim volunteers in the Afghan jihad — a high risk venture without material incentives.

The dynamic approach in analysing the framing of `Azzām's jihad ideas has been very useful. It discloses that `Azzām's effort to mobilise Muslims had not been a smooth process. Indeed, he had to face much criticism and numerous counter-frames in the process and had to dedicate significant effort to respond. Interestingly, the greater challenges he encountered were from Muslims themselves and those who answered his call. Some were appalled by the Afghans' religious practices and behaviours, which according to their understanding were far from Islamic and therefore did not deserve support.

`Azzām's broad appeal to all Muslims brought an assortment of Muslims, some of whom posed serious challenges among themselves and with the local Afghans. Some of them were more radical. They

¹²⁷ `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *The Defence of Muslim's Land*, Chapter 4; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād (Fiqh and Ijtihād in Jihad)*, pp. 53, 54.

¹²⁸ Wickham (2004); Swidler (1986).

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

promoted terrorism which was at odds with `Azzām's classical approach to jihad conduct. `Azzām's leadership was also challenged by those who answered his call.

All these had tremendous impact on `Azzām's two frames. However, they would not be fully understood if serious consideration was not given to the interactive nature of ideas and their context.

Chapter 5

The Implication of `Azzām's Ideas for National Security

5.1 Introduction

After analysing `Azzām's jihad ideas from a framing perspective, this chapter will seek to analyse the implications of these ideas on national security.

The chapter will investigate the following research questions: (1) What are the implications of `Azzām's jihad ideas on national security? (2) In what way could his ideas pose a security problem?

The study will analyse the impact of `Azzām's ideas within the context of effecting mobilisation.

Scholars on security and its related branches have acknowledged that the concept of security today can be approached from two broad perspectives — traditional and non-traditional. The former concerns the survival of the state from extermination, or the protection of its sovereignty from external powers that are set to subjugate its territory, impose their will on it or interfere in its internal affairs.¹ Security in this context is regarded as the most important value and the most treasured national interest.² The latter, however, has been best described by Emma Rothschild in *What Is Security?*:

“The ubiquitous idea, in the new principles of the 1990s, is of security in an ‘extended’ sense. The extension takes four main

¹ Paleri (2008).

² Wolfers (1952).

forms. In the first, the concept of security is extended from the security of nations to the security of groups and individuals: it is extended downwards from nations to individuals. In the second, it is extended from the security of the nations to the security of the international systems, or of a supranational physical environment: it is extended upwards, from the nation to the biosphere. The extension, in both cases, is in the sorts of entities whose security is to be ensured. In the third operation, the concept of security is extended horizontally, or to the sorts of security that are in question. Different entities (such as individual, nations and 'systems') cannot be expected to be secure or insecure in the same way; the concept of security is extended, therefore from military to political, economic, social, environmental, or 'human' security. In the fourth operation, the political responsibility for ensuring security (or for invigilating all these 'concepts of security') is itself extended: it is diffused in all directions from national states, including upwards to international institutions, downwards to regional or local government, and sideways to non-governmental organisations, to public opinion and the press, and to the abstract forces of nature or of the market."³

Despite the accepted use of the extended meaning of security, the concept of national security in this chapter will be largely based on the traditional perspective of security while incorporating the new generation warfare perspective, which is particularly concerned with threats emanating from non-state actors or trans-national groups and the use of asymmetric warfare tactics.

This chapter will be divided into three sections. The first section identifies specific aspects of `Azzām's jihad ideas which have serious implications on national security. The focus here is on the content of the ideas, such as his concept and perspective on the law of jihad which have already been elaborated in the last two chapters. As this study is focused on security, theological, social and

³ Rothschild (1995); Paleri (2008).

other implications will not be discussed. However, it should not be construed that they are any less important.

This section will highlight the negative implications of `Azzām's jihad ideas and practices on national security. It will identify and explicate how two of his ideas could pose threats to state security. The two ideas are: (1) the duty to reclaim all past Muslim lands that are currently part of, or occupied by, non-Muslim states, and (2) the duty to wage *jihād al-ṭalab* (offensive jihad) against non-Muslim territories until they are either part of or submit to the rule of *Dār Al-Islām*.

The second section highlights non-ideational structural factors that accompanied `Azzām's jihad ideas and contributed to its proliferation. They are: (1) precipitant events that provided justification for collective action frames and context for mobilisation, and (2) powerful allies that provided directly or facilitated indirectly, assistance for mobilisation. The section argues that both contributed significantly to a permissive environment for `Azzām's jihad mobilisation. The section then shows the interplay between `Azzām's jihad ideas and these factors within our understanding of the current threat from jihadist groups and the efforts to overcome it.

The third section identifies some of `Azzām's jihad ideas, which despite their militant jihadist bent, are different from the dominant ideas held by current jihadist groups like Al-Qaeda. The section identifies these as rather "positive" implications of `Azzām's jihad ideas and practices because they could potentially be used to counter the contemporary jihadist ideas and practices. `Azzām's jihad ideas and practices identified under this category are his opposition to the acts of rebellion against Muslim rulers and prohibition of indiscriminate attacks, attacks against enemies outside conflict zones or in non-belligerent countries, and the use of terror tactics.

5.2 `Azzām's Ideas and Security

This section will discuss two of `Azzām's jihad ideas which have direct implications on national and international security.

The first, was his view that it was obligatory to reclaim all previous Muslim territories which have come under non-Muslim rule today, such as Palestine, Chad, Eretria, Chechnya, Romania, Bulgaria, Spain and Hungary. By his definition, Singapore should also be included. He considered that armed jihad was imperative (*farḍ ‘ayn*) in order to fulfil this obligation.⁴ This would require a Muslim state, individual or organisation to instigate or wage armed jihad against the countries that rule those lands and, to a lesser degree, to subvert or cause the fall of the ruling government or its annexation by a Muslim state. Until this obligation is fulfilled, all Muslims are considered to be living in sin.⁵

Although ‘Azzām agreed that the Muslim states and their subjects are obligated to honour all international agreements, such as diplomatic agreements and the UN Charter forbidding all hostilities, he considered the obligation of waging jihad as a greater priority.⁶ Thus, Muslim states would have to nullify their agreements in the name of jihad. Until then, the process of subverting and undermining other governments politically, economically and socially was the order of the day as no one country would want to wage war against a strong enemy.⁷

‘Azzām’s view would also mean that individual Muslims could take the initiative to form a group and the group could network with similar groups across boundaries to fulfil the obligation. This facilitated the emergence of trans-national groups like Al-Qaeda which continues to subvert governments and subsequently wage jihad all over the world.⁸

Although ‘Azzām’s concept of the *al-amān* agreement would require that Muslim subjects of non-Muslim countries abide by

⁴ See Section 3.7 on “The ruling of jihad” in Chapter 3. A similar view is held by a jihadist ideologue: ‘Atiyyat Allāh Al-Lībīy. Al-Lībīy (2010).

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ See Section 3.4 on “Status of jihad,” Section 3.5 on “Other relevant ideas to jihad” and Section 3.7 on “Ruling of jihad in Islam” in Chapter 3.

⁷ See Paleri’s “Threat matrix cube” that identifies eight types of threat to national security, (1) direct-overt-internal, (2) direct-covert-internal, (3) direct-overt-external, (4) direct-covert-external, (5) indirect-overt-internal, (6) indirect-covert-internal, (7) indirect-overt-external, (8) indirect-covert-external, in Paleri (2008).

their citizenship contract,⁹ the idea that Muslims are obligated to wage jihad for the liberation of all previous and current Muslim lands that are occupied by non-Muslims has motivated some Muslims to undermine their own governments, as seen in the London-based Al-Muhajiroun.¹⁰ The terror plots by citizens or permanent residents in non-Muslim countries, who were inspired by Al-Qaeda's militant jihad, are testimonies to this threat. Some of these terror groups and their plots include:

- The Singapore cell of the Indonesian Jemaah Islamiyah, which comprise Singapore citizens, planned attacks on various Western targets in the country.¹¹
- Five individuals, who were mainly naturalised citizens of the United States, plotted attacks on the Fort Dix military base in New Jersey.¹²
- Six Yemeni-Americans popularly referred to as the "Lackawanna Six" of the Buffalo cell provided support to Al-Qaeda.¹³
- Four citizens of the United Kingdom carried out the London underground bombing on July 7, 2005.¹⁴
- Five men, who were either citizens or permanent residents of the United Kingdom, were convicted for charges related to the plot of bombing the London underground on July 21, 2005.¹⁵
- Four Australian citizens plotted to attack a military base in Melbourne on August 2009.¹⁶

These subversive activities against the interests of non-Muslim countries also posed serious national security concerns for Muslim

⁸ Paleri (2008).

⁹ See Section 3.15 on "Commenting on 'Azzām" in Chapter 3.

¹⁰ See Paleri's "Threat matrix cube," in Paleri (2008).

¹¹ Ministry of Home Affairs (2003).

¹² Ripley (2007).

¹³ Aziz and Lam (2003).

¹⁴ In depth: London attacks (date not cited). *BBC News*.

¹⁵ Fifth July 21 bomber faces sentence for failed London terror attack (2007). *Mailonline*, November 19.

¹⁶ Stewart and Wilson (2009).

countries when they were conducted within their territories, as seen in the bombings in Indonesia.¹⁷

Marc Sageman, in his study of various terrorism cases in Western countries, observed the shift of the threat of terror attacks from external sources to “home-grown wannabes” who were unaffiliated to jihadist groups but are aggrieved by international events such as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and inspired by militant jihad ideas such as `Azzām's.¹⁸

In this regard, respective governments have been understandably concerned with the ideas espoused by `Azzām and the existence of movements, and local and international mobilisation. The existence of groups like Al-Qaeda and the Indonesian Jemaah Islamiyah has proved that the implications for national security are not just theoretical. The non-Muslim states which used to be Muslim territory spreads over various parts of the world, and the emergence of transnational groups or networks seeking to realise `Azzām's vision implies that the security concern cannot be restricted to the local level.

Another of `Azzām's ideas, which has implication on national security, was his idea of *jihād al-ṭalab* as discussed in Chapter 3. To briefly recapitulate, `Azzām considered that in Islam, jihad is not only for defensive purposes. He argued that the requirement to wage *jihād al-ṭalab* was the final revelation on jihad, and had abrogated previous revelations on the defensive character of jihad. To `Azzām, the final revelation has determined that the primary basis of the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims or between Muslim and non-Muslim states is war, and that it is necessary for Muslims to wage war until God's religion is established and Muslims rule over all lands and people in this world.¹⁹

While this may be accomplished through non-violent jihad (i.e., peaceful propagation), `Azzām viewed armed jihad as an inevitable outcome of the hostile characteristics of *jahiliyyah*.²⁰

¹⁷ Timeline: Indonesia bomb attacks (2009). *ABC News*, July 17. See Paleri's "Threat matrix cube," in Paleri (2008).

¹⁸ Sageman (2007).

¹⁹ See Section 3.6 on "Types of jihad" in Chapter 3.

²⁰ See Section 3.2 on "`Azzām's worldview" in Chapter 3.

Furthermore, `Azzām considered that as long as Muslims have conveyed the message of Islam to non-Muslims sufficiently, they may declare war and wage offensive jihad against those who had refused to accept Islam or the rule of Muslims. In fact, he believed it obligatory for a Muslim ruler to launch military expeditions against these territories at least once a year. This ruling would stand, according to `Azzām, until either the people accepted Islam or submitted to the rule of Muslims, and can only be suspended by a temporary ceasefire or peace agreement.²¹

Unlike *jihād al-daf`* (defensive jihad), this jihad duty is considered *fard kifāyah* (collective duty) and can only be executed by a Muslim authority. Thus, Muslim rulers were obligated to carry out this duty and Muslim subjects were obligated to remind them of the duty. If nothing was done, all Muslims would have to bear the sin.²²

For a non-Muslim ruler, having a neighbouring Muslim ruler who is seriously committed to the idea of *jihād al-ṭalab*, as propagated by `Azzām, would indeed be a major concern. This concern would naturally increase when the Muslim neighbouring country becomes more powerful.²³

If `Azzām's idea of *jihād al-ṭalab* is widely accepted by Muslims and Muslim rulers, it would have ramifications on the dynamics of international politics. Muslims, either individually or in groups, may be encouraged to take on subversive actions against their non-Muslim rulers, thus undermining national security.²⁴ Considering the number of countries and the size of territories involved, this second idea would also have international security ramifications.

5.3 Not Just Ideas

The two previous chapters highlighted how ideas were important to `Azzām's efforts of mobilising participants for jihad against the

²¹ See Section 3.11 on "Ethics and rules of jihad" in Chapter 3.

²² See Section 3.6 on "Types of jihad" in Chapter 3.

²³ See Paleri's, "Threat matrix cube," in Paleri (2008).

²⁴ *Ibid.*

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The two chapters outlined how `Azzām placed tremendous effort on ideological work such as constructing his Islamist worldview and the two important collective action frames, criticising opposing ideologies and frames and justifying his actions from the lens of his Islamist worldview. This made up the bulk of his writing.

It is clear from these writings that his objective was not only to mobilise people to perform jihad and repel the occupying Soviet enemy and its local collaborators from Afghanistan, (i.e., liberation from foreign occupation), but also to spread the Islamist worldview which he believed to be the true understanding of Islam, and to establish an Islamic state as the solution to the problems of Muslims.

The writings which `Azzām produced were not mere narratives about the world. They covered all aspects of jihad and more importantly explicated in great detail the Islamist worldview that is supposed to underlie Muslim action; and *fatwā's* on various theological issues from the Islamist viewpoint.

Conceptually, `Azzām emphasised the importance of theological and ideological training before and during participation in jihad, as discussed in Chapter 3 on his concept of *Al-Qā'idah*. He had put this into practice by organising various training camps and conducting training sessions.²⁵

Based on the above, it could be said that `Azzām's approach to mobilisation was also ideological.

It is important to note that militants and jihadists are not irrational. Despite their tendency to take extreme measures, they work with rational calculation.²⁶ `Azzām was no exception. Although they were not without flaws, the content of his ideas and their con-

²⁵ `Azzām (1992), pp. 126, 127; Some of the material used in this study as listed in the bibliography are transcripts from his lectures, classes and sermons delivered during training sessions. One example is *Fī Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah*, a transcript of his lectures delivered at one of the training camps. See `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah (Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter of the Qur'ān])*, pp. 17, 84, 88, 93; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Al-As'ilah Wa Al-Ajwibah Al-Jihādīyah (Questions and Answers on Jihad)*, pp. 18, 19.

²⁶ Bjorgo (2005), p. 257.

structions show tremendous rationality. `Azzām would not have spent so much resources and effort on ideological matters had they not been important to him. Indeed, these matters served his cause.

The importance and effect of `Azzām's ideological mobilisation can be found in the testimonies of former participants of the jihad in Afghanistan, popularly known as the "Afghan alumni." They testify that `Azzām's books like *The Defence of Muslim Lands* and *The Signs of Ar-Rahman* had greatly influenced their decisions to come to Afghanistan for jihad.²⁷

Another testimony is the proliferation of jihad groups in various parts of the world, the result of the dispersal of members of the Afghan alumni who were exposed to the ideological training during their jihad stint. This phenomenon has been noted by many scholars and is mentioned in the first chapter.²⁸

`Azzām's ideological influence has been studied by the Combating Terrorism Center in the United States. The most influential jihad thinkers and the most popular writings among the "jihadist thinking class" have been documented in the *Militant Ideology Atlas*, a one-year research project based primarily on *Al-Maḡdisī's*²⁹ website, the largest online repository of jihadist materials.³⁰

The study highlights the following findings on `Azzām's lasting influence:

- `Azzām was ranked sixth among the most-cited modern authors.³¹

²⁷ Anas (2002), p. 14; Samudra (2004), pp. 41–44.

²⁸ See Section 1.3.1 on "The important role of the Soviet–Afghan war" in Section 1.3 on "A case for case study" in Chapter 1. Some of the groups include the GIA (Algeria), GSPC (Algeria), LIFG (Libya), Al-Qaeda, JI (Indonesia), ASG (Philippines), Hamās (Palestine) and Ibn Khaṭṭāb's group (Chechnya).

²⁹ `Iṣām @`Aṣim ibn Muḥammad ibn Ṭahir Al-Barqawīy who is popularly known as Abū Muḥammad Al-Maḡdisīy. He is a prominent *salafīy*-jihadist ideologue who is also the mentor of Abū Muṣ`ab Al-Zarqawīy, the late emir of Al-Qaeda in Iraq. He has a dedicated website which is known as *Minbar Al-Tawhīd Wa Al-Jihād*. The website hosts his writings and audio preachings and also serves as the largest jihadist online library. The website is located at www.tawhed.ws. See McCants (2006); Wagemakers (2009).

³⁰ McCants (2006).

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

- `Azzām's book *The Defence of Muslim Lands* was ranked seventh among the most downloaded materials on the subject of jihad (10,792 downloads).
- Two of `Azzām's other books were among the most downloaded materials on the subject of jihad.
- `Azzām's book *The Signs of Ar-Rahman* was one of the top 20 most downloaded books from *Al-Maqdisiyy's* www.tawhed.ws site.
- Four of `Azzām's books were listed among the most popular texts.³²

In an online compilation of jihadist materials entitled *Ḥaqībah Al-Mujāhid* (A Mujahid's Bag) found in a radical forum presumably established as a recommendation for the study of jihad, `Azzām's name is included in a list of more than 50 individuals with 50 of his works being among more than 2000 recommended readings (books and articles).³³

Also, `Azzām's name has been constantly invoked as a source of inspiration and legitimacy for jihadist groups and their supporters. A website that had dedicated itself to disseminating news from various arenas of jihad and promoting and soliciting support for jihadism was named after him — *azzam.com* — until it was shut down after the 9/11 attacks.³⁴ Similarly, his name is also used for various jihadist fighting units and operations.³⁵

However, from the readings of `Azzām's writings, it must be pointed out that it was not ideas "all the way down" that had contributed to the success of his mobilisation efforts from 1983 to his assassination in 1989.

Non-ideational structural factors have important contributions to `Azzām's mobilisation success as he himself has asserted in his writings. `Azzām's ideological approach in mobilising thousands of Muslims for the jihad in Afghanistan and increasing awareness

³² McCants (2006).

³³ Brown (2009).

³⁴ www.azzam.com/2010.

³⁵ Al-`Arabiyah (2005). Interview with Ḥudhayfah, son of `Abd Allāh `Azzām, July 26; see also Militant group claims rocket attacks on Israel (2009). *Reuters*. September 13; Shah (2009).

towards jihad and Islamism could be said to have succeeded due to opportunities such as (1) precipitant events that provided the justification for collective action frames and context for mobilisation, and (2) the powerful allies that provided direct or indirect facilitation for the mobilisation.

5.3.1 *Precipitant event*

The role of a precipitant event as a catalyst to political violence has been widely recognised by scholars as noted in Rand's literature review of counterterrorism from a social science perspective. It defines precipitant events as "an event or incident that helps catalyze or trigger in behavior, particularly a move toward violent action." The review noted that one of the effects of a precipitant event is to provide a window of opportunity for political action or violence.³⁶

The role of grievances as one of many root causes of political violence and precipitant events as factors that feed into grievances have been widely recognised in the study of political violence and terrorism.³⁷

Edward Newman writes, "certain conditions provide a social environment and widespread grievance that, when combined with certain precipitant factors, result in the emergence of terrorist organizations and terrorist acts."³⁸

Finally, Johan Eriksson concludes, in the study of threat politics using framing analysis, that circumstantial factors facilitate and obstruct threat framing and thus contribute to its societal salience. One of the three factors identified was the dramatic event. Based on various studies, Eriksson writes, "It was suggested that dramatic events take on societal salience more easily than both structural conditions and actors."³⁹

³⁶ Noricks (2009).

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 13, 34–36. See Bjorgo (2005), pp. 256–262.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 13. See also Newman (2006).

³⁹ Eriksson (2001).

Precipitant or dramatic event here refers specifically to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The gravity of the event on the Afghan Muslims provided an opportunity for ‘Azzām to emerge from his state of dormancy and take on the role of a jihad mobiliser which catapulted him into prominence and gave credibility to his ideas among Muslims. As noted in the last chapter, although ‘Azzām had been an Islamist and was inclined towards armed jihad after his participation in jihad against the Israeli occupation of Palestine, he had ceased all armed jihad activities after the expulsion of the Palestinian resistance movements from Jordan in the early 1970s.⁴⁰ Hence if it was not for the event, ‘Azzām would be unknown and would have had little impact. The prominent presence of this event in ‘Azzām’s collective action frames, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, also testifies to its significance as a rallying call.

The event became a major source of grievance among Muslims. It is important to note that prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, ‘Azzām did not produce any work instigating armed jihad among Muslims. Thus, it could be argued that both the grievances created by the event and ‘Azzām’s subsequent direct involvement as a jihad mobiliser, became the motivation for crafting the two collective action frames.⁴¹ It also provided legitimacy, credibility and appeal to ‘Azzām’s jihad ideas and frames in the eyes of Muslims at large.

The event also generated international support for the Afghan jihad cause from the United States and its allies, thus lending support to ‘Azzām’s mobilisation efforts.⁴² This will be elaborated upon in the subsequent section.

The relationship between ‘Azzām’s mobilisation success and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has also been supported by scholars’

⁴⁰ See Section 1.3.2 on “‘Abd Allāh ‘Azzām: His life and role during the Soviet–Afghan war” in Section 1.3 on “A case for case study” in Chapter 1 and Section 4.2 on “‘Azzām’s worldview and jihad ideas” in Chapter 4.

⁴¹ See Section 4.2 on “‘Azzām’s worldview and jihad ideas” and Section 4.3 on “From worldview to collective action frames” in Chapter 4.

⁴² See Subsection 1.3.1 on “The important role of the Soviet–Afghan war” in Section 1.3 on “A case for case study,” in Chapter 1.

in the field of political violence. Tore Bjorgo's conclusion on the root causes of terrorism is instructive. He writes,

"Repression by foreign forces or occupation by colonial powers has given rise to a great many national liberation movements that have sought recourse in terrorist tactics, guerrilla warfare, and other political means. Despite their use of terrorist methods, some liberation movements enjoy considerable support and legitimacy among their own constituencies, and sometimes also from segments of international public opinion."⁴³

Theda Skocpol, Frances F. Piven and Richard A. Cloward⁴⁴ highlight the importance of historical context on the emergence of political violence. In this case, the Soviet invasion was as much the context as the precipitant event. Piven and Cloward, in a comparative study of the French and Russian revolutions, notes, "Popular insurgency does not proceed from someone else's rules or hopes: it has its own logic and direction. It flows from historically specific circumstances: it is a reaction against those circumstances, and it is also limited by those circumstances."⁴⁵

5.3.2 *Powerful allies*

Many researchers on the Soviet–Afghan jihad era have highlighted the involvement of the United States and its allies in the form of financial, material and political support towards armed jihad in Afghanistan, as part of their Cold War strategy against the communist bloc. In facilitating the mobilisation and training of Muslim fighters and supplying weaponry for jihad, they contributed to the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and the fall of its local collaborators in Kabul in 1992.⁴⁶

The assistance was done covertly under the codename of Operation Cyclone. It was estimated that between 1980 and 1987,

⁴³ Bjorgo (2005).

⁴⁴ Noricks (2009), pp. 18, 19; Skocpol (1979); Piven and Cloward (1979).

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* See also Piven and Cloward (1979).

⁴⁶ Sageman (2004); Crile (2002); Saikal (2004); Coll (2005).

the United States spent US\$15–30 million to as high as US\$600 million a year on the operation. Part of the money was used to supply tens of thousands of tons of weapons such as assault rifles, machine guns, mortars, rocket-propelled grenades and mines.⁴⁷

‘Azzām attempted to downplay the United States’ role in the Afghan jihad by denying that any assistance reached the resistance groups, and kept emphasising that the United States was the enemy of Islam which sought to extinguish the spirit of jihad from Muslims. Nonetheless, the presence of United States’ support can be inferred from his writings.⁴⁸

For example, ‘Azzām admitted receiving Stinger missiles (portable surface-to-air missiles) from the United States but claimed that the cost of each missile (US\$70,000) was borne by the Saudi government, thus avoiding giving credit to the United States.⁴⁹

This example corroborates with other research findings that there was collaboration between Saudi Arabia and the United States in funding the Afghan jihad. The denial of receiving direct assistance from the United States is not surprising. In fact, it corroborates again with the research findings that all forms of support from the United States then, were channelled through a third party, which may have been Pakistan or the Saudi intelligence agency, before they were distributed to various Afghan groups.⁵⁰

In his writings, ‘Azzām told stories of visits he and representatives of *Maktab Al-Khidmāt* made all over the United States for the purpose of rallying support for jihad, apparently encountering no interference from the authority. He confirmed the existence of an affiliate agency, *Al-Kifāh* Refugee Centre, that helped to raise

⁴⁷ Saikal (2004); Kepel (2003); Crile (2002).

⁴⁸ ‘Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Al-As’ilah Wa Al-Ajwibah Al-Jihādiyyah (Questions and Answers on Jihad)*, pp. 18, 19.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 5, 11; Azzām, AA date (not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād (Fiqh and Ijtihād in Jihad)*, pp. 11, 21, 35; Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Zilāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah (Under the Shades of Al-Tawbah Chapter [The Ninth Chapter of the Qur’ān])*, pp. 105, 170; Azzām (1992); Crile (2002), pp. 419–421, 430, 437, 438; Coll (2005).

⁵⁰ Sageman (2004), pp. 56–59; Saikal (2004), pp. 204, 205; Crile (2002), pp. 198, 217, 341, 510; Coll (2005), pp. 63–68, 73, 74, 81–84, 156.

awareness, funds and support for the jihad in Afghanistan, established by the *Al-Fārūq* Mosque in Brooklyn, New York. He also had an account with the Independence Savings Bank for fundraising purposes in the United States.⁵¹ All these stories confirm that the United States then, did not have a repressive policy towards the jihad mobilisation efforts within its territory.

Saudi Arabia was one of the United States' key allies in supporting the Afghan struggle against the invasion. Scholars noted that the Saudi government's dollar-for-dollar matching of the United States financial support amounted to millions of dollars. It also adopted a non-intervention policy on jihad mobilisation within the country and lent support through apparatuses such as the intelligence agency and religious authority, and through semi-government organisations like the Saudi Islamic Relief Committee.⁵²

'Azzām was full of praise for Saudi generosity and support. He admitted that Saudi citizens made up the largest group of foreign volunteers in Afghanistan.⁵³ 'Azzām and his associates were relatively free to tour the country and held conferences during *haj* (pilgrimage) seasons.⁵⁴ There was even a *fatwā* by the Saudi Grand Muftī⁵⁵ on the obligation of jihad in Afghanistan and of supporting it. The Saudi Arabian Red Crescent and the Jeddah-based Muslim World League were involved in providing humanitarian aid.⁵⁶ Other sources report that the Saudi Arabian national airline gave 75% discounts on airfare tickets to Pakistan to support travellers who wished to join the jihad in Afghanistan.⁵⁷

⁵¹ 'Azzām, (1992), pp. 87–92 'Azzām, (2003), pp. 47–53 'Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Muqaddimah Fī Al-Hijrah Wa Al-Jdād* (Introduction to migration and preparation), p. 55; Marshall (1998); Weiser Sachs and Kocieniewski (1998).

⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 31–34; 'Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Al-As'ilah Wa Al-Ajwibah. Al-Jihādīyah* (Questions and Answers on Jihad), pp. 19, 28, 43; Kepel (2003), pp. 143–145, 208; Coll (2005), pp. 65, 66, 154.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 19, 38; Coll (2005), pp. 154, 83, 84.

⁵⁴ 'Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Defence of the Muslim Lands.*; 'Azzām, (1991), p. 142.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*; 'Azzām (1992), pp. 174, 175.

⁵⁶ 'Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Al-As'ilah Wa Al-Ajwibah. Al-Jihādīyah* (Questions and Answers on Jihad), p. 13; 'Azzām (1992), p. 29; Coll (2005), pp. 154, 155.

⁵⁷ See "The battle of the lion's den, Afghanistan, 1987," an account of the famous battle from various sources published together in 'Azzām (2003); Anas (2002).

'Azzām's tours and mobilisation efforts also faced little intervention in other gulf countries. He was full of praise for the generosity of Kuwaitis and Yemenis.⁵⁸

Pakistan was another key ally in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet invasion. Scholars noted its function as the main conduit of United States' assistance for the Afghans through its Inter-Services Intelligence agency. In addition, Pakistan initiated training for the fighters, provided shelters and safe havens, opened borders and mobilised Pakistanis for jihad.⁵⁹

'Azzām held in high regard the President of Pakistan Zia-ul Haq, and described him as a staunch supporter who was willing to sacrifice his own life for the jihad in Afghanistan. He viewed the death of Zia-ul Haq in an airplane crash as a conspiracy against his support of jihad. It was also a known fact that 'Azzām operated all his mobilisation work from Peshawar, Pakistan and roamed the country freely until he was assassinated.⁶⁰

Thus, 'Azzām's accounts had pointed to a significant degree of tolerance, support, facilitation (structural factors) or the lack of repressive policies by the United States and its allies towards the works done by him and his associates in disseminating his ideas. Indeed, helping the Muslim propaganda campaign against the Soviet occupation, which included mobilisation for jihad, was part of the covert operation by the United States and its allies.⁶¹

Sageman also comes to the same conclusion. He writes,

"The global salafi jihad is without doubt an indirect consequence of U.S involvement in that Afghan-Soviet war. Without the US support for that jihad, the Soviets would probably not have

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 1, 13, 38; *Ibid*; 'Azzām (1991), pp. 190–192; Kepel (2003).

⁵⁹ Coll (2005), pp. 63–68; Sageman (2004), pp. 56–59; Crile (2002), pp. 103–105, 198, 199, 231.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 60–63; 'Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Al-As'ilah Wa Al-Ajwibah. Al-Jihādiyyah* (*Questions and Answers on Jihad*), pp. 3, 5, 32, 38, 41, 42; 'Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Zīlāl Sūrah Al-Tawbah* (Under the Shades of *Al-Tawbah* Chapter [*The Ninth Chapter of the Qur'ān*]), p. 41.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

withdrawn from Afghanistan. US covert action supported a traditional jihad, which included foreign Muslim volunteers.”⁶²

In addition, `Azzām's mobilisation efforts were significantly supported by the local Afghans themselves. Shaykh `Abd Rab Al-Rasūl Sayyāf, the leader of one of Afghan groups popularly known among the Arabs as Al-Ittihād Al-Islāmīy provided guest houses for foreign volunteers and land for training camps.⁶³

There is much evidence to support the existence of non-ideational structural factors that contributed to the mobilisation and proliferation of `Azzām's ideas. However, the objective here is not to provide an exhaustive list. Instead, it is sufficient to validate the role of non-ideational structural factors based on `Azzām's own accounts that were also validated by other researchers.

Recognising that political/collective action and mobilisation does not occur in a vacuum and that they are not only affecting but also affected by context, scholars have long acknowledged the role of structural factors in constraining and facilitating movement of political action and in providing the local and international environments that are conducive (or otherwise) for successful mobilisation.⁶⁴

Specifically, many scholars of social movements have recognised the importance and the positive effects of powerful allies within political elites on the movement's mobilisation process. Resource mobilisation, a theory within the study of social movements, states that the success of a movement's mobilisation is critically dependant on the availability of resources and its effective use. One of the resources identified is the existence of powerful allies like the United States and nations that sponsor the movement's mobilisation. Another theory within the study of social movements is political opportunity which holds that the success of a movement is due to the political opportunities available to it. Among the

⁶² Sageman (2004).

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 38; Anas (2002), pp. 17, 18.

⁶⁴ Hyvarinen (1997); Foweraker (1997); Rootes (1997); Edmondson and Nullmeier (1997); Meyer (2003); Zald and Ash (1996); Benford and Snow (2000).

many opportunities identified by the theory is the existence of powerful allies among the political elites that enable and facilitate mobilisation.⁶⁵

Mayer N. Zald and John D. McCarthy, in a study of the effect of religious institutions on movement's mobilisation, write:

"Resource mobilization perspectives have stressed that resources and the structures of everyday life are important to understanding social movement processes, and the behavior of religious groups in this regard offer extensive illustrations of the point. Rather than stressing the role of religious belief in such facilitation, which was common earlier, we stress how religious institutional structures may affect social movement trajectories."⁶⁶

Zald and McCarthy also highlight how the civil rights movement benefited tremendously from the role played by pre-existing religious institutions such as churches and religion-based societies.⁶⁷ This is similar to the findings in this study on the role played by pre-existing Islamic groups like the Muslim World League and religious establishments in Saudi Arabia and other Muslim countries that had significantly helped to boost the Afghan jihad mobilisation efforts.

It could be argued that the second implication here (i.e., the importance of non-ideational structural factors, specifically powerful allies in effecting jihad mobilisation in Afghanistan) is supported by the general position held by many scholars that structural factors do determine the trajectory of ideas.

It has been concluded in the last chapter that the construction of `Azzām's jihad frames was not ideational "all the way down" as it was also shaped by non-ideational factors. It could also be said that the effects of `Azzām's jihad ideas were also due to non-

⁶⁵ Meyer (2002); Whittier (2002); Jenkins (1983); Ayres (1997).

⁶⁶ Zald and McCarthy (1987).

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

ideational structural factors. These factors were: (1) precipitant events that created major grievances, and (2) an organised political, financial, material and military support at the international level under the sponsorship of the United States as part of its Cold War rivalry against the Soviet Union, and at the local level by various governments within their jurisdictions. The consequences of these two factors were a permissive environment to effect mobilisation for jihad in Afghanistan and the proliferation of militant jihad. Some of the consequences were, (1) the arrival of thousands of non-Afghan volunteers for jihad who were then exposed to the jihad ideas from `Azzām and other strands of Islamism,⁶⁸ (2) the propagation of Islamism and jihad ideas to the Muslim masses through public talks at mosques, organisations and conferences, and the circulation of print, audio and video materials, (3) fundraising of millions of dollars that were partially used for ideological propaganda and mobilisation on a large scale.

These factors led to the exposure of thousands of Muslims to `Azzām's jihad ideas, encompassing the two ideas mentioned earlier which could have ramifications on the national security of certain countries and to a greater extent, international security. Some jihadists were responsible for sustaining the ideas long after `Azzām's death and the end of jihad in Afghanistan, and some contributed to its mutation into a more radical and permissive form of jihad. This permissive form justified armed jihad at any place, by any Muslim (children included), targeting everybody (civilians, fellow Muslims and houses of worships) and using any tactic (suicide, betrayal or robbery) as long as the intention is to achieve glory for Islam. All this on the pretext that Islam permits committing small forbidden acts for the greater good (glory for Islam).

5.4 `Azzām's Ideas and Countering Terrorism

The third implication of `Azzām's ideas is perhaps the most important. It is potentially a potent counter-argument to current jihadist

⁶⁸ Crile (2002).

ideology. Unlike the previous two ideas of `Azzām discussed in the previous section, it has a positive implication to the current security problem of jihadist ideology.

The review of `Azzām's ideological materials and his biography as discussed in Chapter's 1, 2 and 3 indicate that there are significant differences between `Azzām's ideas and practices and the current dominant jihadist strands, as exemplified by Al-Qaeda. These differences provide a window of opportunity to refute Al-Qaeda's ideology and discredit their practices and may be used to dissuade current militants and other Muslims from joining them or from subscribing to their ideology. If more jihadists can be persuaded to abandon their current ideology and/or practice as the Egyptian *Al-Jamāah Al-Islamīyah*, Sayyid Imām Al-Sharīf (a former leader of the Egyptian *Al-Jihād*) and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group had done, and less Muslims are attracted to the ideology, the current jihadist threat can be reduced significantly.

Based on the review in Chapter 3, the differences between `Azzām's jihad ideas and practices and Al-Qaeda and its ilk can be summarised as follows:

- `Azzām discouraged rebellion against Muslim rulers.⁶⁹
- `Azzām discouraged attacks on Western countries, be they attacks on Western targets or people located there. On the basis of *al-amān* agreement, Muslims who have been given permission to live or enter a country have in effect entered into security agreements that forbid any act of hostilities or legal infringements.⁷⁰
- `Azzām was against violating Muslim lives.⁷¹
- `Azzām and his foreign followers did not practice random, indiscriminate attacks that caused civilian death.
- `Azzām and his foreign followers did not attack the enemy's interests outside the conflict zone.

⁶⁹ See Section 3.15 on "Commenting on `Azzām" in Chapter 3.

⁷⁰ See Section on "The division of lands" in Section 3.5 on "Other relevant ideas to jihad," Subsection on "Peace agreement and cease fire" in Section 3.11 on "Ethics and rules of jihad" and Section 3.15 on "Commenting on `Azzām" in Chapter 3.

⁷¹ See Section 3.11.3 on "Non-legitimate targets" in Section 3.11 on "Ethics and rules of jihad" in Chapter 3.

- `Azzām and his foreign followers did not practice terror tactics such as hijacking, kidnapping civilians, bombing civilian places (including houses of worship) and robbery for the purpose of raising funds.⁷²

The last three points were based on the fact there were no records or reports of such practices during `Azzām's lifetime and this corroborates with findings of other researchers⁷³ as well as with the literature on the Afghan jihad written by its alumni. One of them is AbdAllāh Anas, an Algerian, who rejects Bin Laden's self-declaration of war. In 2002, Anas, who was also one of the commanders of the foreign volunteers during the Afghan jihad, wrote *The Birth of the Afghan Arabs* in which he stressed that the Afghan jihad in the 1980s did not introduce the culture of kidnapping civilians and killing them.⁷⁴ The mujahidin were also not enjoined to overthrow their governments upon return to their homelands. Moreover, the Russian and Afghan embassies were even left unharmed by the Afghan mujahidin.⁷⁵

Anas further recalled how `Azzām respected the lives of foreigners in Afghanistan. There was an incident in which `Azzām picked up three female Westerners who were waiting for a taxi to get home at a very late hour. When asked why he had given them a lift, `Azzām said that he did not want them to be exposed to any harm as the village they were passing through was known for its banditry.⁷⁶

Another Afghan veteran who has openly condemned Al-Qaeda is Nu`mān ibn `Uthmān, better known in the Western media as "Noman Benotman." He attended a conference of jihadists from across the Arab world in 1996 in which Bin Laden and Ayman Al-Zawāhirīy were galvanising support to spread their ideological virus. During the conference, ibn `Uthmān had argued that attacking the United States would lead them nowhere.⁷⁷ In an open letter

⁷² See Section 3.15 on "Commenting on `Azzām" in Chapter 3.

⁷³ See Section 1.3.2 on "AbdAllāh `Azzām: His life and role during the Soviet-Afghan war" in Section 1.3 on "A case for case study" in Chapter 1

⁷⁴ Al-`Arabīyah (2005). Interview with `Abd Allāh Anas, December 27.

⁷⁵ Al-`Arabīyah (2006). Interview with `Abd Allāh Anas, January 2.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ Bergen and Cruickshank (2008).

to Al-Zawāhirīy, ibn `Uthmān argued that the citizens of Western countries were not to be blamed or killed.⁷⁸

Finally, the review of `Azzām's writings in Chapter 3 also did not reveal that he harboured any views that would justify such practices.

In contrast, Bin Laden in his famous 1998 declaration of war, called upon Muslims to attack the enemy (military and civilians) wherever they could be found, a point he demonstrated in the 9/11 attacks.⁷⁹ He also instigated Muslims to rebel against Muslim rulers, allegedly, the lackeys of the infidel powers as outlined in his 1998 fatwa against the Saudi government.⁸⁰ The randomness of their attacks, which also sacrificed Muslim lives and extended beyond the conflict zones, has been visible in various terror incidents all over the world. In a study entitled *Deadly Vanguard: A Study of al-Qaida's Violence Against Muslims*, 313 attacks have been identified as being perpetrated by Al-Qaeda from 2004 to 2008 in 17 different countries involving public places such as hotels and markets, and 75 percent of the casualties of these attacks were Muslims. The study compares this finding with 23 other attacks identified with Al-Qaeda from 1995 to 2003 and notes, "the trends reflected from 1995 to 2003 do not differ significantly from those in 2004 to 2008, excluding 9/11, and comparison shows that Al-Qaeda is growing more violent and less discriminate."⁸¹ Al-Qaeda itself admitted to this fact when its spokesperson issued an apology for "the unintended Muslim victims of the mujahedeen operations" in December 2009.⁸²

In addition to the reverence of `Azzām and his ideas by the current jihadist groups, the anti-Soviet jihad of the 1980s remains the

⁷⁸ The letter was published by the Jamestown Foundation in November 2007. Benotman (2007).

⁷⁹ Declaration of war against Americans occupying the land of the two holy places. *PBS Online Newshour* (August 1996); World Islamic Front statement on jihad against Jews and crusaders, *Al-Quds Al-`Arabīy*, February 23, 1998; See his admission in Osama bin Laden transcript: Al-Qaeda leader says Zacarias Mousaoui had no link to 9/11 attacks. *msnbc.com* (May 23, 2006).

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ Helfstein, Abdullah and Al-Obaidi (2009).

⁸² Al-Qaeda offers "condolences" for innocent victims (2009). *CNN*, December 13.

justification for their violence. Potential recruits are constantly exposed to riveting stories of past victories and miraculous incidents on the battlefield. There is a conscious attempt to give legitimacy to the struggle by drawing direct parallels with the past Afghan jihad.

The inconsistencies found in `Azzām's ideas identified in the previous chapter also provide opportunities to mitigate the appeal of `Azzām's ideas among potential recruits.

How all these implications are addressed, however, will be elaborated upon in the next chapter, which will address all the issues arising from this study.

5.5 Conclusion

`Azzām's jihad ideas and practices have both negative and positive implications on national security. The negative implications arise from two of his ideas, (1) the duty to reclaim all past Muslim lands that are currently part (occupied) of non-Muslim states, and (2) the duty to wage *jihād al-ṭalab* against non-Muslim territories until they were either part of or had submitted to the rule of *Dār Al-Islām*. These two ideas threaten state security because they encourage the construction of hostile intent among Muslim rulers, individuals and organisations that could lead to plans and actions to subvert or weaken non-Muslim governments politically, militarily, socially or economically until they submit to *Dār Al-Islām*.

However, the effect of `Azzām's jihad ideas was also enhanced by two important non-ideational structural factors: (1) precipitant event that provided justification for collective action frames and conducive context for mobilisation, and (2) powerful allies that directly provided or indirectly facilitated mobilisation. Both created a permissive environment for jihad mobilisation.

Although the above mentioned structural factors have been based on a specific study of `Azzām, they have value in addressing the current security concern posed by jihadist ideology. As indicated earlier, many scholars have looked into the role of such structural factors in affecting framing and ideological mobilisation.

This would mean that the two structural factors have relevance in addressing the current situation, and the battle of ideas against jihadist ideology would also require identifying other structural factors specific to the context.

The parallel between the findings here with other researches also lend support to the pre-existing view held by scholars with regards to the role of precipitant events and powerful allies in a movement's mobilisation.

The positive implication of `Azzām's ideas and practices are that they may be used to discourage indiscriminate attacks, rebellions against the Muslim rulers, attacks against the enemies outside the conflict zone or in non-belligerent countries, and the use of terror tactics. His ideas in this regard and his practices during the Afghan jihad period were free from such excesses and could provide potent arguments in undermining contemporary jihadist ideas.

Chapter 6

`Azzām & beyond:

Insights for Current Counter-Jihadism Work

6.1 Introduction

The first chapter of this study provided the rationale and its relevance within the field of national security and the current threat of jihadist terrorism, giving this study both academic and practical value.

The second chapter provided the theoretical and historical foundation by offering a literature review on various jihad thoughts found among Muslims today, within which `Azzām's jihad ideas can be located.

The third chapter provided an in-depth descriptions of `Azzām's jihad ideas in order to verify his classical roots and militant inclinations.

The fourth and fifth chapters analysed `Azzām's jihad ideas. The former used framing to dissect the construction of the ideas and understand their dynamic interactions with various exogenous factors. The latter analysed the effect of the ideas on national and international security from the perspective of traditional strategic studies.

The study of `Azzām's jihad ideas and practices in the previous chapter have also revealed the following:

- Two of `Azzām's ideas have possible negative impacts on the national security of many non-Muslim countries and could potentially have serious repercussions on global security.

- Structural factors are also responsible for `Azzām's popularity and the proliferation of his ideas.
- `Azzām's ideas and practices may in fact have the potential to counteract current jihadist ideology and mitigate its security threat.

Despite focusing on `Azzām, this study also seeks to uncover lessons that would contribute to the existing work against jihadist groups.¹ In this regard, this final chapter will seek to address the above three findings and all other issues arising from this study with the objective of providing insights to delegitimise the current jihadist ideology and mitigate its threat to state and international security.

6.2 Issues Arising: Insights & Recommendations

6.2.1 Addressing `Azzām's ideas

The two ideas of `Azzām identified as possible security concerns at both state and global levels are: (1) the duty to wage *jihād al-talāb* against non-Muslim territories until they become part of *Dār al-Islām* or recognise the authority of *Dār al-Islām*, and (2) the duty to reclaim all lands that were historically part of *Dār al-Islām*.

These two ideas pose security concerns as they encourage hostilities toward non-Muslim states and governments. From the perspective of national security, where the stakes are high, understanding potentially threatening beliefs is important in order to pre-empt any hostility.

The importance of understanding beliefs in determining a leader's course of action or as causal mechanisms in international relations and foreign policy has been recognised, especially in studies on operational codes.² Stephen G. Walker and Mark Schafer write, "beliefs as subjective representations of reality" matter in the explanation of world politics in several ways not addressed well by

¹See Section 1.2.2 on "The importance of counter-ideology" in Section 1.2 on "Background to the study" in Chapter 1.

²Walker and Schafer (2006).

general international relations theories. From the cognitive theories perspective however, according to Walker and Schafer, belief can “operate as causal mechanisms independently of the realities... Instead of passively reflecting reality, they steer the decisions of leaders by shaping the leaders’ perception of reality, acting as mechanisms of cognitive and motivated bias that distort, block and recast incoming information from the environment... This role for beliefs is particularly likely when the environment is uncertain.... It is also very likely when new information does not fit with a leader’s pre-existing beliefs based on old information, stereotypes, or other cognitive biases associated with threats to vested interests, or aroused by strong emotions such as fear, anger, shame or hate.”³

It is important that these two ideas be addressed as they can also be found in the current strand of jihadism, especially that of Al-Qaeda’s. Thus, addressing these ideas has direct relevance and significance in countering contemporary jihadism and inoculating Muslims against it. Conceptually, this should be attempted by deconstructing, revisiting and reinterpreting classical works that had been the basis for ‘Azzām’s ideas. This process should be addressed by specialists and scholars of Islamic studies specialising in the study of jihad ideas with the ability to reconstruct new jihad ideas that are true to Islamic principles, suited to the existing environment and that address the security concerns identified in this study. The resulting work would be important in countering the jihadism that is currently being propagated among Muslims both in the real world and in cyberspace.⁴

In practice, however, the above process has already begun and is on-going. This is particularly so in reference to the idea of *jihād al-talāb* and the argument that underlies it (i.e., the abrogation of all previous revelations after the revelation of the verse in the ninth chapter of the Quran).⁵ The reformist strand of jihad has been mostly responsible in deconstructing, revisiting and reinterpreting

³ Walker and Schafer (2006); *Ibid.*, p. 239.

⁴ See Section 1.2.1 on “The threat of jihadist terrorism” in Section 1.2 on “Background to the study” in Chapter 1.

⁵ See Section 2.4 on “Reformist strand of jihad” in Chapter 2.

the idea of *jihād al-talāb* found in classical works long before the emergence of the current scourge of jihadist groups. Some of the prominent figures in this strand are Muḥammad `Abduh and Maḥmūd Shaltut, both were the Grand Shaykh of Al-Azhar, Sa`īd Ramaḍān Al-Būḥayy, and Yūsuf Al-Qaraḍāwīy whose work on the jurisprudence of jihad was recently published in 2009. A review on this strand has been made in Chapter 2.

An interesting development is the publishing of works by former Muslim militants who have renounced their violent ideology. These militants were from the Egyptian *Al-Jamā`ah Al-Islamīyah*, Egyptian *Al-Jihād* and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. They have produced more than 25 volumes of writings in which they review their previously held violent ideologies and criticise existing jihadist groups like Al-Qaeda.⁶

The reformists have offered three responses on the idea of *jihād al-talāb*. They assert that the jihad is defensive in character, and argue that there are no scriptural evidences to support the abrogation claim. They hold that verses on jihad cannot be interpreted in isolation. Instead these verses must be reconciled with other verses to produce a true understanding of jihad in Islam. In this respect, Muslim scholars have agreed that verses whose meanings are general and unconditional i.e., to wage jihad against all infidels, must be interpreted as conditional (i.e., to wage jihad against aggressors only). *Jihād al-talāb*, to them, contradicts the Islamic principles they uphold which is that the basis of relations between Muslims and non-Muslims is peace and that difference of faith is not a justification for jihad.⁷

Secondly, the reformists have sought to contextualise the classical strand in two ways: (1) understand the classical view within its historical context, (2) offer a modern understanding of them by tapping on other modern fields of study. On the former, they argue that views found in classical works were shaped by the constant wars between Muslims and non-Muslims (the Romans and the Persians) and the political culture then when war was the preferred means of

⁶ Ashour (2009).

⁷ Al-Shāṭibīy (1997); Al-Ghazālīy (1997); Al-Shawkānīy (1999).

solving conflicts between states. On the latter, some of them argue, based on the theories in the study of international relations, that the view was fundamentally a response to the prevailing anarchic international system. They offered the perspective of offensive realism, which holds that the anarchic international system provides strong incentives for states to continuously strive for maximum accumulation of power in relation to other states so as to guarantee its own hegemonic power. In doing so, states pursue expansionist policies when and where the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. A non-hegemonic power in an anarchic international system would be constantly concerned that other states would use force on it.⁸

Thirdly, the reformists stress upon the importance of understanding jihad in the light of the international conventions, which recognise self-defence as the only justification for war. It represents the reformist interpretation of what has been an ambiguous area in the works of traditional Islamic jurisprudence. Reformists argue that:

- the underlying values and principles of international law on war are similar to *fiqh* of jihad, which seeks to limit the destructive nature of war by imposing a code of conduct;
- the principles of Islamic jurisprudence recognise customs and conventions as secondary sources of law, and Muslim scholars are in agreement that the law should be tailored, adjusted and changed in accordance to in the context of time and place as long they do not contravene any principles of the *sharī'ah*;
- failure to abide by international conventions will put the Muslim states, communities and Islam itself in a negative light. Muslim states also risk being sanctioned, to the detriment of the *ummah*.⁹

In the conclusion of Chapter 2, it is noted that the reformist view of jihad is the dominant strand held by mainstream Muslims,

⁸Taliaferro (2000/2001).

⁹See An-Na'im (2006); Van Engeland (2008); Bouzenita (2007); Khadduri (1956); Westbrook (1992–1993); Hassan (2007).

and that Muslim scholars today are making serious and continuous efforts to revisit the classical viewpoint to suit the modern context. Thus, the dissemination of the reformist perspective among Muslims could potentially undermine jihadism. Also, tapping on the cultural stock and symbols prevalent among Muslims would give it greater resonance, especially when they are voiced through individual Muslim scholars such as Al-Qaraḍāwī, or collectively, as exemplified by the Mardin Conference¹⁰ and Amman Message¹¹ or via respected institutions such as the Al-Azhar University. Indeed, since the 9/11 attacks, the reformists have taken many initiatives in denouncing Al-Qaeda and jihadism. This, however, should not replace efforts to address the radicalisation of Muslim youth by jihadism given that the main structural factor, i.e., the continual “occupation” of Iraq and Afghanistan, remains.

However, the same cannot be said about the vision of reclaiming historically Muslim lands as a religious obligation. A review of various works on jihad, particularly from the reformist strand, reveals a puzzling lack of attempts to study, deconstruct or contextualise it. Muslim scholars have not responded to the militant strand's position on the issue of historical Muslim lands, neither have they attempted to reconcile the classical view on reclaiming

¹⁰The Mardin Conference was organised with the objective of revisiting the *fatwā* of Ibn Taymīyah, which has been used by jihadist groups to justify indiscriminate violence, rebellions against rulers and the ex-communication of fellow Muslims. The *fatwā* stated that it was permissible to attack the city of Mardin whose ruler and its defending army were Muslims but had submitted to rule of the Mongols who were based in Baghdad, with the objective of re-establishing Islamic authority. The *fatwā* permitted the sacrifice of Muslim civilians in the process as a matter of the lesser evil. The conference, attended by 15 reputable Muslim scholars from all over the world, declared that the use of this *fatwā* by jihadist groups has been erroneous and inappropriate in today's context. The conference also asserted that the classification of lands into *Dār Al-Islām* and *Dār Al-Ḥarb* should no longer be applicable today and that peace should be the basis of current international relations. See Introduction to the Mardin Conference and the Conference Declaration; Heneghan (2010).

¹¹The Amman Message was an initiative by King Abdullah II of Jordan and was endorsed by more than 200 Muslim scholars from all over the world, against the proliferation of jihadist *fatwā* in Muslim society. Declared on November 9, 2004, it emphasises the importance of the tolerance of differences, prohibition of *takfīr* and what constitute a legitimate *fatwā* for Muslims today.

occupied Muslim territories with the modern conception of the nation state.

It must be noted that the modern nation-state concept was a European solution to the wars that had plagued the continent for decades. It was realised through the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648 which brought an end to the dynastic competition and conflicts between the Protestant and Catholic communities of Europe.¹² As a result, Europe was divided into demarcated territories where the right of a prince to rule over the territory and the people living within it was recognised. This eventually led to the emergence of the modern concept of sovereign states.¹³

Although the Muslim world had not been free from internal wars, a multilateral settlement such as the Treaties of Westphalia or their equivalent had never occurred in Muslim history. Even during the period of multiple dynasties within the Muslim world, the idea of a unitary polity was still upheld.

The state system practiced in the Muslim world today had been introduced by the European colonialists as exemplified by the 1916 Sykes–Picot Agreement between France and the United Kingdom for the control of the Middle East, and the 1824 Anglo–Dutch Treaty of 1824 for the control of the Malay Archipelago. The system did not emerge out of the Muslim’s own tradition or initiative. Even today, a majority of the Muslim scholars are hopeful that all Muslim countries be reunited under a single polity. Hence, there has been little effort advanced into rethinking the configuration of the state system of the countries that had previously been part of Muslim territory.

The closest position has been that of An-Na`im within the reformist strand mentioned in Chapter 2. He suggests that, in view of the current context, the idea of jihad as “the unilateral use of force by Muslims in pursuit of political objectives and outside the institutional framework of international legality and the rule of law in general” should be abandoned. He seeks to fully assimilate

¹²See Bewes (1933); Croxton (1999); Raymond (2005).

¹³Croxton (1999).

Islamic jurisprudence of jihad into existing international law and reinterpret them through the contemporary framework of international law and the political system.¹⁴ However, this perspective only addresses the fundamentals of *jihād al-talāb* in order to prevent Muslims from waging wars against other states in the name of jihad. Accepting the current framework would only indirectly suggest that Muslims must forego the right to claim those lands historically under Muslim rule which are presently part of legitimate sovereign states. What has not been addressed are issues such as why militant jihad in this regard is considered wrong, why the classical view has to be reinterpreted with new perspectives, and why the current changes require new thinking. These are gaps in knowledge which should be addressed by scholars and relevant institutions in view of the current security concern arising from the ideology of jihadist groups.

6.2.2 *Leveraging counter-jihadism from `Azzām's ideas*

In reviewing `Azzām's writings,<sup>15</sup> it been has highlighted that `Azzām's jihad ideas and practices were significantly different from that of Al-Qaeda and its ilk. These differences provide opportunities to refute jihadist ideology and practices and to delegitimise them.

This study has proposed that counter jihadism work should be leveraged with elements of `Azzām's jihad ideas and practices which are in conflict with those of the jihadists. This can be done by highlighting the ideological differences to targeted audiences, especially, those who are in or are associated with jihadist circles.

The current jihadist groups and Al-Qaeda, in particular, have attempted to position themselves as descendants of the much-revered Afghan jihad to convince Muslims of their legitimacy. This has been observed by their use of stories of martyrs in pro-jihadist

¹⁴ An-Na'im (2006).

¹⁵ See Section 3.15 on "Commenting on `Azzām" in Chapter 3.

propaganda materials on their websites and forums¹⁶ and the prestige enjoyed by “the Afghan generation” within the Indonesian Jemaah Islamiyah.¹⁷

As the review of ‘Azzām’s jihad ideas and practices during the Afghan jihad period has revealed, the present jihadists have largely deviated from the practices of the first generation of foreign Muslim fighters in Afghanistan. Highlighting this disconnection would reveal the manipulative nature of the jihadists.¹⁸

In line with this, garnering the support of former Afghan jihad volunteers who have renounced Al-Qaeda’s ideology and the practices becomes equally important. Examples of these figures are Sayyid Imam Al-Sharif, a former ideologue of jihadism;¹⁹ Hudhaifah, son of ‘Abd Allāh ‘Azzām;²⁰ ‘Abd Allāh Anas, the former Arab aide of Ahmad Mas‘ūd and ‘Azzām’s son-in-law;²¹ Nu‘mān ibn ‘Uthmān (Noman Benotman), the former leader of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG);²² Nasir Abbas, the former leader of the Indonesian Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)²³ and Ali Imron, a senior member of JI and co-perpetrator of the first Bali Bombing in 2002.²⁴ These individuals are actively speaking up against Al-Qaeda. They have published many books and articles announcing their revisionist views on jihad and have made harsh criticisms of Al-Qaeda in the media. Some of them are directly involved in the rehabilitation and de-radicalisation process of incarcerated members of jihadist groups. However, more should be done.

Currently, access to revisionist materials is limited due to the language barrier. There is an urgent need to translate them from their original language into languages such as Indonesian, English,

¹⁶ See *azzam.com*.

¹⁷ International Crisis Group (2007).

¹⁸ *Ibid*.

¹⁹ Bakier (2007).

²⁰ Al-‘Arabīyah (2005). Interview with Hudhayfah, son of ‘Abd Allāh ‘Azzām, July 26.

²¹ Al-‘Arabīyah (2005). Interview with ‘Abd Allāh Anas, December 27; Al-‘Arabīyah (2006). Interview with ‘Abd Allāh Anas, January 2; See Anas (2002), p. 36.

²² See Abedin (2005); Cilluffo and Evert (2009).

²³ See Abas (2005); Abas (2007).

²⁴ See Imron (2007).

French, Russian, Urdu, Hindi and Pashto in order to reach out to the Muslim masses and jihadist communities. It must be noted that one of the key contributors to the spread of jihadism has been the accessibility to jihadist writings through the Internet, and the jihadist dedication to the translation of these writings to the languages of their target audience, especially English and Bahasa Indonesia.

The review of `Azzām's jihad ideas in Chapter 4 has revealed that most of his responses to criticism were directed to Muslims of the *salafīy* movement. His pre-occupation with the *salafīy* had been driven by his concern that their incessant censure of Afghan religious practices would affect Muslim support for the cause.

In a study of jihadist criticism of non-jihadist *salafīy*, Brynjar Lia, acknowledges `Azzām's difficulties by writing:

"There were significant differences in religious observances and practices between the Arab volunteers, many of whom were observant Salafis, and the Afghan resistance, who by and large observed the Hanafi school and were tolerant of Sufi shrines and other practices that Salafis regarded as godless 'innovatism' in Islam. This had been a problem during the first Arab-Afghan experience from the mid-1980s to c. 1992, and no less so during the 'second round' following the Taliban's seizure of power in 1996 until its downfall in late 2001."²⁵

A similar trend has also been found among current jihadists. Al-Zawāhirīy has had to dedicate extensive efforts in responding to Al-Sharīf's revisionist views and harsh criticisms against him and Al-Qaeda by publishing a book of more than 200 pages.²⁶ His letter to Al-Zarqāwīy indicates his sensitivity to the Muslim criticism of attacks made on Shiites, posting videos of beheadings and

²⁵ Lia (2009), p. 294.

²⁶ See Al-Zawāhirīy (Unpublished). *Al-Tabri'ah* (The Exoneration); Nefa Foundation (English Translation).

indiscriminate bombings.²⁷ Brynjar Lia also notes Abū Muṣ‘ab Al-Sūrīy’s pre-occupation with *salafīy*’s criticism of jihadists,²⁸ and his view that non-jihadist *salafīy* is the major stumbling block for jihadist objectives. Imam Samudra, the leader of the 2002 Bali Bombing and a member of the Indonesian JI, also criticised the *salafīy* movement in his published and unpublished works.²⁹

The effect of these ideological challenges posed by various segments of Muslims has been studied and will be elaborated upon in the following section.

‘Azzām’s jihad ideas and practices, in particular, and criticism by former “brothers-in-arms” and co-religionists of various strands, in general, carry significant value in discrediting and delegitimising jihadism among Muslims and those already within jihadist circles.

In Chapter 4, a major inconsistency in ‘Azzām’s ideas was highlighted. Specifically, it is the tension between the immediate need for all capable Muslims to join the jihad in Afghanistan regardless of their occupation, and the need for proper training in Islamic worldview, jurisprudence, rituals and ethics before joining jihad. The lack of such training could potentially lead to individuals that behave in ways that are counter-productive to jihad, such as carrying out banditry and other violations of the *sharī‘ah*.³⁰

Inconsistencies such as the above should be pointed out as evidence that ‘Azzām’s ideas are not divine imperatives. Rather, they were his personal interpretation of scriptural texts in response to the context that he was in. Being a product of human intellectual endeavour, the ideas should not be treated as definitive solutions, and thus should not be viewed as infallible.

The suggestion to capitalise on some of ‘Azzām’s ideas in order to counter contemporary jihadism should not be construed as an attempt to completely absolve him of militancy. Despite its militant

²⁷ See *Weekllystandard.com* (2005). English translation of Ayman Al-Zawahiri’s letter to Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, October 12.

²⁸ Lia (2009), pp. 281–289, 294–298.

²⁹ See Samudra (2009); Samudra (2008).

³⁰ See Section 4.6 on “Emerging inconsistencies” in Chapter 4.

bent, `Azzām's jihad ideas have the utility of being used to mitigate the appeal of current jihadism among Muslims and jihadists.³¹

6.2.3 *Not just ideas but also epistemology*

`Azzām was an adherent of salafism. Similarly, Al-Qaeda and most jihadist groups today subscribe to a particularly narrow subset of salafism. Their approach to jihad could be described as the classical methodology of *ijtihād* or deduction from the *Qur'ān* and the *ḥadīth* (Prophet's tradition) based primarily on three important sciences known as *Uṣūl Al-Fiqh*,³² *Uṣūl Al-Tafsīr*³³ and *Uṣūl Al-Ḥadīth*,³⁴ and an exhaustive study of classical texts to investigate their stand on pertinent issues. What differentiates them from other schools of Islam are: (1) the belief in the supremacy of the scriptural texts over rational thinking, (2) the belief in the supremacy of the literal meanings of the scriptures above other ways of interpretation, (3) the belief that the best approach in understanding the scriptures is through the lens of the best generations of Islam (i.e., the companions and those who follow their way), (4) deference to classical works which adhere to salafism without any attempts at reinterpretation, and (5) contempt towards those whom they perceive as non-*salafīy* such as the *ṣūfīy* and rationalists (those who base their ideas on Western philosophy and epistemology). `Azzām himself was noted to have disagreed with the *ṣūfīy*³⁵ and reformist on matters related to jihad.

³¹ See Section 5.5 on "Conclusion" in Chapter 5.

³² The Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence. It has been defined as "methods by which the rules of *fiqh* are deduced from their sources." See Kamali (1991), p. 1. See also Al `Alwani (1990).

³³ Also known as *Ulūm Al-Qur'ān*. It is the science of the interpretation of the *Qur'ān*. See Al-Suyūfī, JA (no date cited). *Al-Itqān Fī 'Ulūm Al-Qur'ān* (The perfect guide to the sciences of the Qur'ān), Vol. 1, pp. 1–8; Al-Zarqānī, MAA (no date cited). *Manāhil Al-'Irfān Fī 'Ulūm Al-Qur'ān* (Source book for sciences of the Qur'ān), Vol. 1, pp. 23, 24.

³⁴ Also known as *Muṣṭalah Al-Ḥadīth*. It is the science in the study of *ḥadīth*. Its objective is to determine the authenticity of a *ḥadīth* and how rulings can be deduced from it. See Al-Khaṭīb (1989); Esposito (1995), p. 84.

³⁵ `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Fī Al-Jihād: Fiqh Wa Ijtihād (Fiqh and Ijtihād in jihad)*, p. 33; `Azzām, AA (date not cited). *Al-As'ilah Wa Al-Ajwibah Al-Jihādīyah (Questions and Answers on Jihad)*, p. 17.

Thus, it could be argued that not only is it important to understand the actual jihad ideas of `Azzām and the current jihadism but also the epistemology from which these ideas were constructed. It should be recognised that anything that is not from the *salafīy* would not be effective when challenging or engaging with the jihadists and their circles. Based on this, the following points become important in confronting jihadists at an ideological level: (1) jihadists belong to a distinct segment of Muslims, (2) any ideological challenge that targets jihadists and their circle is best constructed with their *salafīy* approach to religious issues in mind, and (3) criticisms from fellow *salafīy* poses more serious challenges to jihadists.

6.2.4 Promoting debates among jihadists and between jihadists and others

Thus far, the following has been suggested to counter jihadism:

- Using the reformist jihad viewpoint to counter jihadism among the Muslim masses,
- Using some of `Azzām's jihad ideas and practices against members of the jihadist circles,
- Using former militants' revisionist views against those of the jihadist circles, and
- Using *salafīy* critique and epistemology for the construction of theological refutation of jihadism against those of the jihadist circles.

In mitigating the threat of jihadism, the above suggestions should also promote debate among jihadists, and between them and others. This would bring about significant benefit. One is the creation of a marketplace of ideas within jihadist circles. This, would, to some degree, distract jihadist resources and cause division among them.

In Omar Ashour's study on the de-radicalisation of jihadist groups involving the Egyptian Muslim Brothers, *Al-Jihād*, *Al-Jamā`ah Al-Islamīyah*, the Algerian Armed Islamic Group, Islamic Salvation Army and Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat, he concludes that social interaction is one of four important variables

in disengaging Muslim militant groups from violence to participating in previously denounced civil activities. He describes two dimensions of interaction. One is external interaction which occurs between jihadist and “any social actor or entity who/which does not belong to the same ideological camp.” The other is internal interaction that takes place “between the leadership, the mid-ranking commanders and the grassroots” of jihadist groups.³⁶

After studying the groups, Ashour concludes that social interactions that facilitate exchanges of ideas with non-jihadists in combination with the other variables³⁷ will effect the transformation of jihadists' ideology, albeit to different degrees. The interaction affects both the followers and leaders. For the former, the effect is limited because it may not necessarily bring about the de-radicalisation of the group. However, it still contributes to reducing the number of the group's members and creating factions among them. For the latter, he writes,

“Deradicalization efforts are much likely to become successful when they originate from within the organization. Thus, internal interaction between a leadership supportive of deradicalization and its followers is crucial, especially for containing opposition to the process. For example in the IG's [Egyptian Al-Jemaah Al-Islamiyah]... many of the followers did not support the process except after meeting with their “historical leadership” and intensely debating the “theological legitimacy” as well as the costs and benefits of deradicalization.”³⁸

According to Ashour, the subsequent interactions between the leadership of the de-radicalised *Al-Jamā'ah Al-Islamiyah* with other leaders had resulted in the de-radicalisation of the Egyptian *Al-Jihād* and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.

³⁶ Ashour (2009), p. 15.

³⁷ The other variables identified by Ashour are: (1) state repression, (2) selective inducement, and (3) charismatic militant leadership. See Ashour (2009), p. 14–16, 137–141.

³⁸ Ashour (2009), p. 140.

This is where all governments, Muslim and non-Muslim, can play their part to promote and facilitate debate and contribute to the creation of a marketplace of ideas. The marketplace of ideas on the issue of jihad would challenge the worldview of jihadism and its underlying Islamism. This would also generate the culture of critical thinking, promote the re-evaluation of old ideas and deglamourise jihadist groups like Al-Qaeda.³⁹

Heather S. Gregg reports that in Saudi Arabia, through the *Al-Sakīnah* program, the very act of drawing extremists into dialogue and debating their ideas with religious scholars and former jihadists has opened the opportunity for alternative viewpoints and promoted a “middle way” between extremism and secularism.⁴⁰

6.2.5 *Multi-disciplinary approach to the study of jihad*

The previous section has reiterated the need to support and strengthen the reformist jihad ideas so as to inoculate Muslims against jihadism. There is also a need for reformist scholars to respond to `Azzām’s *fatwā* that jihad is *farḍ* `ayn until all historically Muslim territories have been reclaimed.

In view of these two points, it is thus important to promote a multi-disciplinary approach to the study of jihad at traditional Muslim institutes of learning such as *madrasah*⁴¹ and *pesantren*⁴² as well as at universities.

Currently, this process has only been observed at Western universities within the study of Islam or related disciplines such as international relations. Most traditional Muslim institutions

³⁹ Gregg (2010); Bartlett, Birdwell and King (2010).

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 310. See the Al-Sakīnah program’s official website. Available at <http://en.assakina.com>.

⁴¹ *Madrasah* is an Arabic word which originally means school. However, it is widely used by non-Arab Muslims for school that is dedicated for the study of Islam and its related disciplines.

⁴² *Pesantren* also means an Islamic school similar to *madrasah*. However, it is popularly used in Indonesia.

of learning still rely heavily, or solely, on classical works. Even the reformist texts used in comparison with the classical works are largely rooted in traditional Islamic jurisprudence. There is little comparison with modern international law, far from being integrated to it. The study of other disciplines such as international relations in order to understand different perspectives is rare.

These initiatives must be taken by Muslims themselves so as to avoid the perception of colonialism by Western intellectuals. However, non-Muslims can play a part by objectively engaging Muslim leaders and scholars.

In addition, a few other suggestions can be made;

- to produce more Muslim scholars of traditional backgrounds specialising in jihad from a multi-disciplinary perspective by offering scholarships;
- to encourage research that seeks to integrate traditional jihad studies with international law, and a multi-disciplinary approach to the study of jihad in Muslim institutions of learning; and
- to encourage platforms for Muslim scholars of various backgrounds to revisit the view of traditional jihad with the purpose of adapting it to modern contexts. An example is the Mardin Conference of 2010 which brought together 15 scholars to review Ibn Taymīyah's *fatwā*, thereby producing a resolution to abandon the categorisation of lands into *Dār Al-Islām* and *Dār Al-Ḥarb*, and accept peace as the basis of relations between Muslim and non-Muslims.

With the existence of more human capital (multi-disciplinary specialists on jihad), efforts to reach out to Muslims and Muslim students, reformulate the *fiqh al-jihād* (jurisprudence of jihad) curriculum studied at traditional Islamic learning institutions, revisit the traditional interpretations of jihad and encourage debate on this topic among Muslims may all be facilitated more effectively.

6.2.6 Addressing non-ideational structural factors

Addressing `Azzām's two ideas as discussed above is important due to their security ramifications and the effects they may have in radicalising individuals. But, as noted also in the previous chapter, the ideas were not solely responsible in effecting mobilisation and the proliferation of `Azzām's militant jihad. There were also non-ideational structural factors involved as verified by many other studies. Hence, efforts to address threats arising from jihadist ideology should also address the structural factors that contribute to the appeal and spread of these ideas.

The previous chapter has identified the two structural factors as: (1) the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 which provided justification for `Azzām's jihad mobilisation, and (2) powerful allies in the form of political elites, major powers and existing religious institutions that had provided assistance to `Azzām's jihad mobilisation efforts, directly or indirectly.

The first factor is consistent with findings by various studies on political violence while the second factor is supported by the resource mobilisation and political opportunity theories within the study of social movements.

The first factor also has direct relevance in addressing the threat of jihadism and its proliferation today. Studies of the process of radicalisation have highlighted the significance of the war in Iraq and, to a lesser extent, Afghanistan in radicalising Muslim youths to join the jihad effort and plot attacks against foreign military powers in both countries. Farhad Khosrokhavar in his book *Inside Jihadism* also comes to the same conclusion after analysing the spread of jihadism among Muslims in the West.⁴³ Sageman suggests that the removal of the American forces in Iraq, among other initiatives, is "absolutely essential if the United States wants to counter al-Qaeda propaganda" and to extinguish "the sense of moral outrage" among Muslims.⁴⁴ The same suggestion is also

⁴³ Khosrokhavar (2009), pp. 220, 223, 230, 284.

⁴⁴ Sageman (2007), pp. 154, 155.

found in the National Intelligence Estimate report *Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States*.⁴⁵

In 2006, the Pew Global Attitudes project surveyed Muslim perceptions of and attitudes to the image of the United States and its policies. Comparing with its first survey data in 2002, the project reported:

- Since the inception, “our surveys have documented the rise of anti-Americanism around the world, and especially in predominantly Muslim countries.” Seven out of eight people surveyed viewed the United States unfavourably.
- “Anti Americanism is largely driven by aversion to United States policies such as *the war in Iraq*, the war on terrorism, and the United States support for Israel.” [emphasis added].
- “Anti-Americanism worsened in the Mideast in response to the war in Iraq — but it soared among Muslims in other parts of the world that previously did not view the United States poorly — notably in Indonesia and Nigeria.”⁴⁶

Similarly, the January 2009 Gallup reported that Muslims in the Middle East and North Africa felt that the United States’ withdrawal from Iraq would improve Muslim perception and address their grievances toward the United States.⁴⁷

War creates grievances worldwide, similar to those seen during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and it also creates the opportunity for jihad mobilisation and the development of decentralised jihad operations outside conflict zones. When Muslim grievances meet with jihadist worldviews and frames, radicalisation and opportunities for jihad mobilisation is facilitated again.⁴⁸ Khosrokhavar writes, “it is clear from a review of extremist material and interviews that militants are seeking to appeal to young American and

⁴⁵ Office of the Director of National Intelligence (2006).

⁴⁶ Pew Global Attitudes Project (2006).

⁴⁷ Gallup (2009).

⁴⁸ Gartensein-Ross and Grossman (2009), p. 53; Noricks (2009), pp. 34–36; Halmus (2009), pp. 89, 90; Rabasa *et al.* (2004), pp. 128–139, 171, 172, 282–286, 317, 318, 405–408; Bartlett, Birdwell and King (2010), pp. 25, 26, 29, 30, 34.

European Muslims by playing on their anger over the war in Iraq and the image of Islam under attack.”⁴⁹ Based on the study, he argues that the withdrawal of foreign military forces from Muslim countries will have a direct impact in mitigating the current threat of jihadists. A quick resolution to the wars, while ensuring the stability of countries involved is imperative to avoid security problems at local, regional and international levels.

Until then, efforts must be made to offer an alternative narrative to the current quagmire. The experience in Iraq has proven that critical segments of Iraqis could be won over against Al-Qaeda. The Awakening Movement, which comprises of local tribal leaders and insurgent groups, have been persuaded that Al-Qaeda is the enemy of Iraqis and that there is greater good in collaborating with the foreign military forces.⁵⁰

The United States had successfully rallied the international community against jihadist terrorism after the 9/11 attacks. Various laws, regimes and conventions have been established at international and state level.⁵¹ The result is that contemporary jihadists are not experiencing the same structural support they enjoyed during the Soviet–Afghan war.

However, the regimes put in place do not make the second structural factor — powerful allies — totally irrelevant. Limited but significant allies still exist, allowing the perpetuation of jihadist threat.

In the war in Iraq, the structural factor exists in the form of neighbouring states with vested interests in opposing the United States. They provide direct or indirect support to jihadist groups operating there. Direct support may take the form of the provision of training, finance, materials, safe havens and volunteers for jihadist groups, while indirect support may be in the form of interference in the internal affairs of Iraq in order to affect instability and creating

⁴⁹ Khosrokhavar (2009), p. 286.

⁵⁰ Kilcullen (2009), pp. 158–176; Ahmed (2008); Bruno (2009).

⁵¹ Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom (2005); Samydarai (2003); *Singapore Journal of Legal Studies* (2002); *Jurist Legal Intelligence* (2003).

permissive environments for jihadist groups to operate. One important state, in this regard, is Iran as observed by many researchers.⁵² As for Afghanistan, these structures are in the form of elements within the Pakistani government and military, tribal societies bordering Afghanistan and radical religious institutions.⁵³

Perceiving itself being encircled by the United States from Iraq and Afghanistan located at its western and eastern borders respectively. Iran has been providing support, directly and indirectly, to insurgents and jihadist groups operating in both countries so as to inflict harm on the United States and its allies. Its geo-strategic ambition to be a major power in the region also means that it would seek to be actively involved in both countries with the intent of shaping its future in alignment with its ambition. Admittedly, Shiite Iran has no love for Sunni jihadist groups in Iraq and Afghanistan; notwithstanding this, its pragmatism, as exemplified by its support of Hamas and meddling in the affairs of both countries with the aim of undermining the coalition forces, do contribute to a permissive environment for jihadist groups to sustain their struggle and survive.⁵⁴

Addressing the issue of Iran's and, to a lesser extent, Pakistan's support for jihadist groups is beyond the scope of this study as it would necessitate a strategic, domestic and foreign relations analysis. Nonetheless a comprehensive policy in addressing the above two problems and other possibly similar structural factors is imperative to the mitigation of the threat of jihadism.

In conclusion, prolonged war in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the continued existence of structural factors will limit the effect of any attempt to counter and delegitimise jihadist ideology. Counter-ideology, despite its importance and centrality in counter-terrorism strategy, is not and cannot be the silver bullet against jihadism. Its success and effectiveness are dependent on other aspects of counter-terrorism.

⁵² Wehrey *et al.* (2010).

⁵³ Cordesman (2009), p. 21; Amin (2000); Ollapally (2008); Nawaz (2009).

⁵⁴ Rabasa *et al.* (2004).

6.3 Conclusion

Six important points can be derived from this chapter. Firstly, the importance placed by `Azzām on ideology for jihad mobilisation is shared by current jihadist groups and confirmed through the works of former jihadists. All of them expended significant effort and resources on ideological work. Based on this and many other studies on the role of ideology in radicalising individuals, it is thus prudent to incorporate counter-ideology as a central component to counter-terrorism. However, the role of structural factors highlighted in the previous chapter and addressed in this chapter suggests that countering the ideology, while important and central in counter-terrorism, is not sufficient to mitigate the threat of jihadism.

There may be other factors involved, but it is not within the scope of this study to identify all of them. It is sufficient to conclude here that it remains critical for counter-terrorism work to adopt a multi-dimensional or multi-faceted approach that would address the ideational and non-ideational structural factors.⁵⁵

Secondly, counter-terrorism work must adopt a differentiated approach in countering jihadism. It must target specific jihadist ideas that have direct impact on security so as to set priorities and allocate resources. This study has identified two of `Azzām's ideas, i.e., the duty to wage *jihād al-talab* against non-Muslim territories until they become part of *Dār Al-Islām* or recognise the authority of *Dār Al-Islām*, and the duty to reclaim all territories that were historically part of *Dār Al-Islām*. These ideas have to be addressed and the inherent inconsistencies in `Azzām's ideas should be exploited to mitigate their appeal.

Counter-terrorism work must also differentiate between ordinary Muslims and radicals, and between the non-violent and violent radicals. Again, this differentiation will help in prioritisation and focus. More importantly, engaging former militants with *salafiy* leanings to critique jihadism as suggested by this study can only be

⁵⁵ See Jones (2008), pp. 5–9, 27, 28, 162–170.

achieved if the differences are recognised and a differentiated approach is adopted. Indeed, this was ‘Azzām’s approach to jihad mobilisation as seen from the use of two different frames.

Thirdly, is the recognition that Muslims of different backgrounds must work together in countering jihadism. They include scholars of different orientations (i.e., reformist, traditionalist, *ṣufi* and non-violent radical, Islamist and *salafī*), community leaders that could reach out to various segments of the community and disseminate the message. There is also a need to involve institutions of higher learning and Muslim institutions for research work and to rethink traditional jihad ideas. Instead of looking at the moderate-extremist dichotomy, a better consideration is between those who are pro-violence and those who are against violence, even if the latter involves some radical individuals.

This does not necessarily mean that the problem of radicals should be overlooked. However, a prudent policy must differentiate “radicalisation that leads to violence and radicalisation that does not, they should be dealt with distinctly and accordingly”. The latter should be tackled as social or political problems, “not as a ‘subset’ of the al-Qaeda threat.”⁵⁶

Fourthly, understanding epistemology is as important as understanding the intricacies of ideas for effective counter argument. Based on the above third and fourth point, counter-arguments from different approaches (i.e., *salafī*, reformist and traditionalist), to religious issues must be developed to suit different target audiences.

Fifthly, alternatives must be promoted to create a marketplace of ideas that would promote challenges to jihadism.

Sixthly, based on the potential of a marketplace of ideas in challenging jihadism, and the effect of interactions between jihadists and non-jihadists on de-radicalisation and disengagement as pointed out by this study, it is then concluded that the principal approach to countering jihadism is not through the

⁵⁶ Bartlett, Birdwell and King (2010), p. 38.

policy of repression of expression but through a liberal attitude to dissent, disagreement and contestation. A study on radicalisation entitled *The Edge of Violence: A Radical Approach to Extremism* reports:

“... the best way to fight radical ideas is with a liberal attitude to dissent, radicalism and disagreement. This can de-mystify and de-glamourise terrorism without alienating large numbers of people. However — a liberal approach depends on independent voices setting out forceful counter-arguments against extremist ideas... silencing radical views must be considered as a last option because banning radical voices will neither prove effective nor lessen their appeal in the long term. Instead, government and non-government agencies — including Muslims — must set out counter arguments as to why particular radical or extremist ideas are wrong.”⁵⁷

A realistic approach to extremism is to ensure it remains on the fringes of society, and not to totally eliminate it. Repressive policies would only force these ideas underground and compound the problem.

This study is not only beneficial in understanding and addressing the problem of `Azzām’s militant jihad ideas but also the problems of contemporary jihadism today.

The use of Snow *et al.*’s framing model and the broader social movement lens have been very useful in understanding the construction of `Azzām’s jihad ideas through its dynamic relations with factors exogenous to his cognitive domain. They have contributed to a more contextual and nuanced understanding of `Azzām and the key conclusion that can be made here is that `Azzām’s jihad ideas were not the product of a pure academic endeavour or a work of theology alone, but had sought to interpret the scripture in order to inform his audiences on jihad in Islam.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 37, 39.

Based on Peters' review of jihad works in Islam, `Azzām's jihad ideas fall under the mobilising genre, similar to Ibn Taymīyah's work on jihad, which had sought to mobilise Muslims against the Mongols. Works of this genre had served the purpose of mobilising Muslims for armed jihad in response to specific well-defined political situations. It is different from other known genres such as: (1) instructional genre, which is characteristically academic, written with the primary objective of providing religious guidance and rulings on jihad for Muslims; (2) reformist genre that seeks to reconcile jihad with international law or compare jihad with the just-war theory or refute the idea that Islam was spread by the sword; and (3) combination of mobilising and instructional genres published to jolt Muslims from their slumber but not necessarily in response to any specific political situation.

Although a mobilising genre may not be necessarily wrong in its content, its identification helps in putting the jihad ideas in its proper perspective. In addition to the fact that it is a product of human intellectual endeavour, which is not infallible, correct genre identification restricts universality. Identifying and highlighting this fact to the public will inform them not only about the accurate understanding of the idea but also the limit of its applicability across time and space. From a counter-ideology perspective, this would help in responding to any misunderstanding or misapplication of jihad among Muslims.

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